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Abstract
	
!	 The clients of a meteorological consulting firm, not initially
receiving satellite data, were studied to determine the effects of
weather forecasts on their operations. Specifically, we intended to show
	
R	 whether, satellite data aided the forecasters, and produced savings for
the clients. We determined what weather conditions triggered certain
operational decisions for 131 clients responding to our questiontion-
naires, representing governmental bodies, gas and electric utilities,
feel oil dealers, commodities dealers, marine and constructicn interests.
Then, using actual forecasts over a two year period, we calculated the
monetary losses incurred as a result of incorrect forecasts for over 50
of these clients. The results generally show losses in the thousands of
dollars for each erroneous forecast. Thus, if the weather service is able
	
+	 to prevent even one set of poor decisions based on a forecast, the cost of
the service would be returned and in many cases greatly exceeded. Other
effects of the clients' use of the forecast are discussed qualitatively.
	
9	 These include non-monetary gains to the clients and their customers through
increased convenience, easier planning, and fewer breakdowns in service.
At least some clients fail to realize these advantages through inefficient
	
I	 use of the forecast.
Beginning with the third year of the study, the meteorological con-
sulting firm was given the means to receive real-time satellite data, and
incorporated it into their forecast procedures. In addition to just viewing
the GOES-TAP images, they were able to loop, enhance and navigate them,
track clouds, determine cloud heights, and combine the satellite images
with conventional data. Through their McIDAS (Man Computer Interactive
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Data Access System) they could also plot, and analyze surface and upper air
	
9	 data.
After a year, we repeated the process of calculating monetary losses
as a result of incorrect forecasts. Thi; time the forecasts were prepared
with the aid of satellite data. Unfortunately, because the weather events
during that year were so benign, we were not able to arrive at figures
comparable to those for the control period.
	
*	 The significance of the value of satellite data varied with the type
of operation involved:
Marine clients - The satellite data was extremely valuable in
	
1P	 identifying and tracking convective systems and determining
their characteristics;
Storm forecasting - The satellite data aided in locating and tracking
	
6	 storms, especially in oceanic areas;
Temperavire and Weather forecasting - Here, the satellite had the
least impact, though it was some help in temperature forecasts
in regions of cloud cover; and
Commodities - It was essential for analyzing South American weather.
The satellite data was of most use when it could be looped to show
evolving cloud patterns, and enhanced to show brightness differences. The
grids that are supplied with the GOES-TAP images were often inaccurate;
when the images were looped, they were very distracting. The economic valuei
of the satellite data to the consulting firm was at a minimum, several
hundred dollars per month (the cost of maintaining the GOES-TAP line, an
	
i	
additional data source was not in their plans prior to the experiment).
ii
V
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6Our main conclusions are as follows:
(1) Satellite data, while most useful in data poor areas, serves to
fine tune forecasts in data rich areas. 	 It consequently has a
resulting significant economic benefit because, as previously-
stated, even one improved forecast per client per year can save
each client thousands of dollars. 	 Multiply this by several
hundred clients and the dollar savings are sizeable.
(2) The great educational value which experience with satellite data
gives undoubtedly leads to improved forecasts.
(3) This study lays the important foundation for future work in
C this area.	 More studies of this type should be undertaken for
longer periods of time to smooth out the unreliability of the
weather.
(4) Any type of future satellite data delivery system should take
into account the needs and facilities of the user community to
make it most useful.
C
Finally, we have shown that it is possible, using real data in actual
situations, to determine the economic impact of a new tool and the ways
it can be used to bring about greater public benefits.
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01. Introduction
a. Background
The purpose of this report is to document a four year research program
carried out by the University of Wisconsin Space Science and Engineering
Center aimed at exploring the economic benefits of meteorological satellite
data to a variety of users of weather information.
Historically, weather forecasting received its first big technical
advance with the invention of the telegraph which made rapid collection
of weather data possible. Later, the critical dependence of air transpor-
tation upon weather factors in the first half of the twentieth century
brought about a significant increase in the weather data collected and
reported by government agencies. During this same period the public
became accustomed to general weather forecasts produced by the Weather
Bureau, but largely dispensed by the privately controlled media--both
printed and electronic.
By ' mid century, radiosonde networks were established for more adequate
C	 upper air coverage. The last half of the century--from the 60's onward--
has been marked by the development of earth satellites and remote sensing
methods suitable for weather satellites. Meteorological satellites and
the data they produce have changed greatly from the TIROS of the 1960's
to the sophisticated GOES, NIMBUS, and NOAA satellites of today. Over a
period of only 15 years, the technical capabilities of these systems have
increased and improved to such an extent that data processing and utilization
techniques simply have not kept pace.
The volume of the data involved in storing and editing satellite
9	 images dwarfs that coming from conventional sources, often cramping
IW°
0
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available apace and time allowances. In addition much remains to be
learned about how best to obtain use.ful information from these images once
they are made available for viewing and manipulation. While many advances
have been made in these problem areas, these techniques are not yet generally
available to the forecaster. This is caused in part because the maintenance
of a weather satellite system entails considerable expense.
There are however other factors which account for the slow acceptance
c>	 of this new technology. Often, the formative experience is with the product
in its early stages, when its capabilities are limited and its application
not well understood. As a result, the true value of the new tool may not
C
	
be widely appreciated. Although meteorological satellites have evolved
greatly, adequate utilization techniques are still being developed. Lackit ►g
a demonstration of the value of direct application of satellite data, verb
C
	
few private firms were willing to invest the capital required, or to Under-
take the additional operating expense to acquire more than twice daily
GOES images transmitted over the FAX lines when this program began. This
C
	
situation is gradually changing. Up to now private forecast operations
have been labor intensive. However, the decreasing relative cost of
hardware will soon make investment in computing equipment feasible. Since
C	 the same equipment might be used to reduce the labor of processing and
charting conventional data as well as satellite based data, the adoption of
high technology is probably imminent.
Before this can happen however, there must be some way of assessing
at least tentatively the possible benefits of such system versus its
prospective cost. The problems encountLred in arriving at an objective
and reliable assessment of tl;<< effectiveness of the meteorological satellite
a	
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programs and of their value to the nation are many, and very difficult to
handle. For example: Satellite data, radar, surface observations,
rawinsonde data, aircraft observations, and so forth are all melded to
produce a forecast. Bence, the value of the contribution of any single
data source is extremely difficult to isolate. Furthermore, the parameters
which are featured in the general purpose forecast may not be the ones
important to a specific economic activity. To accommodate such needs,
special purpese forecasts have been developed: bog temperatures for
cranberry growers, winds aloft and significant weather for aviation,
marine forecasts plus several others, a few of which are discussed by
t	 Hussay and Heacock (1978) in the context of satellite data.
Despite these problems, we found a convenient way to approach the
problem of forecast value or utility by studying the relationship of a
private meteorological forecasting service and its clients. These firms
have arisen because many, if not most, ,jobs are sensitive to both weather
and weather information either directly or indirectly. As business and
governmental concerns become more aware of how weather affects their
personnel, equipment, and timetables, they desire to control these effects
Ps much as possible (Collins, 1956). Meteorological information specially
tailored to the needs of both the public and private sectors of the
economy has now become increasingly in demand. As industrial and business
operations generally become more efficient, well-planned, and technical in
C	 nature, small environmental changes have become of obvious importance to
the overall success of an operation (see World Meteorological Organization,
1968; Maunder, 1970; and Taylor, 1970). Because these needs are not
9	 always fully met by the general or special forecasts available to the
10
i
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public, and because managers and planners perceive a monetary value in
specialited information, meteorological consulting firms have been
1	 established. (Some larger firms have also engaged in in-house forecasting.)
The clients, or end users, of thess private weather services are
identifiable, as are the uses of the meteorological information they
receive. The clients' applications of the forecast are usually associated
with economic factors--dollar savings--which motivate the client to pay
for the service. Because the forecasts cost them money, and because they
potentially yield benefits, we expected the clients to be more aware of
the quality of service they received, and to be more motivated to cooperate
in a research program whose ultimate outcome might improve these forecasts.
These factors encouraged us to focus on the application of GOES images by
one meteorological consulting firm, and the resulting economic benefit to
t	 their clients--a representative sample of the potential economic benefits
of meteorological satellites. Since little use had been made of satellite
data by the cooperating firm prior to this study, we have taken advantage
of the possibility of a before- and after-the-introduction-of-satellite-
data comparison wh I -ti will greatly aid in understanding the role of the
satellite data in the mixture of radar, surface observations, radiosonde,
aircraft observations and other data that are eventually combined in a
given forecast.
_	 b. Consulting firm operations
f
The task of the meteorological consulting firm is to provide technical
information to meet the client's needs, which, because of their highly
detailed and specialized nature are not, or cannot, be met by the National
Weather Service. Consulting meteorology covors many diverse areas, providing
4
Mom-
`
	
	
meteorological advice and information on instrum(mtation, weather modification,
advertising and marketing, statistical analyses, surveys and field studies,
data processing, legal matters, and radio and television programing, as
well as short- and long-term forecasting for various business and industrial
C	
operations.
The National Weather Service (NWS) and the Federal Aviation Administration
are the consulting firm's basic sources of data. Facsimile machines repro-
{	 duce NWS maps and analyses. Teletypewriter circuits from the Federal Aviation
Administration supply hourly surface and upper-air synoptic data from most
North American stations. Satellite data are becoming more widely used.
Pictures in facsimile format from government transmission lines can provide
satellite data as often as every half hour in the visible and infrared
channels. Radar information can be obtained even more frequently (up to
every S minutes) from certain NWS stations in the United States by means
of a dial-up facsimile system.
The flow of weather information can be briefly represented as in
Fig. 1. This report primarily considers the change in economic benefit
to the user/client group (bottom box in the figure) due to the use of
newer satellite based technology for part of the dats collection (top
box in the chart). For reasons to be considered in more detail below, we
have concentrated on the information path through the consulting firm and
will not extensively consider the impact of public, or media forecasts
(see Fig. 1).
At present the organization and facilities of meteorological consulting
firms vary conside&,sbly (Myers and Cahir, 1971; Wallace, 1971; and
Hallanger, 1963). There is no minimum standard to which they must conform.
The American Meteorological Society has a Certified Consulting Meteorologist
9
DATA COLLECTION
chiefly by government
agencies, NWS,FAA etc.
I
^s
NATIONAL WEATHER
SERVICE PROCESSING
Model runs, general
forecasts, and other products
THE CONSULTING FIRM
MEDIA
Print media, radio, television
THE PUBLIC I	 I USER/CLIENT
FIGURE 1.
Data from current weather observations gathered by government agencies, is
_	 available to the consulting firm in near "real time" by telecommunications
(denoted by 1 above.) Similarly, 2 indicates rapid availability of maps,
charts, and text pertaining to operationally processed data and forecasts
by telecommunication.
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(CCH) program consisting of certain professional and ethical standards
to which a member must adhere; asany,consulting meteorologists operate
with this certification. There are however, other eompetent note-
urologists in consulting who are not CCMs simply because they have not
felt the need to go through the process of applying for certification.
c. Purpose and initial Man of program
In our program we proposed to by pass the economic effects of the
actual weather, and examine the effects of the forecasts, and thereby the
effects of satellite technology, on the accuracy and timeliness of the
forecasts. The value of any meteorological service is very difficult to pin
down. David Atlas (1975) described the problem well:
Another difficulty, when discussing atmospheric
science and its value, is that so little has been
done to appraise the value of present and potential
at*^spheriv science applications. Changnon and others
have suggested the need for socio-economic studies
of such potent.Lal benefits. The importance of such
studies cannot be overemphasized, nor should their
hazards be minimized....
The last statement needs to be elaborated. Most past cost-
effectiveness and socio-economic studies fall into the category that
Atlas calls "what if" studies. An assumption is made, and the consequences
of that assumption are then calculated and reported. Obviously, at best,
these studies are only as good as their beginning hypothesis. Again,
Atlas states:
.....Unless accompanied by realistic appraisals of what
capabilities are realistic to expect, "what if" studies
may merely give the impression that we are more confident
of reaching the capability than we have any right to
be. Again, we are raising premature expectations.
In order to determine the value of meteorological satellite data in
-8
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a realistic way we planned the following program in five steps:
i ! 1. Find an established private weather service with a variety
of clients, in which meteorological satellite data has not
been used, but for whose services it would be valuable.
C	 2. Establish and document the csrrent weather service supplied
to the clients and establish a quantitative measure of the
value of that service.
3. Develop, jointly with the operators of the private weather
service, the facilities and techniques required to supply
them with meteorological satellite data in the mode most
likely to increase the value of the service to the clients.
4. Install and activate the meteorological satellite data
capability in the operator's place of business.
5. After a suitable period, establish a quantitative measure of
value of the augmented service.
Prior analogous studies have centered on the consequences of alternate
decisions (e.g., Thompson, 1972); we have used actual forecasts, outcomes,
and consequences to examine some clients who are typically served by the
private consultant in terms of their weather-sensitive operations, their
use of the forecast, and the benefits--economic or otherwise--gained from
such use. One reason for choosing this area of concentration is that the
effects of the consultation are more easily quantifiable. Forecasts are
typically issued on a routine basis, thus allowing the collection of an
adequate data sample, and these forecasts are applied to specific practical
problems about which a decision must be made, usually in a relatively short
period of time (hours, or at most, days). Such decisions as, for example,
0
those made by a city department responsible for plowing snow, have direct
economic consequences. Another reason for addressing the area of operational
forecasting has been our experience that this function of meteorological
consulting is not well understood by the public and in some cases by the
C
client users themselves. We hope to clarify the relationship between the
service the consulting firm provided and the uses to which such information
was put by the user in actual circumstances.
in summary, we chose a "before and after" approach. A private con-
sulting firm and its clients are suitable for this approach because they
form a relatively closed system, because at the start of the program they
were making little explicit use of satellite data, because with their
active cooperation we could learn how the data were used. Further as
^-	 suppliers of the data, we could control the data to some degree. Access
to the firm's forecast records was expected to give detailed information on
forecast accuracy and timing. As noted above, public forecasts already
incorporate satellite data to some degree, but it seemed unlikely that we
could effect a change of NWS operations that would materially affect the
fraction of satellite data in the mixture to the degree that this would
be possible with a cooperating private firm. In the case of the private
forecaster, locations of forecast areas, the timing of the forecasts, the
forecast parameters and the detail or resolution of the forecast are
designed to meet the need of specific identifiable economic activities.
These forecasts are subject to more definite verification than general
public forecasts. Finally, it was thought that with the help of the con-
sulting firm the cooperation of the client firms could be secured in order
0
0	
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to obtain information on the costs and other consequences of various fore-
cast stud weather situations.
The initial problems we expected to encounter were many and varied:
How can the weather of one season be compared with that of another? How
do we find an impartial means of selecting a firm to whom we will supply
satellite data? How do we gain confidential information from the benefi-
ciaries of the data? How do we quantify "economic benefits?" The solution
to these problems, plus the other problems we faced and their solutions
will now be discussed. These will be followed by our results, general
observations and a discussion of the program.
t;
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2. Program Formulation
a. Selection of cooperating consulting firm
One of the earliest hurdles of this study was the selection of a
meteorological consulting firm which would be most suitable for our needs.
The selection had to be totally impartial because we, a government funded
facility, would be working with a firm in the private sector. We also had
to avoid giving the chosen firm any undue competitive advantage. A fair
balance had to be struck between the benefits to be received from the use
of (and experience with) the satellite system, and the expenditures of time
and manpower for participation in the study.
-`
	
	 Prior to contacting any potential participant, a list of criteria for
selection, based on the needs of the program, was drawn up (see Appendix A)
to provide an objective basis for selection. The program needed an estab-
lished and well respected consulting firm with a large and varied clientele.
We wanted to work with a firm that offered services of high quality, and we
preferred a firm with at least one Certified Consulting Meteorologist on
its staff. In addition, we looked for a complete willingness to cooperate
in the many facets of the program. The assessment of these criteria could
be made only by personal visits and inspection of the interested firms.
From a directory of currently active consulting firms supplied by the
American Meteorological Society, the most promising companies were contacted.
The letter of contact included a description of the program plus the
selection criteria described above. These letters were then followed up
by phone calls. The two most promising firms were then chosen for a visit.
It was agreed that all information gained from these visits was strictly
It	 confidential.
AM
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To help insure the impartiality of the selection process, addition
precautions were taken. First, a list of the type of information of
interest to us was sent to the two interested firms -so they could 'best
prepare for our visit (see Appendix A). Second, a detailed list of questions-
to be asked on both visits was prepared in advance (see Appendix A). These
questions were to be our guidelines for the visit. In addition, each visit
was to be made by two staff members to minimize personal bias. One staff
member made both interview trips so that a more direct comparison between
the firms could be made.
E	
The actual interview paralleled the list of previously prepared questions.
E
iv
!	 The areas discussed were: staff organization and procedures; the nature of
s
in-house quality control; the current and future plans for satellite data usage;
actual forecast operations; hardware in use; and reasons for participation in
this program. After the visit, each interviewer also recorded his subjective
impressions of the operation of the consultant, based upon what- he was able to
view.
When all the questionnaires were completed and analyzed, the selection was
made on the basis of the previously described criteria. Weather Services
Corporation of Bedford, MassPchusetts met all the needs of the program, and
this choice was strengthened by the individual evaluations and subjective :mpres-
,ions formed by the visiting team members. The crucial selection factors were
tems 2, 4, 6 and 7 on the criteria list in Appendix A.
Weather Service Corporation (WSC) is a highly respected meteorological
onsultant firm with more than 30 years of experience. They employ more than 20
,rofessional meteorologists and four technicians; three staff members are certi-
ield Consulting Meteorologists. 'their members are active on the National Board
if Industrial Meteorologists and in local and national activities of the
t 
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American Meteorological Society. Their forecasts and verifications are
archived for research as well as quality control. The hardware and
techniques they use employ the latest advances in the field of meteorology.
5
Most important, they expressed a strong interest in the study, had a strong
desire to incorporate satellite data into their operations, and gave every
impression that they wornld be cooperative partners in the study.
The clients of WSC number more than 300 from Knine to Georgia. Many
Fr	 are potentially affected by weather originating in oceanic regions where
conventional meteorological data are sparse. At the time of our interview,
they includeu: (1) one hundred forty-seven state, county and municipal
governments, shopping centers, universities and some private industries
interested in snow and ice removal and other emergency weather warnings
(e.g., floods, high winds, heavy rains); (2) thirty-three gas utilities
interested in temperature forecasts as well as emergency warnings; (3)
eleven electric utilities interested in temperature, humidity and cloud
cover forecasts as well as emergency storm warnings; (4) fifty-nine fuel
oil companies which need temperature and heavy snow information; (S) nine
commodities clients who use current, long range, and world-wide climate
data; and (6) an assortment of construction, blasting, marine and aviation
clients. Media clients served by a subsidiary of WSC were not included
in this study, to preclude advertising of the satellite data.
At Weather Services Corporation, operational forecasting is divided
-'-	 into two areas: daily or routine forecasting and storm or emergency fore-
casting. Routine forecasts include information such as temperature, degree
t	 days, humidities, and cloud cover that is sent out several times daily to
8	 utilities, fuel oil companies, construction companies, and others. Forecasts
are made for specified times or for three-hour intervals and cover periods
of up to 72 h. Storm forecasts are only sent out as the need arises and
can include notice of such events as snowfall, flooding, high winds, or
thunderstorms. These forecasts give expected time of arrival (plus or
minus a few hours), intensity, areal coverage, and ending times.
The level of service depends on how much the client is willing to pay.
Reports are sent out by phone or teletypewriter opca a day or every few
hours with updates as needed. These forecasts are usually tailored to the
peculiarities of a client's needs. For example, areas prone to flooding,
hills that ice up rapidly, or highly vulnerable poster lines may be of
particular concern to individual clients. Clients whose geographical area
of responsibility is wide may require forecasts by districts. A major
advantage to the client is the freedom to telephone the forecaster if
additional information or clarification is needed. In addition to the
above forecasting areas, Weather Services also has a world wide climatology
group, a marine forecasting group, plus a media subsidiary.
Once the selection was official we entered into an agreement with WSC
(see letters in Appendix B) which outlined restrictions and responsibilities
of both parties. To summarize, SSEC vas to develop the means by which WSC
would receive satellite data, and would train WSC personnel to use it. WSC
would document its forecasts and verifications, and would permit SSEC to
contact all WSC clients.
In addition, WSC was restricted from referring to this study in any
advertising or promotion to gain new clients, and would not display any
reproductions obtained directly from our data installation in any communi-
cations medium during the period of this study. All records and discussions
v	 w
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pertaining to this project would be kept confidential unless otherwise
I
	
	
decided by both parties. The selection of Weather Services Corporation
in no way constituted an endorsement of that firm over any other con-
sultant.
b. Initial problems
The initial plan for the program was to have the Man-Computer Inter-
active Data Access System (McIDAS) system built and installed by September
1977. (This was the means chosen to supply them with satellite data.)
This uate continued to be pushed back, and the system was delayed a full
year. The reasons for this were twofold. First, due to a manpower drainage
to other programs, intensive work on the system did not begin as soon as
it should have. This program was given a rather low priority on SSEC's
list of tasks to be accomplished, and hence, much of the engineering work
that was expected to be finished early in the year never was. The second
problem was that since this system differed in various ways from our McIDAS,
certain of the components presented time consuming unforeseen delays.
The second hurdle we had to overcome was presented by the private
meteorological firm that we interviewed, but did not select. Their feeling
was that since we were working with a private firm, we were giving them
an unfair competitive advantage, and it was excess government interference
in the free enterprise system. These feelings were not at all expressed
when there was a chance of their participating in this program. In restro-
9
	
	 spect, these fears have proven to be unfounded: our involvement with WSC
has caused minimal changes in either their operations or their clientele.
As a consequence, SSEC and the University of Wisconsin were threatened
f	 with legal action to halt the program. We and the University's legal staff
spent many hours rebutting their allegations. When the initial threats
	`0.
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did not produce the desired results, they were then directed at NASA. This
led to a period of uncertainty as to the future of the program, and all
work was halt-:d. Eventually, we received reassurances from NASA that our
efforts were to be supported.
c. Program operation
The program, lasting four years was originally planned as follows:
Year 1, 1976-77: Develop the methodology for the program, find con-
sulting firm and contact clients, develop and build
hardware.
Year 2, 1977-78: Control year - complete hardware/install.
Year 3-4, 1978-80: Experiment period.
As it turned out, we were able to gather control statistics from the
first two years, and that is what will be referred to as the control period.
Due to the delays discussed elsewhere, the McIDAS system was completed and
installed at the beginning of the third year, almost a year behind schedule
(September, 1978). It was never reliable enough during that third year for
statistical purposes, so although it was functioning sporadically, the
forecasts during that period were not documented. The experiment period
began in May, 1979 when McIDAS operations became more reliable and con-
tinued until April 1980. The program operation was terminated early as a
means of saving money, and because the April-May period would add little to
	
C	
our results.
In addition, because WSC did not keep complete records on the down-time
of McIDAS, we therefore had to assume that satellite data was available to
	
t	 them, unless specifically told otherwise.
F.
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3. Methodology
a. Approaches
There are several different ways in which this economic impact study
could have been approached theoretically. One which could be rejected
almost imaediately would involve working with two different consulting
firms, one having a satellite data system, the other not. Comparing the
operations of these two firms over a suitable length of time should reveal
a difference in forecast accuracy. In addition to the practical problems
of getting two firms to cooperate, there are two other obvious obstacles.
The operations of any two firms in this field would vary significantly in
terms of the size and abilities of the staff and their general forecasting
procedures. These differences somehow would have to be "subtracted out"
in order to detect a variation due to the use of satellite data. Second,
the client groups served by the respective firms would differ substantially
in nature and location. To account for such diverse factors in any
systematic way would be impossible.
Another approach which initially seems more attractive woul,i nvolve
only one firm. After installation of satellite data hardware, the firm
would be responsible for generating two forecasts for every client in
every situation; one with knowledge of the satellite data relevant to the
forecast, the other without. Differences between the two sets of forecasts
over a long period would indicate variations due solely to satellite data
	
a	 input.
Unfortunately, this method is not as feasible as it seems. First, the
burden of producing two forecasts for every client would cause a significant
and probably unacceptable, disruption in the operations of the firm.
C	
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Second, it would be extremely difficult to set up such a procedure in a
scientifically valid way. If two different staff members produced the two
different forecasts, one would have to account for differences in personal
forecast abilities. If the same person did the two forecasts (one without
looking at the satellite data, then another revised forecast after seeing
satellite data), the first forecast might affect the way he interprets the
satellite data. It is also doubtful that later updates or new forecasts
f	 could be made without recollection of satellite data.
The methodology chosen for this study was a variation of the one-firm
approach just described. The forecast and client operations of a single
firm were: studied for a control period of two years to obtain base statistics
about the forecast and the clients. During this phase researchers became
familiar with clients' operations and their particular vulnerability to the
forecasts, and examined the records of the consulting firm's forecast and
their verification to determine the economic impact each year of service
had on clients.
This whole procedure was then repeated after the satellite data hard-
ware was installed and debugged, providing a one-year period in which to
study the effects of the new data. It was hoped that comparison of this
set of data with that from the previous years would illustrate any relevant
differences due to the use of satellite data, provided certain extraneous
influences were removed. One of these influences stems from the variation
s	 in weather from one year to the next. For example, in a year with twice
as many snowstorms as usual the total economic benefits due to correct
forecasting may be significantly increased. In comparing successive
seasons, reference to a climatological mean to normalize the data or
provide for a similar sampling of storms from both seasons was necessary.
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Concerning the consulting firm operations, it was important that there
be little change in personnel, or operational procedure (other than that
associated with the use of satellite data) over the three year study
period. WSC is a stable and well established firm and fulfilled this
requirement very well. The regular forecasting staff remained essentially
the same over the three year period.
Similarly, substantial changes in the clients serviced over the
period of the experiment could adversely affect our results. By "changes"
we mean either that the client ceased being a customer of the consulting
service altogether, or that the client modified forecast requirements in
such a way that older forecasts could not be quantitatively compared with
newer forecasts for the calculation of benefits. Changes affecting the
clients' operations only and not creating associated changes in the forecast
information received (inflation, or acquisition of new equipment, for
instance) were not considered after our initial survey in 1977. Since in
this experiment we wished ideally to consider only one variable, that of
having and not having satellite data, all our results are essentially
normalized" to the situation prevailing at the beginning of this project.
For the most part our desire for a stable client base was fulfilled.
For one of the two main client groups (utilities), only two clients (out of
10) dropped their service, while in the other (snow and ice) four clients
out of twenty -six (15X) dropped. Though two of these latter drops were
large state wide clients, this still left several similar clients in the
study for the complete period. Finally there was one marine client whom
we might have used for analysis had they remained a client. Overall,
however we consider that these client changes did not seriously affect the
quality of our data sample.
G
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Finally, it was important that the satellite data system installed not
produce a major disruption or reorganization in the procedures used by the
consulting firm; otherwise, the study might measure the effect of the
changed forecast procedures and not of the introduction of the satellite
C	 data. This is a difficult goal to achieve. On the one hand, the means
must be provided to make the satellite data as useful as possible. For
example, combinations of contoured conventional data with satellite images
will facilitate the integration of the satellite information into the
total forecast product.
On the other hand, the convenience of having conventional data at one's
C	 fingertips in a new and useful format may, in itself, have an effect on
forecast accuracy. To minimize this problem it was necessary to scrutinize
the capability of the equipment given to the consulting firm to assure
that nothing really "new" was being made available to the forecaster except
the satellite data itself. Since SSEC would be installing a computer with
both satellite and conventional data displays,it was highly desirable that
the participating consulting firm have some in-house computer capabilities
prior to the beginning of the second phase of the experiment. WSC, the
chosen firm, did have PDP-11 computer facilities allowing the display of
conventional data.
b. Defining economic benefits
There are many different economic benefits accruing to the clients of
meteorological consulting firms, but not all of them are tangible. An
attempt will be made here to describe and classify such benefits, especially
s	 those with which this study is concerned.
1. Direct and immediate benefit to the client
Forecasts to a client may be improved in one of three ways: by making
0
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possible a more accurate forecast; by improving on the frequency and timeliness
of the forecast (including updates and .emergency warnings); and by allowing
the inclusion of more detail or aerial coverage in current forecasts. These
improvements may benefit a client in a variety of ways. The most easily
measured benefits are those which a client realizes from a single forecast
or group of forecasts (for, say, a single storm); the client can point to a
specific gain coming directly to him (as opposed to the community of users
	
C	 the client may serve or operate in) over a short period of time (a period of
days). Examining in detail the operations of a client, one can ascribe a
fairly exact monetary value to some of these benefits. Examples include
	
=t";>	 savings in payroll size, in deployment of equipment costs, and in the use of
materials. A major goal of this study was the accurate measurement of this
sort of economic value.
Other direct and immediate benefits are not so easily quantified
because they involve factors of convenience or efficiency. For instance, it
may be of great psychological value to a foreman of a snow and ice crew to
know that no storms are expected over the weekend or overnight, since he can,
with peace of mind, use his time without the worry of making special plans
for handling a plowing situation outside of regular hours. Should a storm
occur unexpectedly anyway, he still may be able to handle the situation
through last minute efforts in a way no more wasteful of money than he would
have used had he known earlier about the storm. But the unpleasant strain
	
1	 placed on him in such a situation is something he would rather avoid by
paying for a weather service. In the final analysis, such convenience may
have economic ramifications by improving worker morale, efficiency, and
	
t	 turnover rate, and by decreasing the number of errors made in scheduling.
4
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Assigning an exact dollar value to such complex factors, however, was not
a central objective of this study.
2. Direct and long term benefits
There are some advantages to a client subscribing to a weather service
which, while accruing directly to the client, can only be seen as a gradual
occurrence or as the net result of a long series of forecasts. Again, as
with short term benefits, some of these advantages can be measured; others
cannot. An example of the former case would be a fuel oil dealer who
finds that accurate degree-day forecasting illows him to make fewer
refuelings per customer over a winter season. While this kind of benefit
t.	 could possibly be quantified by examination of seasonal statistics, there
certainly would be difficulties in determining how satellite data was con-
tributing to the overall success or failure of the forecasting.
'x
	
	Other long term benefits are more ambiguous. Through improved fore-
casting, equipment wear and maintenance may be less over a season, but not
in any readily quantifiable amount. The increased accuracy of a forecasting
service may encourage a client after a long period of doubt to increase his
reliance on the forecast in ways that will ultimately save money, but unless
this decision can be specifically connected with satellite data input, it
has 1.__ie meaning to this study.
3. Indirect benefits
Indirect benefits are those that accrue to the clients' customers or
t	 to the community which they serve. There are many possible examples of
this type of benefit. Time is saved by motorists going to work on roads
that have been quickly cleared of an early morning snow; lives may be saved
*	 and accidents prevented in the same situation. Consumers of agricultural
products will save money where prices have beer. lowered by wise commodities
0
 IXX
k 	 -23-
purchasing baued on the latest weather information. Certainly there is
also an economic value to the better service a utility customer may get
through prompt emergency repairs. Although all these benefits could be
linked to the improved use of satellite data, quantifying them would be
a formidable job, requiring massive public interviewing plus an ability
to translate intangibles (e.g., time) into money. For this study, then,
these benefits were generally beyond our powers of quantitative analysis.
It should be noted that many of those benefits which were calculated were
also indirect benefits to the public. This was particularly true where
tax money was saved by municipal departments (i.e., the majority of
s	 snow and ice forecast clients).
In summary, this study concentrates on quantifiable short term benefits
of direct economic value to the client. This is not to say that other
types of benefits do not accrue from the use of satellite data, but only
that such benefits cannot be reliably determined.
Two final comments: There was a certain degree of difficulty in the
assignment of an effect to any one cause in a process as complicated as the
interaction between a weather forecast and a business decision. In many
cases the forecast was only one item among many affecting the decision, for
example, to increase energy production or buy commodities. Attention in
this study had to concentrate on those decision-making processes where the
weather information had a clearly defined role.
f
	
	
Second, we measured only those benefits the client, itself, chose
to capitalize on. It was often apparent that a client could have put a
forecast to better use than its procedures would then allow. However, our
purpose was to measure what was actually being done by a cross section of
different enterprises, not to specify what could have been done under ideal
conditions.
0
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c. Methods of measuring economic gain
Since one of our goals was to understand the operations of each client
to see how each eventually would be affected by satellite data, it was
first necessary to group clients according to the type of operation they
performed. It is important to keep in mind that such groupings do not
imply that the clients in each group were by any means homogeneous in their
use of and response to the forecast, but only that they all received the
same type of forecast product. Grouping the clients was done merely with
the expectatior that certain similarities in operation could form the
basis of useful generalizations later in the study. Six general groupings
were decided upon: snow and ice, electric utilities, gas utilities, fuel
oil dealers, commodities dealers and const Action clients. 	 In addition,
we considered a number of miscellaneous clients (whose unique operations
received separate analysis), and a small group of clients concerned with
blasting. We decided not to include the latter group in this study.
This decision hinged on the fact that blasting operations rely on accurate
sounding information to determine how far from the blasting site the noise
will penetrate and on other weather data for safety considerations. Though
both of these were valuable uses of the forecast products, neither was
economically quantifiable. The remaining client groups will be dealt with
more thoroughly in Section 6.
There are three main approaches possible for measuring economic gain:
a study of overall group characteristics and operations; individual studies
of a particular client over time; and case studies of particular weather
events in relation to a client or set of clients.
The first approach is the most desirable because it allows a larger,
widely applicable picture to emerge but requires not only a good
C	
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cross section of clients from a particular specialty (i.e. in sufficient
C
	
	
numbers and variety), but also an adequate number of weather events over
the experimental period to insure statistically valid generalizations.
While we cannot claim to have met the former criteria completely, the
statistics presented for the individual clients in each main group were
drawn from a sample sufficient to indicate at least the magnitude of the
forecasting benefits involved. We have, however, been reticent to provide
t	 means or generalized statements about these clients as a group. The
second criteria proved to be more formidable in terms of the original
objectives of the project and will be discussed later.
At times case studies proved interesting as well, particularly in
situations where the weather events were unusual and complex, as in the
case of severe weather affecting utility maintenance. These are presented
where appropriate.
In summary, we have relied chiefly on the analysis of individual
clients over time, grouped by type of operation and presented together
to show the variation within the group. Where the method would have been
infeasible, we have used case studies to illustrate the nature of the benefits
involved.
d. Use of questionnaires
Questionnaires provide an attractive means of gathering data. They are
cheaper than personal visits, and allow the respondent time to carefully
think out and research his answers. It would be very difficult to accurately
obtain the same quantity of information by phone, so telephone interviews were
not considered as a primary means of gathering data. Consequently the use of
questionnaires, supplemented by personal contacts where necessary, was chosen
b
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as the only practical means of obtaining the vast amount of information
required.
The main purpose of the questionnaires was to provide written documen-
tation on the operations of individual clients of Weather Services Corpo-
ration, and to ascertain, through the structured questions, the general
economic impact of weather forecasts on their operations. This method
presupposes that only a discrete number of weather conditions affect each
client. If the reactions to and impact of each weather condition were known,
we could determine the impact of each situation as it arises during the
course of the study without re-contacting the client.
We allowed for several obvious limitations in constructing our question-
nacres. Recognizing that we were totally dependent upon the good will and
cooperation of the clients, we tried to keep the questions short and to the
point, to avoid wasting the respondents' time and trying their patience, and
to gather only directly useful information. Because this requires some
prior knowledge of each client's operations, we used an "iterative approach."
Except for those clients primarily concerned with snow and ice control
or removal, each client was first mailed a one page, two question Form and a
letter explaining the program. The questions were:
1. In what specific operations do you use weather forecasts from
Weather Services Corporation as an aid?
2. If you were asked to place an economic value on the weather forecast
you receive, what factors would go into your calculations? (Mone-
tary values are not currently needed, but we're interested in speci-
fics about manpower, equipment, material3, etc.)
Because it was December, and because we wanted responses from "snow and
ice" clients for the CULrer.t season, we attempted to accelerate development of
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a more specific set of questions for this group. Thus preliminary stow /i
questions were drafted and sent to a sample group. To gain more insight
the impact of the forecast on snow/ice removal, and to ascertain the utility
of our questions, we personally visited several "snow and ice" clients to
discuss the questions, responses and our general understanding of their
operations. Most of our questions elicited the desired responses, so this
questionnaire was distributed to the client group as a whole.
For other large client groups the returned preliminary questionnaires,
supplemented by phone conversations, provided much of the informational basis
for more specific questionnaires. Helpful information was also obtained from
the collaborating consulting firm in the form of promotional material, and
from trade journal publications based on their own "product research and
development" efforts. The final questionnaires were constructed after
extensive evaluation by project staff members and distribution to similar
clients in our local area for their comments. When necessary, all completed
questionnaires were supplemented by phone calls.
The basic information that these questionnaires obtained included:
1. Size and scope of weather sensitive operations;
2. Circumstances under which weather information was expected to
have a differential impact on operations, and variables most
important to these situations (how often, when or how far in
advance information on these was needed);
3. Responses or possible outcomes of these weather sensitive situ-
ations, and the effect of rec=eived weather information on actual
responses or outcome; how the decisions were made;
4. Variable costs or expenses, their !.ources and rz,antitative relation
to both the chosen response and actual weather conditions.
it
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The questionnaires, in many situations, had to be followed up by phone
calls for a variety of reasons=-misunderstandin g of questions, reluctance
to put facts into writing which the client considered unpleasant, and a
need to translate figures given in one format to some format that we would
find useful. In general, however, the questionnaire approach proved
satisfactory.
Smaller groups, such as construction companies and commodities dealers,
require detailed study and consideration because they do not constitute a
statistically valid sample size. The same applied to the one-of-a-kind
clients, such as off-shore operations. For some of these, the questionnaire
that gathered background information was also, the basis for more detailed
case studies.
For all clients, the questionnaires gave us documented information
on how each client uses the weather forecast in a variety of situations,
and how the accuracy of the forecast affected operations financially. In
most cases the answers were used to predict what a client's response would
be to a given forecast so that we could calculate an economic impact without
having to contact the client about his response in every forecast situation.
The questionnaire also gave us enough information to judge what weather
situations would offer potentially interesting case studies. By checking
through weather records for forecasts which were likely to have affected
the client significantly we could follow up to determine the history of the
event from the client's point of view. During the course of this study,
these answers were applied to a variety of weather situations and along
with the forecasts clients received and their verification, were the basis
of our calculated benefits.
f
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e. Forecast verification
An important stage in the process of analysis for both the first and
second phases of this study was the verification of the forecasts made by
Weather Services Corporation. If satellite data did in fact improve their
forecast, and if this improvement had an impact on the clients, this could
best be proven by showing that forecast errors in the control period were
"significantly greater" than those in the experiment period. Verification
is a notoriously difficult problem, but in this study there were several
factors which made the problem much easier to solve. We should point out
first that the verification we were attempting was designed only to catch
those errors which had a significant economic effect on the clients, where
the individual client was located.
Second, clients, in many cases, could supply the necessary verification
data themselves. Utilities, for instance, kept their own observations of
temperature and related power requirements. Using such client observations
and regular National Weather Service data, Weather Services Corporation
was able to construct maps and tables which were sufficient to provide the
verification needed in all cases. Table 1 contains a listing of the veri-
fications we used, and which were supplied by WSC.
A related problem in this study was that of obtaining the climatological
statistics necessary to normalize the data for all phases of Lhe study,
so that the same basis of comparison was used in analysis. Not a great
	
f	
deal of data was available for this task. With the end of the federally
	
F
	 supported State Climatologist System, high density data from many eastern
states were sparse. If we had attempted to determine accurately the
climatology for each client location, we would have faced an insurmountable
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TABLE 1
Forecast forms and other data obtained from Weather Services Corporation
A.	 Snow and lee
1. Time of predicted onset on storm
2. Amount of frozen precipitation predicted, temperature and wind.
3. Updates
4. Base maps for prediction and verification
5. Location of client vs. location of prediction and verification
6. Base maps for State and Turnpike systems
B.	 Gas Utilities
1. EHDD forecasts and updates--up to six days in advance
2. Verifications
3. Location of prediction and verification
4. Same for Weather alerts (cold temperatures, rain, wind, frost)
5. Base maps
C.	 Electric Utilities
1. Load Forecast (temperature, humidity, cloud cover, wind), updates
2. Verification
3. Location of prediction and verification
r
4. Same for weather alerts (cold temperatures, rain, wind, frost, severe
weather, lightning)
5. Base maps
D.	 Fuel Oil
1. Total degree days for season
2. Daily DD forecasts--up to three days and updates
3. Weekly (or daily) verifications
4. Storm warnings (snow and ice) and updates
1
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Location for prediction and verification
E. Marine Forecasting
1.	 Forecast sheets
F. Construction
1.	 Rain, wind, high and low temperatures, snow prediction and updates
2.	 Verification
G. Automobile Association
1.	 Temperatures in November and December (10 degree or below)
2.	 Rain and temperatures rising into the 40's
3.	 Verification
is H. Commodities
1.	 Forecast sheets
C
0
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problem. However, because we were attempting only to compare data from
the two periods, an absolute error in the averages to which we referred
was not of mayor significance. It was important only that the statistics
from the two periods be compared to the same base statistic. The available
monthly and annual statistical summaries contained the gross kind of
averages necessary to accomplish this aim.
t^
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4. The MIDAS System
a. McIDAS hardware
1. General
The satellite image processing system constructed for this program is
an updated version of the Man-computer Interactive Data Access System
(McIDAS) developed at SSEC for tracking clouds on ATS 3 and later SMS/GOES
images. McIDAS consists of two major parts--a general purpose scientific
i	
computer with digital disc storage and a display terminal consisting of a
terminal controller, high resolution color monitor, alphanumeric CRT and
keyboard, joystick pair and hard copy printer. Figures'2 and 3 detail
the functional block; of the computer system and the display terminal.
2. Processing section
The McIDAS System is built around the Harris Slash 6 general purpose
digital computer. This compute: contains some 32 K words of 24 bit main
memory and is configured with 15 megabytes of digital disc storage. In
addition to the digital disc, the computer is connected to three data
interfaces. Low speed asynchronous communications is supported by the
asynchronous interface. The asynchronous interface connects to the Teletype
control terminal, the FAA WB604 Data Service supplying conventional weather
data (surface and upper air) and a modem permitting the system connection
to the remote card reader/line printer at the University of Wisconsin for
remote software maintenance. Satellite data, in a form of sectorized GOES
- t -	 images, are received off the leased telephone line and brought into the
system via the GOES-FAX ingest. Connection to the display terminal is
accomplished via the terminal interface serial I/O controller. This con-
I	 troller permits high rate communications between the display terminal and
the computer.
I
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3. Display terminal
The display terminal consists of a terminal controller and the visible
human interfaces; color monitor, alphanumeric CRT and keyboard, joysticks
and hard copy printer. The terminal controller contains the microcomputer
that handles communications with the Harris computer, controls the image
and graphic displays, including the enhancement functions, and supports
the joystick and cursor generation. The color monitor is used to display
graphics and image information. Image information is held on the 100
frame analog disc. Graphics information is contained in two 640 pixel by
512 line one bit graphic planes. The dual joysticks are used as a
generalized analog input device but are usually used t3 control the cursor
displayed on the color monitor. In this mode, one joystick acts as a
coarse position control and the other a fine position control.
b. McIDAS application software
1. General
The bulk of the application software sued in this program is a subset
of SSEC's McIDAS system software. It was necessary to cull out a subset of
the software due to the limited disc space available.
2. Types of programs
The majority of the applications programs on this system belong to one
of the following groups:
a. Image handling. This group includes those for ingesting satellite
images, loading a display frame from digital areas, frame selection and
setting up frame loops.
b. Enhancement. This group of programs controls the enhancement
function permitting either gray scale or color enhancements of the images
	-	 t
t	 -37-
	
_	
f
contained on the analog disc. Table values may be determined by a set of
key-ins or may be controlled by the joysticks.
f
c. Navigation. Navigation programs are used to align the satellite
image sequences, thus allowing calibration of the images in latitude and
longitude coordinates for tracking clouds.
d. Wind measurements. This function is implemented in one program
called WINDCO. WINDCO permits generation of wind vectors from displacement
t	 of clouds and measurement of cloud height from the infrared temperature.
e. Conventional data. These programs automatically ingest data from
the WB604 data line and archive it in the system data base. The data base
(	 may be queried via a set of key-in commands which permit generation of
plots, lists, tables and maps of the station data, upper air data and ship
data. The output functions are applicable to some or all of the following
parameters: temperature, dew point, pressure, wind, cloud amovat and
type, advection, divergence, vorticity, mixing ratio and time differences
in temperature, dew point, wind, potential temperature, equivalent potential
temperature and pressure. These may be viewed independently as charts or
averlayed over satellite images to aid analysis.
c. Design changes over system life
This section will detail design changes made to the hardware and soft-
ware system, either to correct deficiencies or to enhance system operation.
i
	 1. Computer memory expansion
Very early in the program, it became clear that additional memory was
needed in the Harris computer to permit faster execution times. At 32 K
words, the system was memory bound. An additional 16 K word memory board
f
was purchased for the system and installed, increasing the system's operating
C
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efficiency.
2. Terminal software
Minor deficiencies in the terminal controller were noted and corrected
by installation of new terminal firmware.
3. Auto-Answer Modem
The existing modem on the remote card reader/line printer port required
activation by Weather Services Corporation's personnel in order to be able
to perform remote programming of the system. The manual 300 Baud modem
originally installed was replaced with a 1200 Baud auto-answer modem. This
permitted remote maintenance without intervention by Weather Services
personnel to initiate or Lcrminate the calls. Automatic termination of
the calls permitted a significant savings in phone charges between UW SSEC
and Weather Services Corporation.
4. Direct GOES TAP
As originally installed, the GOES-TAP connection supplying sectorized
satellite data to the system was paralleled off the National Weather
Service Forecast Office in Boston, Massachusetts. Selection of the sectors
received on a Tap from the Satellite Field Service Station at NESS can be
made only from one location. As an auxiliary Tap off the National Weather
Service Forecast Offices GOES-TAP line, Weather Services Corporation had
no control, nor any knowledge of what sectors would be received from the
line. This difficulty was eliminated by installation of a direct leased
line to NESS in Washington, D. C. Additional hardware for control of the
GOES TAP was installed to permit selection of sectors without intervention
of personnel at NESS. With this change, WSC personnel had complete control
over the satellite pictures received off the GOES-TAP line.
9
5. 80 Megabyte disc
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In November of 1979, a minor problem with the Harris computer escalated
into a loss of important segments of the operating software for the McIDAS
system at Weather Services Corporation, including backup discs. Lacking a
tape drive, the only method available for reprogramming the system was lost.
i
Space Science and Engineering no longer used the same type of disc drives
installed at Weather Services. In order to restore the system, an 80
t	 megabyte disc and controller were removed from operation at SSEC and
installed at Weather Services. The necessary software was transported and
installed successfully on the system permitting Weather Services to resume
operation. The additional capability of the 80 megabyte disc permitted
faster execution of many functions and permitted storage of more and larger
satellite images.
6. Analog disc
Throughout the life of the system, nearly all of the serious problems
with the system were due to malfunctions of the analog disc. These problems
are reviewed in the next section. Although the present device is the same
unit that was installed in the original installation, extensive modifications
were made in an attempt to improve its performance. The only functional
change was the reduction in frame space from 200 to 100 total. All other
modifications to the analog disc were made to correct various deficiencies
and to increase system reliability.
d. Major problems
The McIDAS system installed at Weather Services Corporation had a
number of serious problems but nearly all were concentrated in two basic
C
areas. The first and most serious, as well as most numerous set of
i
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problems, was due to the analog disc.	 The second source of problems was
s
fr due to the lack of a tape drive on the system.
f
Analog discs can provide satisfactory performance as a display device
if certain conditions are met. 	 The most important consideration is that
a well-engineered product must be used.	 The analog disc used on this
system is manufactured by Davie-Smith Corporation.	 The disc was not
supplied as a complete disc subsystem but rather as a kit. 	 The kit con-
:	 t_ tained the necessary mechanical elements to build an analog disc but
lacked any electronics, and the mechanical portions were designed for low
cost rather than performance or reliability. 	 In order to complete the
disc subsystem, bits and pieces of other technology and some original
designs were applied to come up with a one-of-a-kind disc. 	 However, no
amount of reengineering could make up for the basic deficiencies of the
t
device. In retrospect, additional funds should have been used to buy a
better quality disc, even after the original installation, in light of the
high maintenance costs that were incurred in support of the analog disc.
i
The lack of a tape drive on this system made software maintenance of
the system extremely difficult and also presented problems in hardware
maintenance when computer diagnostics were necessary for isolation of
i
problems. The tape drive was deleted from the original system for cost
considerations and because of our desire tc limit potential system modi-
fications by WSC personnel. If the system had a tape drive, many problems
could have been averted. All reprogramming of the system required trans-
porting of mechanically sensitive digital discs to Weather Services Cor-
poration or required use of the remote card reader/line printer interface.
The remote card reader/line printer interface is adequate for small
i_
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reprogramming tasks but is useless for major software efforts. Normally,
diagnostics for the Harris computer are on tape. Lacking a tape drive,
diagnostics had to be run from disc. This is not a particularly desirable
situation as a common problem area in computers is with the disc itself.
0	 While software problems were not a major factor at this installation, the
lack of a tape drive was definitely felt.
As a general note on system problems, it should be pointed out that
most portions of the system performed admirably. Most of the hardware
of this system was installed and required no further attention throughout
the system life. This is instructive as it should be clear with with
 the correction of the system's chronic deficiencies, extremely reliable
hardware and software would result.
e. Maintenance procedures
All maintenance of the Weather Services Corporation McIDAS system was
carried out under the direction of Gary Banta, a UW SSEC engineer. Two
maintenance organizations located in Boston, Massachusetts, were used to
provide local maintenance for the McIDAS system.
The general maintenance procedure was as follows. Should a problem
C
	 be noted by the operating personnel at Weather Services, a call was placed
to Gary Banta at SSEC. The purpose of this centralized control over the
maintenance was to insure, that first of all, the Center, having basic
responsibility for maintenance, was aware of all system maintenance
problems and that the problem was not merely an operator problem. Most
problems were either correctable over the telephone or were no problem at
all. Some problems required the assistance of SSEC programmers utilizing
the remote card reader/line printer interface to make some minor software
9
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modification. If there was indeed a hardware problem, a decision was made
as to the appropriate authority. If the problem was with the Harris
system, as it was about four times over the system life, Harris Corporation
was called in to repair the hardware. If the problem was in any of the
non-Harris hardware, a determination was made as to whether the problem was
of sufficient severity to require onsite attention by one of SSEC's
engineers. If the problem did not require direct action by one of SSEC's
engineers, a local maintenance organization, Compu-Serve, was used.
This maintenance procedure worked quite well over the system life. Had
the two major deficiencies, that is the analog disc and the tape drive,
been corrected--either at the initial design or early in the program--
this procedure would have worked quite well. However, the severity
of the problems, particularly with the analog disc, resulted in numerous
	
i	 trips by SSEC personnel to Weather Services Corporation in Bedford
massachussets, for problem correction.
f. Installation and training
Well before the completion of the McIDAS system itself, a trip was
made to Bedford to inspect the proposed facilities for housing the computer
system. It was decided to located the terminal in one of the forecast
rooms where it would be highly visible and easily accessible to the fore-
casters.
The location of the computer proved to be a more difficult problem.
Weather Services is housed in a 200 year old house in relatively cramped
quarters that were not suitable for the controlled environmental conditions
needed to safely house computer equipment. Hence we designed and Weather
Services constructed a special "computer room" in their basement which
t^
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satisfied our basic specifications. After completion, Harris Corporation
(who was providing hardware maintenance) inspected the facility and
approved it.
Of major importance to the success of this project was the training of
Weather Services personnel on McIDAS. If the system was to have an impact
on forecasting, the staff must not only know how to use McIDAS, but must havf
a positive attitude toward the potential help that satellite imagery could
have on weather prediction. With these aims in mind we had two forecasters
here at SSEC for a one-week period in October of 1977. These two people
would in turn help other WSC staff to adjust to the use of the system during
the installation and breaking-in period at Bedford.
The specific training schedule included a daily round of demonstrations,
discussion, and general use of McIDAS for both real time and recent weather
situations. Emphasis over the last four days of training was on weather
prediction.
The training proved to be successful. The forecasters were throroughly
familiarized with the specific operations and capabilities of the system
and were able to suggest possible software modifications, which would be
helpful to them and feasible for us. In addition, examination of real
time data over the period gave the visitors evidence of how the satellite
could provide improved information on predicting the development and pro-
gression of storms. We were encouraged by their ready acceptance of the
satellite ' s utility and their intention to take advantage of system cap-
abilities on a regular basis.
Even though this training took place well prior to the actual instal-
lation of the system, we expected these two people to have gained sufficient
i C
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familiarity with McIDAS to be useful in helping us undertake a similar
training process at Weather Services itself.
The McIDAS-2 system construction was completed in August 1978 and
after a period of several weeks of testing in Madison, McIDAS was shipped
to Bedford at the end of the month. Soon thereafter, an engineer and a
programmer were sent to install the system at Weather Services. This
task was completed in a week, following which David Suchman and Brian
Auvine arrived to complete the introduction of McIDAS into the consulting
firm's routine operations. Specifically our intentions were to train the
staff in the effective use of the system, to correct hard- and software
deficiencies, and to see how well the staff would adapt to McIDAS in
terms of the objective of this program.
Training of the staff involved group demonstrations followed by
individual sessions with as many people as possible over a week long
period. The two forecasters previously trained 	 in a position to
continue this training after we left ane help oversee the use of the system.
The training of the staff was made somewhat more difficult because of
the nature of McIDAS software which was designed as a research and development
oriented system as opposed to a routine forecasting applications system. Thus
the manual with its organization of commands into a set of two letter
key-ins was not a particularly easy system to memorize. The command
structure, unlike others designed for the inexperienced, did not prompt
the user or provide simplified means to accomplish routine tasks. While
the manual was not impossible to use, it proved to be inconvenient and
time consuming. It was partly this situation that necessitated the
the expenditure of considerable time on training in the first place.
	k 10	
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Our second objective, correcting hard- and software deficiencies,
proved to be the most difficult. The system hardware, especially during
the first weeks of operation, had numerous problems including analog
disk faults, difficulties in cursor manipulation and bad connections between
various system elements. Software changes were more easily manageable.
The quality of the incoming image data was highly variable and the IR
brightness proved to be unca!ibrated, and thus not usable for cloud height
	
i	 calculations. The navigation routines did, however, give reliable align-
ments of the pictures and the graphics and other system software were in
need of only minor adjustments.
g. System incorporation into forecasting procedures
Initially, personal reaction from the staff to the capabilities
{ of the McIDAS system seemed favorable. Between intention and actual
use, however, there were a number of barriers. One of these has al-
ready been mentioned: the awkwardness of the command structure. This
factor may have discouraged the more inexperienced staff from using the
t
system.
Another problem lay in the fact that the staff was often busy keeping
forecast deadlines and did not always have time to ingest and navigate the
current satellite image. Ideally there would have been a regular operator
whose job was to ingest and display all pictures. In practice this problem
was minimized by designating certain staff as operators during their slow
periods.
A third general problem area was found in the actual performance of
the system. Particularly during the first six months, McIDAS had a fair
number of hardware problems which included both poor image production or
0
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actual down time. In addition it was not until June, 1979, that a private
facsimile line was rented. Prior to this, WSC was dependent for its images
s	 on the National Weather Service Boston Office which did not always select
an image appropriate to WSC's needs. Together, these two situations tended
to discourage system use because of unreliability and inability to
establish a routine for obtaining and using the information.
In general, all these problems were of minimal importance during the
last year of system operation, there having been nearly a whole year pre-
vious during which bugs in operation had been greatly reduced. System
performance had improved, the staff had become more familiar with the
command structure, and the staff had to a large degree incorporated
picture ingestion into their routine. A more subtle problem has to do
with how well this new information was being incorporated into actual
forecasting decisions, a factor that would intimately affect how much
the satellite data proved beneficial to the accuracy of the forecast. We
will deal with this question in our later discussion of the actual out-
come of the experiment.
f
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5. Climatological Work
in order to compare both forecast	 Hkill and remit1tant economic
effects of sequences of forecasts from different years, we must eliminate
the effects of year to year weather variations on the results.	 For
example, in the case of snow plowing, we are most concerned with cases
for which snow near or above the threshold for plowing might have
been reasonably forecast. 	 Similarly, for heating degree days, we are
interested in cases above the threshold for the use of supplemental gas
or electric supplies.	 If there are five plowable storms one year, and the
next season fifteen, the economic losses cannot be directly compared--they
must be normalized to some common point, and then compared.	 The same is
trve for temperature forecasts.
Theoretically, this normalization can be done in two different ways.
One of these would be to simply compare thi actual monthly temperature
or snowfall with the 30 year mean, or with those from the other years.
Higher snowfalls, for example, implys an increased probability of storms
that could result in dollar losses, in comparison with a year of lower
snowfall.	 If there were an exact relationship between the difference in
means and the frequency of possible dollar loss situations, then normaliza-
tion would be relatively simple. 	 There would still be the problem that not
all storms are equally difficult to forecast correctly, thereby making a
year of exceptionally difficult storms more error prone. 	 This error factor
is minor, however, in comparison to the problems that arise by only using
the mean value for a season with several large storms or temperature excesses.
A season with the same mean but a multitude of smaller events, will have a
greater vulnerability to loss. 	 Thus a comparison of means only gives an
6	
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approximate indication of the effect of weather on possible economic loss.
We have nonetheless presented these comparisons to illustrate the unuxual
fluctuations occurring over the period of this study.
A second method of normalization fares better in regard to our data,
especially the temperature forecasts. This scheme entails an actual.
count of potential loss situations. For temperature forecasting, for
example, a potential loss occurs every time the threshold temperature
(see Section 6b) is exceeded or is forecast to be exceeded (if there is no
threshold then every day is a potential loss day). With snow forecasting,
such a determination is more difficult. :` the forecast calls for flurries,
should this be considered a potential loos situation? Complicating this
picture is the fact that there is a double threshold for losses, one for
sanding and salting and another for plowing. A simple total of the number
of actual snowstorms or the number of storm forecasts does not therefore
give a complete indication of the proper normalization, but again we have
included these figures here to poin t_ out the magnitude of the fluctuations
in climate ovee the period.
We should also note that normalizations are most meaningful when
there are a large number of cases (i.e. snowstorms, temperatures above
threshold) from which the statistics are being drawn. A small and unrep-
resentative sample of weather events, such as we have been faced with
does not produce reliable results capable of accurate normalization.
We have acquired several series of NOAA publications for verification
of forecasts and as source material for normalization statistics. We have
calculated for each city or location, the manthly recorded snovafall, its
t
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distribution by storm as well as 30 year means of the monthly snowfall
and storm amount. Using these, monthly departures for both the control
and experiment period have been obtained. We have generated the standard
deviations from the individual year's data, making use of the 30 year
reference period, and expressed the monthly departures in terms of percent
of the monthly standard deviation.
We have also obtained statistics for the temperature sensitive
operations. These include both 30 or 40 year means and standard deviations
of monthly average temperatures as well monthly average departures from
these long term means for both the control and experiment periods. We
have similar statistics for daily maximum, daily minimum and daily average
temperatures. The 30 year base was used for T
max 
and 
Tmin' a 40 year base
for T
ave '	 ave
The T	 departure has also been obtained as a percent of the
standard deviation of the 40 years in the base period. Finally, departures
and standard deviations are available from a minimum 20 year base of heating
degree days and a minimum 8 year base of cooling degree days for many
locations. The official source documents used for data on normals and
departures from normal are summarized below:
Source , Documents From NOAA
Climatological Data: Data, issued monthly, are listed by station name
and climatological division, for eazh state or geographical region.
Included are monthly average data for 
T max ' T 
min ' Tave' mean departure
{	 from normal, degree days for month, number of days with T>90F, Tmax <32F
and Tmin <32F and Tmin <0. For precipitation, the total accumulation and
the departure frcm normal are Given. For snow and sleet the total accumu-
lation is given, the maximum depth on the ground and the number of days
with precipitation exceeding 0.10, 0.50 and 1.00 inches. Daily data are
given for precipitation, T max , Tmin' snowfall and snow on ground.
Climatological Data -
.
Annual Summary:  This gives average temperatures
and departures from normal for each month, as well as totRl precipitation
and departure from normal for each month. Temperature extremes and freeze
data include highest and lowest temperature with dates, dates of last
spring 
Tmin less than 16, 20, 24, 28 and 32F as well as the first fall Tmin
less than 32, 28, 24, 20 and 16F.
Local Climatological Data: Issued monthly for each station, this
publication summerizes daily data including 
Tmax' Tmin' Tave' departure
from normal, heating degree days, and cooling degree days. Precipitation
data include snow and ice pellets on the ground at 7 a.m., daily water
equivalent of precipitation, daily depth of snow and ice pellets. Also
given are daily average pressure, daily average resultant wind vector,
average speed, speed and direction of the fastest mile, minutes of sunshine,
percent of possible, average daytime sky cove: in tenths. Water equivalent
of precipitation is also given hourly. There are three hourly observations
of sky cover, ceiling, visibility, dry bulb, wet bulb and dewpoint tempera-
tures, relative humidity, wind speed and direction as well as current
weather.
Climatogra^^ of the United States No. 20: These are issued for
individual stations and summarize means and extremes. Some cover 1951-
1972, 1931-1960, 1948-1971 etc. The formats of the temperature and
precipation data resemble the monthly summaries. Tmax' Tmin' and Tave are
also given by month for the individual years. Monthly normals are given
for temperature, precipitation, heating and cooling degree days. Total
precipitation and snowfall totals are given monthly by year for the period.
Snow Amount No. of Storms
>111
	 >6"Mean o
42.7" 14.8"
47.9" 16.7"
27.4" 13.3"
24.3" 13.7"
1.9
2.6
1.0
1.1
0.9
1.5
4.7
5.9
2.9
3.0
2.5
4.5
2.9
2.0
1.9
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.3
9.7
10.7
6.9
7.1
5.6
12.4
5.3
4.5
3.7
2.3
11.2"
15.7"
13.6"
10.5"
10.3"
5.7"
20.5"
45.9"
21.5"
16.8"
14.0"
7.0"
There are freeze and precipitation probability tables.
Tables 2 and 3 show the stations for which our calculations have been
s:
made.
a. Snow and ice
Figures 4a and 5a show the ten year mean annual snowfall for the
eastern United States. The amounts increase from 3"-6" over North
Carolina to about 20" over Maryland and about 55" over eastern New England.
Some typical 30 year means and standard deviations are:
Boston, MA
Springfield, MA
{	 Bridgeport, CT
New York, NY
Philadelphia, PA
i	 Pittsburgh, PA
Baltimore, MD
Washington, DC
Richmond, VA
Raleigh, NC
Unfortunately, for our study, during the control seasons of 1976-7,
and 1977-8, the northern stations had unusually heavy snows (see Figs. 4b,
c) while during the experimental season of 1979-80, these areas (especially
New England) had one of the least snowy winters on record (see Fig. 4d).
To the south, the reverse was more generally true (see Figs. 5b-d).
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Table 2
Stations With Temperature Records
Trenton NJ Hartford CT
Richmond VA Bridgeport CT
Roanoke VA Concord NH
Philadelphia PA Boston MA
Portland MA Avoca PA
Norfolk VA Atlanta CA
Milton MA (Bluehill) Allentown PA
New York NY (LaGuardia) Albany NY
New York NY (J.F.K.) Providence KI
New York NY (Central Park) Worcester MA
C Buffalo NY Syracuse NY
f
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Table 3
Stations With Snow Records
Trenton NJ Baltimore MD
Richmond VA Lynchburg VA
Roanoke VA Washington DC (National)
Philadelphia PA Washington DC (Dulles)
Milton MA Charlotte NC
New York NY (LaGuardia) Raleigh NC
New York NY (J.F.K.) Amherst MA
Buffalo NY New Haven CT
Hartford CT Yorktown Hts NY
Bridgeport CT Bedford MA
Boston MA Brockton MA
Avoca PA Holyoke MA
Albany NY Peabody MA
Providence RI Pittsburg (APT) PA
Worcester MA Springfield MA
Syracuse NY Taunton MA
Wilmington DE Walpole MA
Newark NJ Norfolk VA
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To be more specific, for the sasx cities;
Snow Amount	 No. of Storms
Control	 Fxpt.
Control	 Expt.	 Diff.	 W,	 >1"	 11,611 	 >3" ,0"j
`t
	
Boston, MA	 71.8"	 12.7"	 -59.1"	 11	 5.5	 4	 3	 2	 0
Springfield, MA	 59.7"	 14.0"	 -45.7"	 14	 8	 4	 5	 2	 1
Bridgeport, CT	 40.0"
	
9.6"	 -30.4"	 10.5
	
4	 1	 3	 1	 0
i
New York. NY	 35.611 	 -24.6"	 8.5	 3	 1.5	 5	 1	 0
Philadelphia, PA	 36.8"	 20.9"	 -15.9"	 8	 4.5	 1.5	 5	 3	 0
Pittsburgh,	 PA	 55.8"	 24.1"	 -31.7"	 15.5	 5	 1.5	 7	 3	 0
Baltimore, MD	 22.7"	 14.6"	 -8.1"	 4.5	 2	 0.5	 5	 2	 0
Washington, DC
	
16.9"
	
20.1"	 +3.2"	 4	 2.5	 0	 6	 2	 1
Richmond. VA	 12.6"	 38.6"	 +26.0"	 4.5	 1	 0	 6	 3	 2
f
Raleigh, NC	 7.1"	 18.3"	 +11.2"	 2.5	 1	 0	 4	 2	 1
Complete statistics can be found in Appendix C. 	 To put some of the above
into perspective. for the control period, the snow at Boston was +1.966 a,
i
Philadelphia, +1.46 o and greater than one standard deviation above normal
for P14ch of the northeast.	 By contrast, during 1978-80, the snow at Boston
was -2.03 a, Bridgeport, -1.34 a, Worcester, -2.65 a, Avoca, PA, -1.46 a,
Pittsburgh, -1.39 a, Hartford, -2.56 a, and more than one standard deviation
below normal for much of the remainder of the northeast. 	 By contrast, during;
1979-80. at Bichmond it was +2.39, Raleigh, +1.98. and at Norfolk, +5.48 a.
Even more telling are the scarcity of snowfalls during the experimental
period; some- New En land clients had no plowabie storms during 1979-80.
T1	 f -	 it w	 ld b	 fruitle s to tr	 and normalize the data for snowfall^.	 ^	 sere o. e,	 ou	 e	 s	 y
during the period of the program. The amounts vary so greatly. that our
l
r
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only recourse is to view our results in the context of the weather seasons,
and not try to compare them directly.
b. Temperature and heating-, cooling-degree days
For the electric utilities (all located in the Northeast) in the
summer season when peak load forecasting is critical, the temperature
statistics reveal no great deviations from normal. In 1977, cooling degree
days and temperatures were near average or slightly above, while 1978 and
1979 were below average from one-half to two degrees for all clients. This
makes the experimental period on the whole somewhat cooler (by about 0.5°)
than the control period. See Appendix C, for more information on these
temperatures as they relate to specific clients and statiors.
The gas utilities experienced an extremely cold winter season in
1976-77 especially in the South where temperatures averaged up to 7 degrees
(more than two standard deviations) below normal. The season 1977-78 was
somewhat warmer but still one to three degrees below average. The last
season, 1979-80, was substantially above normal by 3 to 4 degrees. In
comparison to the control period winters, this represents a change in
average temperature of 6 to 8 degrees and accounts for the drastic drop in
the number of critical forecasting days.
r
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6. Client Groups Surveyed
once a group of clients was selected for analysis, we tried to keep in
touch with them when interesting weather situations arose. Some were more
willing than others to discuss problems caused by bad weather or forecasts.
During the time that satellite data was incorporated into WSC's forecast
procedures, the WSC forecasters maintained a log of situations where the
satellite data had a strong bearing on their forecasts; it appears as
Table 4. The log is not intended to be a complete catalogue, but more
as a sample: the number of entries was not regulated and varied with the
forecaster and with the situation. We have hoped to use this log as the
f.	 basis for case studies during the experiment period. Unfortunately (for
this project) the area under study had no major weather events which
involved participating clients. This will be discussed further in Section
8. Therefore, what follows are the seasonal averages of losses due to
incorrect forecasts for both the control and experiment periods.
a. Road and street departments
The storm or emergency forecasting area mainly supplies governmental
bodies (city, state, and county transportation and public works depart-
ments) with snow and ice storm forecasts in winter and issues alerts for
heavy rains, high winds, and severe weather during the other seasons.
Snow and ice forecasts result in decisions on whether to plow or sand,
when to mobilize equipment for these operations, when to keep people on
alert or send them out, and whether and when to call out contractors.
These clients formed the basis for our first questionnaire, a process
which began in December 1976. Since this was the largest and most varied0
client group (147 subscribers), and because an early start seemed advisable,
0
6	
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Table 4- Log of Forecasts In Which McIDAS Satellite Data Proved Useful.
BATE	 CLIENT	 TYPE OF WEATHER/ACTION TAKEN
6/13	 CITY OF	 THUNDERSTORM ADVISORY ISSUED
CHARLOTTE. NC
C.
7/5	 DUNE POWER THUNDERSTORM NEAR ATHENS• GA.. ADVISED OF
POSITION AND MOVEMENT.
7/9 DROWN AND ROOT ADVISED OF INCREASING CONVECTIGN ANI, POSSIBLE
CIRCULATION OVER SW GULF OF MEXICO,
C
7/10 BROWN AND ROOT BRIEFED ON STRONG TROPICAL DEPRESSION OVER CENTRAL
GULF OF* MEXICO
7/11 BROWN AND ROOT CLUSTER OF STRONG THUNDERSTORMS WITH ARC CLOUD/GU
E	 FRONT VISIBLE NEAR 2SN/94.SW. ADVISED THAT MOVEME
WAS TOWARDS THE WORK SITE AT 624 WEST CAMERON.
7/16 BROWN AND ROOT ADVISED OF DEVELOPING THUNUERSTORHS OFF THE
MISSISSIPPI DELTA MOVING TOWARD WORK: SITE AT
57 SOUTH PASS.
C
7/17 SOUTH CAROLINA THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPING OFF-SHORE BUILhING WEST-
ELECTRIC AND GAS WARD TOWARD CHARLESTON.
7/18 BROWN ANI, FOOT THUNDERSTORM CELL DEVELOPING OFF LOUISIANA COAST
MOVING TOWARDS THE WORK SITE AT 624 WEST CAMERON.
7/23	 ALL MEhIA	 USEFUL IN DETERMINING EXTENT OF THUNDERSTORMS IN
CLIENTS	 NORTHEAST AND MIDhLE ATLANTIC STATES. *
7/.25 BROWN AND ROOT HELPFUL IN DETERMINING LOCATION OF' HEAVY CONVECTIC
OVER GULF OF MEXICO.
7/29	 K C M 0	 EXTENT AND MOVEMENT OF CONVECTION IN THE KANSAS
RAhIO	 CITY AREA,
7/30 ALL MARINE LOOP OF TROPICAL WAVE NEAR 15N/43W GAVE BETTER
ACCOUNTS	 INFORMATION AS TO STRENGTH OF THIS WAVE THAN ANY
OTHER SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
8/3 BROWW ANh ROOT ADVISED OF SQUALL AREA AND ITS MOVEMENT OVER THE
SOUTHWESTERN GULF OF MEXICO.
9	 8/6 BROWN AND ROOT ADVISED OF RAPID DEVELOPING THUNDERSTORMS OFF THE
LOUISIANA COAST NEAR 3 WORK SITES.
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Table 4 (cont)
4
f
DATE	 CLIENT-
8-9 BROWN i FOOT
8-10 ALL NORTHEAST
CLIENTS
8-11 ALL NORTHEAST
CLIENTS
8-18 KCMO AND WVGY
$-18	 BOSTON
REP SOX
8 -19 THE CAROLINA
UTILITIES
8-21 PHILADELPHIA
ELECTRIC/ PPSL
8-23 SOUTH CAROLINA
ELEC AND GAS
TYPE: OF WEATHER/AGT I014 TAKEN
DOW14PLAYED TROPICAL WAVE IN PAY 0+ CAMPE CHE
I1EVELOPMEN1 OF STORM SYSTEM OVER VRT LAKES A14D
ASSOCIATED TSTMS AND MOTION
DEVELOPMENT OF FRONTAL WAVE AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER
PROBLEMS
M0141TORED THU14DERSTORMS
RAIN ADVISORIES VOR BALLGAME
POSITIONS GROW'(Hv A1411 MOVEMLNT OF THORDERSTORMS
REVISED GE14ERAL WEATHER FORECAST
USED SATELLITE LOOPS EXCLUSIVELY FOR TSTIS NAPS
1"
r
f
8-23	 WDGY BASED ON' LOOPSs, HELD CLOUD 114 F'OR'ECAST LONGER THAN
OUR EARLIER FCSTS A14D LONGER THAN PIWEAU FCST
8-30 ALL NEW ENGLI411 BASED 014 GRAPHICS AND SAT LOOPS (AI_UNS WJ TH THE
CLIENTS CONVENTIONAL DATA)	 ISSUED SEVERE TSTH ALERTS ;' HRS
FE! )RE SELS ISSUED SE VEkE TSTM BOX
8-31	 CAROLING LOOPS SHOWED Ht:LN DAVID TUR14II46 SHARPLY NNW )1\11(1
POWER 8 LIGHT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. KASED ON THIS ► SENT FORFCASI
TO CAR POWER I LIGHT SHOWJ14G DAVIft THREATENING THE
SE U.S. EARLY THE F01.1.0WING WEEK
9-4	 THE CAROL114A MOVED DAVID Old SHORE AT SAVA140AH IILIRING 1HF LAZE
UTILITIES AFTERNOON/EARIY EVENING PERIOD.
0
.- Was
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Table 4 ont)
DATE	 Ak A/(:LIE_NT	 ACTION TAKEN
_9-
10-10	 ALL NEW ENGLAND
SNOW/ICE
10-23	 CHARLOTTEP RALEIGH
PORTSMOUTH. IBM-
GAITHERSBURG
-SO.-
1-24	 NY YORK THRWUAY
BASED ENDING TIMES or SNOW ON TIMING
SUGGESTED BY SAT LOOP.
RAIN/WIND FORECAST ISSUED BASED ON LOOP
MOVED SQUALL BANDS ACCORDING TO POSITION
AND MOTION SUGGESTED BY LOOP.
1--27 MITE-ATLANT:r, AND
SOUTHERN UTILITIES RAISED FORECASTED MTN TEMPS DUE TO CLOUD
1-28 ALL UTILITIES IN RAISED FORECASTED MIN TEMPS DUE LINGERING
N.	 & S.	 CAROLINA CLOUD COVER
1- . 29 SAME" AS FOR	 1--28 SAME REASON AS FOR 1-28
2--4 N.Y.	 STATE AND NEW TEMI • S AND GENERAL WEATHER FORECASTS
ENGLAND CLIENTS
.., SAME AS 2- 4 SAME AS FOR 2-4
2-5 MINNF_ASPOL IS AND ENDING OF SNO W BASED ON LOOPS
KANSAS CITY RADIO
DAILY USI: OF SOUTH AMERICA PORTION OF EASTERN FULL. DISC BY COMMOD1110;
GROUP FROM 1--1 TO CURRENT DATE, GRAPHICS VERY HELPFUL ON NUMEROUS
OCCASIONS MAINLY AS ONGOING MONITORING OF A GENERAL FORECAST,
f1^^.
6	
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we contacted this group first. Also, the winter season had already
begun--a time when we could expect these clients to be most aware of their
problems and operations.
The makeup of the snow and ice client group when the program began,
can be summarized as follows: Almost all (138 of 147) are government
departments in an area ranging from Maine to North Carolina; of these,
most (121) are cities ranging from a few thousand to several hundred
thousand population. Over half of these cities, however, have populations
of less than 30,000. In addition to the cities, there are four state
highway divisions, six turnpike authorities, and seven county bodies. The
non-governmental bodies among the snow and ice clients are either universi-
ties, shopping centers or private corporations, all of whom have large
parking areas to clear.
The questionnaire design effort was followed up by a visit to a number
of clients of different types. On the basis of the information so obtained,
we were satisfied that the questionnaire was sufficient for our purposes.
Questionnaires were mailed in early January 1977. As replies were received,
each client was contacted personally by phone for a few additional questions
and possible clarification.
Of the 147 subscribers in our sample, we received a total of 70
complete replies (48%). These 70 replies were then re-examined and recon-
tacted by telephone. After further analysis, it was decided to keep 26
for our final analysis. These clients cover eight states from North
Carolina to Massachusetts and break down like this:
States, Turnpikes, Counties: 6
	
Cities 50,000-100,000: 4
Cities >100,000 population: 8
	
Cities <50,000: 8
6	
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The sample is fairly representative of the group as a whole with a
weighting towards the larger users, and the elimination of the small,
private subscribers. In general, the weather forecast had a more
measurable impact on the more populous clients, and hence, the bias of our
sample.
The reasons for not selecting the other forty four give us an
insight into the problems encountered in disseminating meteorological
information. First, a few of the clients decided at some point that one
questionnaire was enough, and they refused to cooperate further. About
a dozen of the clients don't use the forecast at all. The reasons vary
from a preference for the National Weather Service since they are closer,
the fact that their predecessor subscribed so they feel they should, to
total ignorance of the product they are paying for. The others did not
use the forecast in a way that we can calculate its economic impact.
A sample questionnaire is included in Appendix D. (For reasons of
confidentiality, no client names are included on any of the samples.) The
3	
example given is from a city of about 25,000 population. As the question-
naire shows, we were interested not only in how forecast situations were
related to decision-making, but also in general characteristics of the
IF
entire operation, such as budget size, cost for an average plowing or
sanding situation, the size of the highway system, and so forth.
The replies to the questionnaires indicated that the two significant
forecastarameters for snow forecasting are timing and amount withinP	 8	 8
specified limits. The latter is used to determine what action will be
taken--sanding/salting or plowing. Most clients sand when minimal amounts
of snow fall, but plowing criteria vary from as little as 1 112 inches
t
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to as much as 4 inches. Hence, a city that plows at 4 inches will have
one course of action for any forecast less than 4 inches and a different
one for 4 inches or mare. In most cases a forecast of 4 inches produces
the same action as one of 10 inches. The exception is when outside con-
C	 tractors are called in, usually at a 6 or 8 inch forecast. Contractors
often require 2-4 h notice and must be paid for a minimum amount of time
(usually 4 h) whether or not the storm materializes. Forecast amounts can
therefore be translated into mobilization and personnel costs--what equip-
ment should be mobilized and who should be put on alert.
Timing is used to determine when the above occurs. During w,:ekday
C	 work periods timing is not that crucial, but at night and on weekends it
determines which crews are held over and who is put on alert at premium
wages. A storm that begins 12 h after it was forecast can thus cost
thousands of extra dollars.
There are a few other significant points. First, for about 1/4 of
the clients surveyed, the forecast of adverse weather has little economic
impact. Many of these are small townships who use the forecast for infor-
mation purposes only; mobilization time is so short and costs are so
minimal that they can wait until the last minute to prepare for a storm.
The security of knowing that they will be contacted at any hour in case of
an emergency is well worth the cost of the service (usually under $1000 per
season). Other clients, for example those in high snow regions, are
always mobilized for adverse weather or, at least, automatically mobilize
prior to a weekend or holiday.
About 1/5 of the respondents react to storms only when they are in
progress. They never mobilize for sanding until the snow begins to fall,
4
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and the plows are never brought out until a plowable amount is on the
ground. We also encountered many clients who seemed unpredictable; they
either subscribed to other weather services or only occasionally listened
to the consultant's forecast. These people preferred their own interpre-
tations to those for which they paid. Finally, public officials are very
reluctant to admit to misspending money or making mistakes; this makes the
task of assessing the impact of weather forecasts even more difficult.
The "overforecast," a forecast predicting more snow or ice than
actually falls, seems to cause the greatest quantifiable losses for snow
and ice clients. In such cases, crews are called in and equipment mobilized
unnecessarily. Given personnel salaries for sanding and salting, plowing
mobilizations and road operations, and a knowledge of when and for how
long crews would be called in, we were able to construct a fairly exact
method for calculating the cost of all overforecasts.
The "underforecast" was not so amenable to analysis. Many of the
"losses" here are indirect, as previously described, involving increased
complaints, loss of reputation, delays, and inconvenience to the public.
Another more quantifiable loss is the increased amount of time necessary
to clear or improve streets given a start in operations after the onset of
precipitation. Most clients had no idea how much such situations affect
their total time on the road, although one client thought it would result
in about a 25% increase in time and therefore in cost. Unfortunately,
this estimate is only approximate. In addition to the uncertainties
inherent in speculation about what would have happened if the forecast
had been otherwise, the actual difficulties imposed by a late start would
depend significantly on the rate of fall of the snow or ice at the beginning
4
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of the st,.rm, the condition of the streets before the onset of precipitation,
C	 the speed with which crews could mobilize and be out on the streets, and
the total effects of the storm, including such factors as drifting or
heavy icing that could magnify or minimize the effects of a slow start.
Since it is almost impossible to obtain meaningful quantitative losses for
the underforecast, in most cases we used only the overforecast for loss
calculations; thus our total costs will underestimate the true losses to
the clients due to imperfect forecasting.
Because different criteria are used for snow removal, a good forecast
to one user could cause a major loss of money for another. Table 5 shows
t.	 this variation forthree governmental bodies, and also shows possible
monetary losses. Two of these are public works departments in moderate-
sized cities and the third is a state highway department. The dollar figures
C	 in the cost column are a combination of expenses for a) mobilization and
demobilization of sand and salt equipment; b) the same except for plowing
equipment; c) payroll cost per hour for sand and salt crews; and d) the
same except for plow crews. Plow crews are usually larger than sand and
salt crews and thus involve greater expense. Mobilization is the process
of readying the trucks for street work; this includes loading materials
f	 into the trucks and mounting plows.
Every client has its own peculiar combination of costs. For instance,
some clients incur no mobilization expense if the snow forecast is received
I	 during regular work hours because there are enough personnel to perform
the mobilization as part of the normal daytime routine. Such factors,
along with overtime costs, are noted in the table.
In general, mobilization is a one-time cost (i.e., the entire cost is
incurred once the decision to mobilize is made). Waiting-time costs (c
-73-
C
T*mA S. Monetary losses due to incorrect snow forecasts.
t"
4
I
Forecast Outcome Cost
City A
<4" no snow $44/h + $750 (mobilization and demobilisation)
<4" later than forecast $44/h
>4" no $now $132/h + $750 (mobilization and demobilization)
>4" later than forecast $132/h
>4" <4" $U/h
Four-hour minimum. 1.5 for overtime. 2 for holidays.
City B
no snow plowable $150/h extra
> 2" no snow $200/h + $130 (mobilization and demobilisation)
> 2" later than forecast $200/h (standby)
>2" <2" $1 000/h + $100 (mobilization and demobilization)
If during regular hours (8 a.m. to 4:30 p .m.) costs are
} less and mobilization cost - 0
State C
< 2" no snow $27 050/h + $9 800 (mobilization and demobilization)
>2" no snow $27 050/h + $15 200 (mobilisation and demobilization)
>2" later than fo rast $27 030/h
$5 SIX (mobilisation and demobilization)
1.5 for overtime
v:^tAL PAGII IB
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and d above) are hourly and rise proportionately to the length of the
F
delay in precipitation onset or until the decision is made to demobilize.
The decision to demobilize is usually made when a forecast update is
received cancelling the snow alert.
Thus, for City A a forecast of <4 inches of snow would cause the sand
and salt trucks to be mobilized ($750) and the crew to wait ($44/h), if
necessary, from the time the snow was forecast to begin until the snow
actually began or until the decision was made to demobilize. Mobilization
costs in this case would only be counted as a loss if no snow fell; hourly
crew costs would only be considered losses if the crew was required to
wait for precipitation to begin.
Similarly, forecasts and outcomes for >4 inches cause plow mobilization
($750) and possible waiting time for the crew ($132/h). The case of a
forecast >4 inches and an outcome of <4 inches is a hybrid: the losses are
the result of paying for a plow crew when only a sand and salt crew was
needed ($132/h - $44/h - $88/h). This loss would be incurred for every
hour the unneeded plow personnel were held over. For City A no mobili-
zation loss would have occurred in this hybrid situation since the tasks
involved are the same regardless of whether sanding or plowing is being
planned. In other cities mobilization tasks vary between sand and salt
and plowing preparations, and the difference in expense would therefore
enter into the total loss.
City H estimates that it costs them about $150 per hour more to deal
with an unexpected storm than one they are prepared for. They also have
a skeleton crew ($200/h) on standby until precipitation begins, at which
time their full crew ($1000/h) is put on their payroll. State C puts its
s
tr
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full crew out for any amount of frozen precipitation, with the only differ-
ence being in mobilization costs.
Appendix E shows a series of actual WSC forecasts from the 76-77
season: Forecasts A and B are for a Boston suburb, and C is for two
districts of a state highway commission. They are summarized in Tables 6a
and b, and are chosen to illustrate our calculation procedure. The
December 29 storm (see Table 64 is an illustration of a gross underforecast
which did not result in calculable direct losses--though traffic was tied
up and total cleanup time for regular crews and contractors was probably
extended, no losses could be determined. The January 14 case (for the
same city) shows the danger of overforecasts. Because the snow did not
each plowable amounts (3 inches) during the evening, plows were mobilized
unnecessarily ($3300), contractors were called in at a forecast accumulation
>6 inches and paid the minimum four hours when they were not needed ($7000),
and day crews were unnecessarily held over until the snow stopped at 2 a.m.
(10 h x $250/h - $2500). Total loss was $12,800 or close to 9% of the
total seasonal snow budget.
Table 7 shows a series of forecasts for January 9. The forecast for
uver 3" of snow meant a plowable situation; its estimated beginning time
caused day crews to be held over. Snow actually began at 5 P.M. with a
total accumulation of 2.4", then changed to freezing rain and later to
rain. Plows were mobilized (due to the forecast) at 5 P.M. Because it
was at the end of the day shift crews were held over until the 5:30 A.M.
forecast update. Since the client only plows when 3" are on the ground,
it did not need to mobilize its plowing; force or hold its crews over. The
I
4	
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Table 6a
Sample Snow Foreca.it
Forecasts
k
Dec. 28	 8 A.M. snow beg. 9 A.M. 2"-4" by late P.M.	 50% chance of 4"+
1 P.M. snow beg. 9 P.M. 1" by 1 A.M.. 2"-4" by 6 A.M.
9 P.M. snow developing 3-6 A.M.	 2"-4" by 9 A.M.	 Risk of 4"+
by afternoon
Dec. 29	 9:30 A.M. Expected accumulation 2"-4" risk of 4"+
C
11:30 A.M. Total accumulation 10"-15".
Actual Conditions
t
Snow began at 3 A.M. became heavy by 9 A.M. and ended at 6 P.M.
Total accumulation:	 12"-16".
f
i
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Table 6b
Sample Snow Forecast
Forecasts
Jan.	 13	 9:30 A.M. light snow 1"-3" beginning 1 A.M.
2:00 P.M. snow beginning 3-6 A.M.
1"-3" by afternoon
55% chance of '"+
Jan. 14	 9:30 A.M. snow redeveloping 9 P.M.
1"-3" by midnight
3"-5" by 3-6 A.M.
4"-6" by 9 A.M. - Noon
1:00 P.*i. snow developing 6-9 P.M.
3"-5" by 1-3 A.M.
6"-8" by 6-9 A.M.
10:20 P.M. 3"-4" by 3 A.M.
6"-8" by 6 A.M.
7"-9" by 9 A.M.
Actual Conditions
.January 14
Snow began at 7 P.M., ended at 2 A.M. next morning
Total accumulation: 1.5"-2"
-tom,_.
ar .. W.
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Table 7
Actual Snow Forecast Lnd Oute ae
	Forecast 10:10 A.M.	 3"-6" beginning 7-9 P.M.
	
3:00 P.M.	 3"-6" beginning 3-5 P.M.
	
9:40 P.M.	 as above
Next bay	 5:30 A.M.	 1"-2"
Actual Conditions
Snow began at 5 P.M.: total accumulxtioa of 2.4" changed to freezing
rain, then all rain during the night.
Plows mobilized at 5 P.M. and stayed until 5:30 t..M. update.
Plowing criteria: 3"
-79-
extra cost was $23,450 calculated from
$1250/hr (crew costs) x 1.5 (overtime) x 12.5 hours.
This extra money was expended for what appeared to be a good forecast by
ordinary criteria.
In our study, however, most clients said they would prefer to be
prepared for a storm and lose money if the storm does not develop rather
than to be caught with their plows unmounted.
Finally, there is a situation in which an apparently incorrect forecast
is really more than adequate. This would be in a case where a client
receives a forecast for 6 inches and the actual accumulation is 15 inches.
The 6 inch forecast implies that the subscriber should put its entire
plowing force into operation, and once this is done total accumulation does
not alter the procedure--the operation just takes longer.
Detailed analyses were performed on the clients for the control
seasons. Mean snowfall for these clients ranges from over 100 inches to as
low as 5 inches. The results for the 1976-77, and 1977-•78 are summarized in
Table 8, with the specifics for each client given in Table 9.
In the latter, the second column shows an annual snow/ice budget;
the third includes the number of measurable snowfs.11s by amount; the next
column includes the number of forecast situations, and the percentage of
forecasts not producing a loss. That does not mean that the forecasts
were judged in an absolute sense, but only by their effect on the client's
operation. This is followed by the nunbfr of cases producing a calculable
monetary loss, the ^ionetary loss, and the percentage loss relative to the
annual budget. The final column includes any comment relevant only for
particular clients. There are a few clients for whom some forecasts were
-80-
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t
lost for part of a season, and hence, no calculations were made for that
year. All dollar figures are based on data obtained in 1976.
Though, for the most part, the number of measurable snowfalls averaged
out to be about the same for the two control years, the number of plowable
'	 snowfalls increased by one-third, with many unusually heavy seasonal totals.
Correspondingly, the number of storms producing monetary losses increased
by 10% during the second year with resulting losses increasing substantially
t	 (62X). We have found, that in general, the greater the seasonal snowfall,
the greater the potential economic loss, and that is borne out by these
statistics. Although no direct relationship exists between snow amount
and economic loss, the greater the number of snowfalls, especially those
which are plowable, the greater the potential for misforecasts which can
cause monetary loss. Another factor affecting the increased costs was
that an abnormally large number of storms either occurred at night or on
weekends resulting in premium wages being paid to workers on standby.
To summarize, the economic losses due to incorrect forecasts varied
f	 from an average of under $5,000 for the smaller communities to over $60,000
for the larger subscribers. This represented 3-15% of their annual snow
budget. Half of the clients studied had received more than five poor
forecasts that caused economic loss while only six subscribers had fewer
t	 . The majority of misforecasts were for light (up to 3 inches)
snow that never materialized. Though poor forecasts of plowable storms
were infrequent, they caused considerable loss. The number of erroneous
forecasts not causing direct losses averaged about four, with most of
these being underforecasts. The percentage of correct forecasts averaged
about 85%, which, from our experience, is rather high.
iL:77: 11 : A.
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The consultant's fees ranged from about $1,000 per snow season for
many of the cities to over $10,000 for the larger units. In most cases,
one forecast that prevents a client from unnecessarily calling in a con-
tractor, mobilizing, or holding crews over at night psys for the service
9
for the entire snow season. As the fee was usually less than 2% of total
expenditures, the clients who responded felt that the service was well
worth the cost.
The same procedures used to calculate losses during the control period
were applied to the 1979-80 snow season when satellite data were available.
It should be reiterated that the expe:imvntal period was one of the least
snowy years on record in the Northeast (e.g. it had the least snow in over
40 years at Albany, Providence, and Hartford), and among the snowiest on
record in many stations in Virginia and North Carolina. In addition, during
the course of this study, four of the snow/ice clients whose operations
we concentrated on, dropped the service: one from each group except
"southern cities."
The results for the 1979-80 season are summarized in Table 10, with
a client breakdown given in Table 9. We assumed the same dollar amounts
in all our calculations, though current costs are certainly much higher
than they were in 1976. A comparison of Table 10 with Table 8 shows that
during the experiment year:
1. The number of forecast days was reduced by between one feurth
(in the south) to one half (in the north).
2. The number of days of 1" snow or more was as few as 25% of those
during the control period in the north, but increased slightly for
the southern clients. This figure represents the number of cases
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where some action was taken (a.g. sanding or salting the streets).
3. The number of plowable storms averaged fewer than three (a
reduction by over half) with the greatest number of snowfalls
over three inches occurring in the south.
4. The percent of forecasts producing losses decreased everywhere
with the oust significant change in the large governmental bodies.
S. The monetary losses were either constant or reduced with the
changes reflecting the decrease in snow. In the turnpike authority
E
	 class, one very bad forecast greatly biased the average.
Thus, the only real conclusion we can draw is that the milder the
snow season, the smaller the losses due to incorrect forecasts. Many of
the forecast situations during the experimental year were for storms of
less than one inch. 'These forecasts rarely have much of a monetary effect
on the clients, and hence few situations existed this year where the
satellite data could have had an impact. In order to more closely measure
the impact of the satellite information we would need more data obtained
from more representative seasons.
b. Electric utilities
Eleven large electric utilities from New England to North Carolina
receive weather data from Weather Services Corp. Unlike many of the other
client groups, most of the electric companies service large areas and have
a cllentele ranging over a million households. Hence, any slight change
in their efficiency would be magnified many times. Weather forecasts are
used in three areas (:. operstinn: 1) winter load forecasting, in regions
where electric heating is prevalent; 2) summer load forecasting, in areas
of high air conditioning usage; and 3) storm alerts for maintaining and
repairing equipment.
r
t	
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Electric company equipment is very sensitive to weather extremes
because much of it is above ground and exposed. In winter, heavy snow,
extreme cold, high winds, and (most important) ice storms damage electrical
systems; in summer, severe weather, including high winds, hurricanes, and
lightning, often disrupt electrical power.
Though a forecast cannot prevent disruption, it can allow the utilities
to alert their own crews to catch trouble when it develops, to alert crews
from nearby systems, and to restore power at the fastest rate possible.
For routine maintenance, the utilities use the forecasts to make the most
efficient use of their manpower. In addition to economic factors, accurate
forecasts also have a benefit in the area of safety (such as the safety
of crews during electrical storms) and personal comfort.
Load forecasting depends upon a number of meteorological variables:
temperature, humidity, wind and cloud cover. Accurate forecasts enable
the utilities to better cope with long periods of temperature extremes or,
for example, by preparing reserve generators which are not economical to
maintain during non-peak situations, and which take a long time to be put
into cperation. A more efficient use of available equipment could minimize
down time and reduce "brown-outs."
Eleven utilities in all were contacted as part of this study, most
of them located in the Northeast. A sampi- ^:impleted questionnaire is
included in Appendix F. This company receivtd forecasts every three
hours for temperature, relative humidity, winds and weather for two days
in advance, plus a third day outlook. If severe weather occurred, they
were also notified. They are a su-ner peaking company whose major
t
problems are brought about by heavy air conditioning use and rapid chanRes
. 
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r
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tenauce of the hi hl vulnerable air system,8 y	 P-and .another iavalving=the	 ,
use of daily forecasting to predict and plan for peak loads. The former
situations were done on a case study basis of which two are presented here;
the latter was done with the help of daily forecast forms and verifications
over the summer months, when the utilities are most vulnerable to unexpected
peak loads.
Peak load forecasting (see Barnett, 1973) refers to the necessity for
electric utilities to predict the maximum power usage on any given day.
During the summer months, when power usage is often expected to exceed the
amount of power available from other outside sources (many companies belong
to a network which supplies all members with power), the utility must plan
on generating its own extra power, usually from either steam or combustion
turbines. Given plenty of warning, cheap steam turbines can be put on line;
however, because turbines have a long (12 hour) "warm-up" time, a company
may be forced to use combustion turbines. These can be readied in a
matter of minutes, but are twice as expensive as steam generators: 40
mills per kilowatt-hour as opposed to about 20 mills for steam. (By the
summer of 1979, these costs had risen to from 50 to 80 mills/KW for combus-
tion and 25 to 30 mills/KW for steam.) The economics of the situation are
apparent: an over-forecast of degree days, temperature-humidity index or
other measure of heat and humidity used by the company results in unneeded
4
i
t
0
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ci
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J	 use of expensive combustion turbines. Power cane be saved from day to
day: once scheduled, .it motet be used.
There are a number of ether factors which affect the economic impact
of the weather forecast on these users. There are:
Tolekance--- 11 companies  have a certain amount of s1 cg in their
power usage such that they can ,tolerate unexpected fluctuations in
(	 temperature. This _Leeway	 be as large as 100 but usually it is from
2° to V.
Size of the System--Naturally, very large system covering 'population
centers or even whole states are more vulnerable to temperature fluctuations
than are small system. The typical cost of a 1° error in the forecast
above the aforementioned tolerance, is about $2000 but this can go as high
as '$3000 or as low as $300.
Critical Point--This is the point above which a utility must schedule
the use of its own turbines. A forecast or actual weather above this point
has a potential economic impact. Below this point, the system would not
ordinarily schedule extra turbines and thus would not be vulnerable to
forecast errors. Critical points are usually at a THI of 70-75, or about
85°F.
Given information on the tolerance, size, critical point and cost
of turbine power generation, it is possible to calculate economic impact
of the forecast on a given system. Such information was available from 3
of the 8 systems from whom questionnaires were received. The others were
not used because they did not do peak load forecasting from WSC forecasts
(3 clients); or their systems had large tolerances which made misforecasts
0-
-93-
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E
highly unusual (2 clients).`
An exile of such a calculation is sham below:
Critical point at which extra turbines are added • 70 THI
Forecast at-8 AM, 7/?/77 for 3 PM 7/1/77
Temperature a 81% R. Humidity - 642
Actual Weather at 3 PM, 7/1/77
Temperature • 86% R. Humidity - 69%
Since both the forecast and the actual weather exceeded 70 THI, an
error of 5° would potentially cause economic loss. The system had a
tolerance of 2° which means that the actual impact on the system was 3°.
Each one degree error causes a 100 MW change in load. Multiplying this
times the cost of power generation ($22.001MW HOUR) gives a cost of $2200
per degree. Thus the extra cost of scheduling combustion turbines to
ccver a high temperature that was 5° in error was $6600/hr. Since the
peal. load period can generally occur anytime from 11 AM to 3 PM, this
same cost could be incurred during other hours; however, since this client
was not as vulnerable to extended periods of peak shaving only used this one
hour value as an indication of the loss. Because of our conservative
approach, actual losses could have been several times higher.
If the same error had been made in the 60° range, no loss would have
incurred since the critical point of 70 THI would not have been exceeded.
The results from these three utilities are summarized in Table 11
for the period 1977-79. The calculations for all years were carried out
using the same method and cost factors. These calculated costs do not
include person power (to run extra generators) which was a negligible part
of the total. The months included in the analysis are consistent from
year to year for each client, but vary between the clients themselves
0
PIPM
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TABLE 11
Electric Utility Results*
Max Poorer M12 Critical
Company
	
Used (MW) Serviced Point Tolerance Cost/deg Period Analyzed
A	 4,425 10,000 85' 4° $2205 4/1 to 9/30
B	 2,932 1,230 70 THI** 2 0 $2200 4/1 to 9/30
C	 5,760 2,475 None 30 $2000 5/9 to 6/15, 7/1 to 9/30C
Total No. of Misforecasts/
Total Forecasts exceeding
'	 Critical Point Overforecasts Underforecasts
1977	 1978	 1979 1977	 1978 1979 1977	 1978 1979
A	 12%22	 4/35	 5/30 10	 3 1 2	 1 4
B	 49/103 70/100	 42/90 36	 34 28 13	 36 14
C	 56/101 53/100	 53/101 28	 31 26 28	 22 27
C
Total Loss Due to Forecasts
Normalized
1977	 1978	 1979
	 1978	 1979
A	 $67,813
	
$28,665
	
$11,585
	
-$11,406
	
-$13,074
B	 $323,400	 $492,800
	
$235,400
	 $502,219
	
$276,217
C	 $1,113,500 $1,144,500 $1,037,000
	
$1,144,500 $1,037,000
* Based on 1977 data
** Temperature-humidity index
0
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depending on the completeness of the data. Thus Client A and B were
analyzed over a similar 7 month period from April to October while Client
C could be followed only over approximately a four month period through
May to September.
Comparing the clients with one another, one quickly sees that although
costs per degree are about the same for all three clients, Client A has
both a lower number of misforecasts and a lower dollar loss figure. This
is primarily due to the fact that Client A has a relatively high critical
point and tolerance level. Thus in 1977, only 22 forecasts were for
temperatures equal to or exceeding 85°F and of these only twelve had
errors greater than the tolerance value.
One would expect, looking at the number of misforecasts and cost/
degree, that Clients B and C would have similar dollar losses. In fact,
Client C has losses larger by a factor of about four. This is because
Client C stated that they could incur peak load forecasting losses over
a four hour period depending on forecast and actual temperatures given
twice during this interval. Based on the information we had, we assumed
Client A incurred losses only over a one hour period and Client B over
two hours although these assumptions underestimate the actual dollar
loss on exceptional days.
In addition, Clients B and C were, as previously mentioned, not com-
pared over the same length of time. The longer data series used for B along
with its lower tolerance tends to compensate for the more restrictive
critical point. In any case, the dollar figures are most meaningful in
their variations from year to year for the same client. Costs are not
strictly comparable between clients as absolute values not only because
of the differing times compared but also because of variations in the
r.
['I C
quality of the information upon which the calculations are based. The
FF	
dollar figures nonetheless do give an indication of the order of magnitude
f	 of costs involved.
The total number of misforecasts is broken down into overforecasts,
C
	
those times when predicted maxima exceeded the actual, and the opposite
case, underforecasts. Overforecasts outnumber underforecasts by 57% to
43%, but we are doubtful that there is any statistical significance to
this, especially since we can think of no practical reason for the pre-
dominance of overforecasting.
The final entries of Table 11 show the actual losses for the two
control years and one experimental year plus the values of the last two
years, normalized with respect to the first. This normalization was
accomplished by comparing the number of times in each year the critical
point was exceeded. Since this number is either a function of temperature,
or both temperature and humidity, such a comparison is used to eliminate
the climatological variations between the two years with regard to the
dollar losses presented here. Thus, if Client X had 20 days in 1977
which exceeded the critical point and 10 days in 1978, one would expect
that the losses in the latter year would be half that of the former, if
I	 forecast accuracy were to remain the same. Of course, this accuracy
varies, and should account for most of the differences between the normal-
ized values.
If this assumption is true, then one can make the follcwaing observations:
s
	 for Client A there was a drastic improvement in accuracy after 1977 when
normalized losses actually became negative. This sudden change is a little
C_	 hard to explain unless one assumes that a differert forecaster with greater
-96-
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skill or better techniques assumed the job after the first year (although
WSC has no recollection that this happened). Clients B and C are more
uniform; they both have greater normalized losses in 1978 and the best
record of all in 1979, a 14% improvement over the first year for B, a
7% improvement for C.
Can this improvement be related to the introduction of satellite data?
Unfortunately, no. There were few known instances when temperature fore-
casts for these utilities were altered because of satellite information.
Forecast accuracy may have been helped in 1979 by the fact that there were
fewer cases than average of heat wave or severe storm conditions, times
when the forecast would be more crucial and data sources consulted more
thoroughly.
Turning now to our case studies, one documented storm we have studied
concerns the Northeastern snow storm of March 22-24, 1977. This storm was
not forecast to affect the region as it did with up to 30" of snow over a
two day period. In fact, even at the time that maximum electrical outages
1;	
were being reported, the forecast was calling for only 1-2" of snow. The
cost for hiring extra crews to service the affected area was in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars. (One company estimated the cost to be $351,900).
r	 No forecast could have reduced this figure to zero; however, the failure
to give adequate warning of the impending crisis no doubt took its toll
in the slowness of the recovery. One company reported up to 59,930 outages
it	 at the peak of the storm on the 22nd, another reported 34,245. While this
was reduced to 9,500 two days later, the remaining restoration was made
difficult due to the inaccessibility of roads due to snow. Not until the
26th was full power restored. Speed in power restoration is, of course,
r'--
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highly desirable not only because of the inconvenience to the customer but
also because delays in power restorations tend to compound themselves due
to continuing storm conditions, (e.g. snow, wind, and drifting). The
importance of the forecast in this process is obvious.
Another storm of consequence occurred on October 16 to 20, 1977. This
storm brought up to 14" of heavy wet snow to the mid-Atlantic region. Like
the previous case, the severity of this storm -gas a surprise, with only
1-2" forecast around midnight on the 16th, just hours before the heaviest
accumulations fell. Due to the weight of the snow, much damage resulted
from falling limbs and trees. A total of 55,194 customers were eventually
affected for periods ranging from two minutes to 72 hours. Total cost of
this storm was $2,025,000.
Both these case studies are for the control period. Our hopes for
similar case studies in 1979 where we could perhaps have shown a concrete
application of satellite data to an ice storm situation were foiled by the
fact that there simply were no ice storms of note in the 1979-80 season
affecting the region served by the utilities.
In summary, we halve documented here in a quantitative way the effect
of weather and weather forecasting on the electric utilities. While we
cannot present the actual benefits of satellite data to such a user, one
can easily see the areas where satellite information would be valuable.
In summer, clues as to the location, movement, and severity of thunderstorms
are often provided from satellite data, and in winter, the advantages
pointed out under the snow and ice section pertain here.
Satellite data is less crucial to temperature forecasting (used in
peak load determination), but even here changes in cloud cover can on
i
';	 % c
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occasion greatly alter the prediction. Especially with a looping capa-
bility, one can sometimes spot trends such as the movement of dry tongues
or regions of subsidence before they are clearly apparent in other data
sources. For the cases studied, however, these opportunities are found
C	 only infrequently.
c. Gas utilities
Weather Service Corporation provided forecast information to 33 gas
utilities from Maine to Georgia. They ranged from among the largest
utilities in the country (Con Edison, Philadelphia Gas) to small municipal
systems (Lexington, NC Gas Dept.; Vermont Gas Sytems, Inc.). The weather
forecasts were used in two major areas: (1) maintenance and service of
the system, and (2) forecasting load requirements in order to make optimal
s-
use of the available gas supply.
Since most gas mains are underground, weather does not frequently
interfere with equipment. Occasionally extreme cold, snow and other forms
of precipitation interfere with routine maintenance, and heavy snow
plus deep frost penetration require the call-up of emergency manpower. In
emergency situations the forecast is used to minimize the time customers
are without service, and to schedule available manpower efficiently. In
routine maintenance, forecasts are used to call men into work when the
weather permits. For example, if crews are called in and the weather
is inclement, they would have to be directed to other tasks or paid even
if they did not work; if they were not called in dtiring good weather,
needed repairs may have to be done on overtime shifts. No company was
able to quantify these losses or relate them directly to forecast errors,
however, due to complicated union rues or other work force scheduling
arrangements. As a result we have not included case studies in this area.
-100-
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	 Gas utilities are vulnerable to many of the same factors as the
electric utilities with regard to peaking problems. In general, the
E
	 factors of threshold, system size and tolerance apply here as they do for
electric companies (see Ruskin, 1967; Roth, 1963). Gas companies can
	
l_	 draw only so much from their pipelines; anything above this set amount
has to be provided from in-house supplies such as liquid natural gas
(LNG), propane-air or storage facilities. These sources are generally
more expensive to use (in 1977 anywhere from $1.50/MCF to $3.50/MCF*)
than pipeline gas and therefore unneeded use of these due to forecast
error would have an economic effect. Sometimes, generation of unneeded
	
t
	 gas could be stored for the next day thus eliminating financial loss. In
other cases, a company might have a special contract whereby gas could be
provided through storage or pipeline on a few hours notice. But in many
cases such flexibility was not available and the loss due to exce a gas
generated could not be mitigated. Likewise, the failure to prepare for
an actual peak load, would mean using either pipeline gas at penalty rates
	
4
	 (up to 10 times more expensive), using more expansive storage gas that
had eventually to be replaced, or shutting off interruptible customers with
a consequent loss of income. This latter possibility has become increasingly
	
J
	 rare in recent years. Whereas at the start of this study in 1976, most gas
companies had at least some interruptibles whose gas flow could be adjusted
to compensate for unexpected peaks, current gas shortages caused most
t
.0,
t
*Conversations with some of the utility clients this past year indicate
that cost, and in some cases, procedure have changed since our original
survey. For instance, LNG conversion to pipeline gas in 1979 cost between
$5 and $6 per MCF as opposed to $3.50 in 1976 and steam turbine costs have
increased by 50% or more. Also, in at least one case, the client has
laid an additional pipeline thereby cha:±ging his critical point by 10°.
G
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companies to either cut their interruptables off completely (especially
during winter months) or switch to a "priority" system of gas distribution.
In a priority system all customers are liable to a cutoff with large
commercial customers being the first to go and smaller residential cus-
tomers being last. Cutoff could be done on short notice thus giving the
gas company great flexibility. Where such an operation was in effect, it
made calculation of monetary loss impossible unless one knew in exact
detail the situation in regard to gas supply and allocation on a given day.
Of the 33 gas utilities contacted, complete responses were received
from 21; three declined to participate. Many of the 21 also were contacted
by phone to clarify some answers. A sample completed questionnaire is
included in Appendix G. This utility (Company S) received forecasts up to
three days in advance for average temperature, maximum and minimum tem-
perature, degree-day, and effective heating degree-day (EHDD, which includes
wind). In addition, temperature forecasts were given for every three hours,
and wind data every twelve hours. When significant weather was expected,
that too was included in the forecast. Company S explained that since
every
 maintenance situation was different, it would be impossible to give
exact monetary figures. On the other hand, it was apparent that when tem-
peratures dropped to about 10° F, the exact accuracy of the forecast became
crucial, with penalties of up to $5.00/million cubic feet for the gas that
was "misused."
In studying this gas utility company we used the forecast EHDD along
with their updates, matched them with actual conditions and determined how
far Company S was from the optimal use of their gas supplies due to the
weather forecast.} f
rA,
_ t
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Of the 21 clients who returned questionnaires, 5 were usable for cost
calculation. Mother 7 were not used because of failure to provide suf-
ficient information on their operations; 8 were clients using a flexible
system of special contract, storage facilities, or priority allocation
mentioned above; and one client dropped service after 2 years. Generally
s	 the 16 clients whose responses were not used were either smaller utilities
with less gas flow, or the very large companies with ambiguous cut-off
C	 points for peak shaving.
To illustrate the operations of these clients which were used for
calculation purposes, we will examine one forecast for a utility which
C	 receives forecasts for two cities within its service area. The critical
point for this utility was 52 degree days (DD), arrived at by their send
out and gas availability. (The critical point is reached if the weighted
(by relative gas consumption) average temperature of the two cities equals
or exceeds 52°). They could tolerate a V error and needed a lead time of
four hours to adjust their operations. Table 12 shows the forecasts.
C	 updates and verifications; the 1200 LT forecast is the one used for veri-
fication. For city A, the error was 2°. Since they use 1875 thousand
cubic feet/degree day (MDF/DD) and expensive gas is $3.50/MCF extra, the
C	 extra cost is 1875 x $3.50 - $6562.50 (considering the 1° tolerance). For
city B. with a 5° error and a sendout of 625 MCF/DD, the cost for the
gas was $8,750. In addition it cost them $40/HR x 24 hrs ($960) to run
the peaking facility when it could have remained idle. Hence, total loss
for the utility this day was $16,272.50. On the other hand, with a forecast
of 50 DD and a verification of 42 DD this larger error would not have had
 any adverse economic impact because it was not in the critical temperature
Ci,
C:
C.
Manpower Coats: $40/hr x 24 hrs
- $960.
Total: $8750 + 960 - $9710.
Total Loss: $16,272.50
E
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#	 Table 12
Actual Gas Forecast And Outcome
Cif 	 City F
Forecast	 Forecast
Effective	 Effective
De ree	 free
Tom. M
	
Temp. Days
7:00 AM	 15'	 57	 17'	 55
12:00 Noon	 16	 55	 18'	 54
9:00 PM	 19	 53	 22'	 50
Actual: 20% 53 DD.	 Actual: 23% 49 DD.
Critical Point for Supplemental Gas: 52 DD
Need 4 Sours Lead time.
Can absorb V error
City W	 City F
(2' error - 1' tolerance) x 	 (5' error - 1' tolerance) x
1875 MCF/DD - 1875 MCF.	 625 MCF/DD ; 2500 MCF.
1875 x $3.50/MCF extra	 2500 x $3.50/MCF extra
$6562.50	 $8750.00. +
-104
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The results from our calculations are summarized in Table 13. Notice
that the critical points for gas companies are in degree days. The 1978-
.	 79 season is not included because it was a transitional period in the use
of the satellite data, as stated pre-iously.
s
	
	
In general, the gas utilities here are smaller operators than the
electric utilities previously surveyed, although their losses due to
forecasting erro: can still mount up into the hundreds of thousands of
9	 dollars. Companies D and E are exceptions to this rule because they both
have high (in degree days) critical points which are seldom reached. Even
a slight lowering of these points would have resulted in substantially
9	 greater vulnerability to loss. It would appear that Client A would be
the most prone to such losses but A is a Southern system with a high
tolerance. Its losses are therefore less than the Northern Clients B and
C. Company C in particular has a lower tolerance and a higher cost per
degree, making its losses the largest in the table. We caution, however,
that these figures should be considered only as estimates of the actual
losses. Because of the complexity of the individual operators, these
figures are not strictly comparable except when viewing one client's
change over time.
As with electric utilities, overforecasts (i.e. prediction of higher
temperatures than actual) predominated 61% to 39%. We do not know the
reason for this bias.
The 1976 thru 1.978 winter seasons were considerably below normal in
temperature and unnormalized losses are correspondingly great. The 1979-
80 season was much above normal. Taking these fluctuations into account,
one can see that normalized (with respect to 1976-77) losses show worse
!'^- 
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Table 13
Gas Utility Results
Max Gas Mil Critical
Company	 Used (MCF) Serviced Point Tolerance Coat/deg. Period Analyzed
A 144,000 1025 28 30 $2500 11/1 to 2/28
B 260,000 1703 50 2° $7000 11/1 to 2/28
C 206,000 '.66 52 1° $8750 11/1 to 2/28
D 36,000 150 55 20 $1995 11/1 to 2/28
E 91,878 225 55" 20 $3125 11/1 to 2/28
t Total	 of Misforecasts/
Total	 of Forecasts ex-
ceed ing Critical Point Overforecasts Underforecasts
1976-	 1977- 1979- 1976- 1977- 1979- 1976-	 1977-	 1979
1977	 1978 1980 1977 1978 1980 1977	 1978 1980
A	 22/65	 14/63 10/49 15 9 5 7 5 5
B	 12/29
	 8/19 2/11 8' 3 1 4 5 1
C	 25/28	 15/17 8/13 13 13 7 12 2 1
D	 1/2	 Oil 0/0 0 0 0 1 0 0
E	 1/4	 1/1 0/0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Total Loss Due to Forecast
Normalized
1976-77 1977-78 1979-80 19771-78 1979-80
A	 $122,500 $95,000 $50,000 $98,770 $80,154
B	 $175,000 $133,000 $49,000 $193,345 $157,621
C	 $354,375 $264,688 $85,313 $403,907 $275,157
n	 S1.995 SO $0 -- --
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forecasting errors in 1977-78 for clients B and C, and then noticeable
improvement thereafter for all three clients (35X, 10%, and 222 for A,
B, and C respectively, comparing 1976-77 to 1979-80). In all cases, this
last season brought forward the best forecasting results.
We can say as with the electrin utilities that satellite cloud cover
information could be expected to improve temperature forecasts. Yet the
staff of WSC could point to few specific situations when the satellite
data helped their predictions. Thus we cannot ascribe any of this final
improvement to the McIDAS system data.
d. Fuel oil dealers
t
Fuel oil dealers generally receive three distinguishable services from
the weather consulting firma One of these, calculated effective heating
degree-days, is based on actual weather data and is used with the customer's
empirical "K-factor" to estimate the rate of fuel consumption. By keeping
track of cumulative effective degree-days since the last fill, the current
status of a customer's fuel supply can be determined. The impact of
satellite data on knowledge of actual (past) wind and temperature would be
slight. However benefits might be expected in the other two services--pre-
dicted degree-days and storm warnings which are both used to make delivery
schedules more efficient.
Not every firm responded to every question on our questionnaire; of
the total of 52 possible respondents, 21 were usable because most of the
essential information was supplied. The uniformity of response to the
principal questions indicated that this is an adequate sample. A repre-
sentative completed questionnaire has been reproduced in Appendix H. 	 he
operation described is typical, though a bit larger than most.
l:
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A typical fuel oil company surveyed serves about 3900 customers,
and delivers 6.6 million gallons annually using seven or eight drivers
who work the equivalent of five and one half days per week. Normal (1976)
rate of pay ranged mostly within a dollar of $6.50 per hour, but drivers
4
Ct	 often worked overtime at around $10.00 per hour. Within the heating season
there are peaks in the demand for fuel delivery. Most firms handle this
by the overtime mentioned above, but a few switch burner repairmen or
office personnel to delivery.
The typical fuel oil customer receives about 180 gallons per tank
fill. This is done about 10 times, so he or she uses about 1800 gallons
per year. The heating season in the northeastern U. S. has about 7500 EDD
(an effective degree day [EDD] differs from a degree day in that it includes
the effect of wind) so that a typical customer burns about 0.24 gallons per
EDD. For cold days (50 EDD), this amounts to about 12 gallons per day.
In terms of 50 EDD days, a three-to-four day tank reserve is 36 to 48
gallons. This is roughly consistent with the stated optimum fuel drop of
192 gallons (.70 tank capacity, 265 gallon tank) for most dealers. Since
the actual drop is nearer 180, the typical customer carries almost seven
days reserve ([265 gal - 180 gal]/12 gal/day - 7 days).
Most dealers prefer to plan deliveries three or four days in advance,
though later adjustments can be made if necessary. This means that delivery
rates are dependent on about eleven days of verified degree day data and
up to three or four days of predicted degree day data. This suggests
that predicted degree days would have to be 50 EDD (or 12 gallons of oil)
in error over a four day period to cause a noticeable risk of tanks
§ ^..	
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dropping significantly below the 0.30 full level. The dealers surveyed
expressed a significant concern for forecast errors more than 36.5 EDD in
four days.
Figures 6a-c shows the predicted and actual EDD values for December 1976
through February 1977 using the last available forecast before delivery.
One can see that the areas of disparity are relatively small compared with
50 EDD. On the other hand, if first available forecasts (up to four days
t,	 ahead, coinciding with the delivery planning cycle) were considered, fairly
large disparities are occasionally found. These errors, however, are
economically insignificant since the operators themselves use the latest
'	 information for planning.
The effect of improved precipitation information on actual oil
delivery would usually be more important than improved degree day forecasts.
'	 Winter storm warnings play a major role in short range schedule changes.
The oil dealers agreed that up to four inches of snow would not stop their
trucks because of the heavy load and large wheels. However, it does slow
things down, so that over half the firms will try to pull ahead on especiall-,
difficult 'snow stops'. This usually mea_Ls overtime pay for drivers at 1.5
times normal wage rates. For snow over 4" this practice is nearly universal.
Consequently, 4" Li an important threshold value for snow forecasts. A
'good' forecast is one for which the forecast snow depth and the actual
depth fall on the same side of the 4" mark.
If overtime is scheduled on the basis of a forecast which later proves
incorrect, the loss arises because the overtime and premium rate were
unnecessary. Similarly, if a storm occurs which was not forecast properly,
drivers are unable to make deliveries at difficult "snow stops" and, in
t
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an extreme case, have had to hand carry 5-gallon cans of fuel to customers.
Snowy conditions also slow down deliveries to normal customers, which
cause reserves to drop, and the risk of a run-out to increase.
Considering the factors important to the fuel oil dealers, there were
only a small number of potentially significant weather events to monitor
even in the severe winter of 1976-77. Day of the week and previous
weather modify the effects of forecasts. Projections for Mondays, or days
after holidays, depend more on forecasts than do normal work days; previous
weather may determine whether deliveries are current or have fallen behind.
A Friday forecast of 4" of snow for Saturday, for example, would have no
effect if 12" had been received on Thursday. Delivery efforts would
already be backed up. For snows much greater than 4", the available
response time was often too short. It simply takes more than two or three
days to recover from a 10" snow.
Of the ten principal events examined for 1976-77, five forecasts
exceeded the threshold criteria set forth above (namely, a 4" depth or
greater). Only one of the ten precipitation forecasts had a large error
with regard to amount. With respect to being on the same side of the 4"
threehold, however, only five of the forecasts were good. The above results
apply to three geographical areas and affect 16 of the 21 firms available
for study.
For a December 1976 storm with an 11" snowfall, for example, an hour
of overtime worked before the storm was worth a savings factor of four
times as much as an hour of overtime worked after the storm according to
one of the clients. Many companies placed two men on a truck because of
the very difficult hose pulls. Consequently, a 'typical' oil company
employing 7.5 drivers at the overtime rate of $10 per hour, had the
-111-
opportunity to put in six to eight hours of overtime ahead of the storm
and save $1350 to $1800 in delivery costs. (7.5 drivers x $10/hr/driver x
3 [ - savings factor) x 6 or 8 hours) The aggregate savings to the 16
firms in this area for the three large snowfalls during the 76-77 winter
season came to about $60,000. The benefits could have been much greater
with more lead time. Firms did not return to a normal delivery schedule
for as long as a month after the January 7-10, 1977 storms.
Unfortunately, as noted ir, other sections of this report, during
the with-satellite data year of this study, the winter was so mild and
nearly devoid even of threats of heavy snow (>4") that a meaningful com-
parison and valid conclusions are not possible.
e. Merine forecasting
One client firm was engaged in offshore exploration. General marine
forecasting is an attractive application for satellite data, since one
of the significant problems in marine forecasting is .lack of conventional
data.
The forecasts were intended for operations about 200 miles offshore,
conducted from a 175 foot research vessel. The ship towed cables bearing
sensitive instruments for geophysical sounding. After two weeks at sea,
the ship would normally return to port, change crew and return to station.
Wind, waves and unusual weather were of interest. The cable-instrument
assembly, valued at one-half million dollars, could easily be damaged by
unfavorable weather. Consequently, weather forecasts were important in
planning the orderly conduct of exploration (decisions to deploy or retrieve
the equipment). Since the vessel is comparatively small it had to return
to po •:t in severe weather. This required a 15 to 20 hour warning to insure
^`^ -	 .,
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against damage or loss of the ship, a multimillion dollar investment, and
*	 harm to the lives of the crew.
If a storm occurred but was not forecast, or if it were more severe
than forecast, the direct economic loss would include the cost of damage
S	 and lost time for repairs, multiplied by the ship operating costs and wage
rates. If a storm were forecast (wind or waves) but was late, was less
severe than forecast, or did not occur at all, direct economic loss would
6	 be quantifiable as lost time multiplied by wage rates, plus the cost of
maintaining the scientific crew and operating the ship on station ($9K per
day). There would be an additional cost for fuel, if the ship leaves
i	 station unnecessarily to avoid the expected storm. According to the client
it was not possible to calculate the indirect economic impact of the lost
time; such lost time affected the competitive position relative to other
companies. (In the opinion of this client, indirect dollar benefits and
losses of this kind were far larger than direct costs or benefits.) While
our program was in progress, this client discontinued its forecasts from
Weather Services, and hence it was not possible to complete the study of
the benefits of satellite data.
A second marine client was a barge towing firm. The primary activity
of this particular company involved transport between fixed points. Often
the cargo was coal in large open hopper barges. Push towing was preferred.
Typically, two forecasts were issued each day (830 and 1530 GMT). Both
0	 forecasts were broken into several segments three to six hours long, as
needed. Usually, both extended through 2400 GMT the following day. Forecast
parameters included: General weather; visibility; wind, speed with direction
0	 on 16 compass points; speed of gusts; seas; and remarks.
I
*	 fi
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Typically, three zones were forecast. The first was Philadelphia
Harbor, Delaware Bay and the Upper Chesepeake Bay, the second was the .lower
Chespepeake Bay, and the remaining one was Cape May to Providence.
The client did not maintain an independent log of verifications. The
critical parameters were, according to the client, wind speed, and to a
lesser extent, direction. For the Cape May to Providence leg, winds blowing
out of the west to northwest were less effective in setting up short
"choppy" waves which were much more important than swell. This is the
reason the client was much more interested in the "winds" part of the
forecast than the "seas" portion. Except for the obvious effect on
visibility, general weather was of no consequence.
According to the client, one of the shortcomings of present forecasts
was the tendency to a loge spread in forecast values. For example, on
29 April 1977 the forecast called for winds out of the north 15-20 kt
between 900 and 1300 GMT in the upper Chesapeake Bay. In the lower Bay
the spread was wider, 15-25 kt out of the north.
The range of greatest interest was roughly speeds over 20 kt. It
is possible that satellite data could have materially improved the shorter
range portion of the forecasts and brought about a reduction of the spread
of values, making the forecasts more useful to the client.
The obvious, direct economic loss to the barge operator was the wages
of the crew during periods when prohibitive conditions were forecast,
but did not prevail. However, there was a further economic value of the
time lost. If none were lost, more loads could have been transported,
hence more revenue generated. Therefore, the lost time should also have
been multiplied by a significant fraction of the rate at which transport
generated a net economic value (revenue less operating costs excluding
6
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those attributable to lost time itself), and the result added to lost wages.
6	 None of these calculations were in fact possible due to the absence of a
ship log for verification.
The third marine client was added after our research was in progress.
C	 This client chose not to provide detailed information. The enterprises
requiring Tnarine forecasts were off-shore construction projtcts. The
usefulness of satellite data to this company can be judged from the log
C	 in Table 4. Though we cannot quantify its impact, the log illustrates
that satellite images are useful for precisely locating small scale intense
systems like gust fronts and thunderstorms for very short range forecasts.
f. Commodity clients
Among the weather service clients are nine commodity dealers. We
were able to obtain some information from seven, and detailed questionnaire
responses from four of these. In addition we were able to acquire still
more understanding of this group through two on-site visits.
Futures trading is a major preoccupation of these firms. In contrast
to speculators whose intention is to turn a quick profit: .lient firms
trade mainly to guarantee supplies and to protect themselves from unexpectedly
large fluctuations in raw material prices (although they do occasionally
take advantage of a singular opportunity).
This client group carries on mainly three kinds of activity: First,
they may produce and merchandise brand name products to consumers through
wholesalers and retailers. Secondly, they may produce a bulk, or unpackaged
commodity which is made into consumer goods, or packaged, and merchandised
by another firm. Sometimes the "other firm" may be a functionally inde-
pendent branch of the same company. Typical commodities of this kind could
E	
-115-
be vegetable oil, sugar, or flour. The third activity is dealing in raw
commodities, like soybeans, wheat or coffee beans. The intention is to
obtain these from producers and make them available to producers after
providing necee ,jary storage, transportation or other service.
In order to clarify the economic benefits of weather information,
both actual and forecast, for these firms, we must point out that the
impact may be quite different for each of the activities mentioned above.
In general, for consumer products, retail prices are determined by many
factors unrelated to the cost of the raw materials (e.g. advertising,
labor, shipping). In addition, prices obtained for consumer products
t	 do r3^)t necessarily vary in a one-to-one correspondence with these costs.
Sometimes the price is relatively inflexible. Thus, even though the costs
of the raw product may be a minor component of the total cost, it can be
a major factor in the spread between prices and total cost. For this
reason, the firms may use the futures market to assure themselves of a
future supply of a commodity at a known price.
The cost of a raw commodity is a more significant factor in the case
of the bulk processing activity. This is because other cost components
such as advertising, labor, and transportation tend to be less significant,
t	 and because the product is a commodity indistinguishable from the com-
petitor's product which must sell at a price determined by supply
and demand in the market place. (In the case of finished products a
portion of the cost increase can sometimes be passed on, because the
product differs from the competition and consumers will continue to buy
because of taste preference, brand loyalty, habit, or other factors.) To
keep customers supplied and facilities running near peak efficiency, bulk
i
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processors must continue to buy, process And sell even if the cost price
spread is unfavorable.
Commodities futures prices on which the above activities depend are
very sensitive, experiencing short and long-term fluctuations in response
to several types of information such as news of changing monetary policies,
foreign trade considerations, the diplomatic climate and others. Com-
modities whose production is concentrated in small regions subjecting a
significant fraction of the entire production to destruction by a single
weather event such as a drought, hail or untimely freeze, are extremely
sensitive to weather information on the futures market. In order to operate
effectively in the commodities markets a varied of valid up-to-date
information is needed, Including weather information.
After studying the material obtained from the cooperating clients.
we concluded that in r<,st day-to-day operations of these companies, the
effect of weather information could not be accurately quantified because
it is diluted by the other considerations mentioned above. Weather plays
a somewhat stronger role in advance planning for production, processing.
and promotion, according to those we interviewed, but still could not be
objectively quantified. With the information at hand, a direct e•:onomic
benefit could be substantiated best in the futures market under suitable
circumstances. Stich circumstances occurred about the time our research
pr_,gram was beginning when a destructive freeze damaged the Florida citrus
crop and also when the Brazilian coffee crop experienced severe freezing
conditions. Certain traders, who had advance warnings of either of these
and acted on the information, made substantial profits.
In view of the small number of such situations arising, as well as
the unique circumstances associated with each, it was not possible to do
f
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a before and after satellite data comparison. Although quantitative
(	 results were not obtained, Weather Services Corporation found satellite data
especially useful for forecasting temperature falls in the citrus belt,
and rainfall in the soybean areas of Brazil.
1
Brazil affects the U . S. economy through corn and wheat markets, but
especially through soybean markets. Brazil has become the world ' s number
two producer of soybeans (after the U.S.). One of the salient features
of this relationship is that the Brazilian growing season is offset from
the U.S. season by siz months, hence the final projections of the
Brazilian crop influence U.S. plantings.
I
	
	
In the past offical estimates of Brazilian production have proved
erroneous. Soybean Digest (JL1y/August 1978) noted that the officially
reported 1977 Brazilian soy crop was 27 percent below preliminary USDA
(	 expectations. Food Manufacturing (May 1978) asked rhetorically whether
the Brazilians might not be 'talking the price up'--that the effects of
tho five month Brazilian drought had been over estimated by Brazilian sources-
For this reason, commodities clients desire independent data on Brazilian
weather. Weather Services Corporation has found GOES
-E images very useful
for providing these data.
6
g.	 (Other clients 
1.	 Construction
Only three clients are included in this category.	 All are involved in
Ir
concrete pouring and paving operations in the New England or mid-Atlantic
region.	 A questionnaire was first prepared on the basis of preliminary
information from these three companies.	 The answers to these questions
r
were supplemented by detailed interviews by phone to gain better insight
into the operations.
9
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One of these clients felt the weather forecast had little value to
	
s	 his operation and in fact discontinued the service during the course of
this study. The other two clients used the forecast for operations
planning, especially optimal deployment of their crews. Factors affecting
	
C.	 these decisions were heavy all-day rain, strong gusty winds, extreme teu-
peratures, and snow--any of which could lead to the cancellation of part
or all daily operations.
These clients, upon detailed questioning, were unable to link specific
forecasts to amounts of economic loss partly because they had contingency
plans for use of crews which though inconvenient, prevented total waste
from occurring (e.g. indoor educational activities) and partly because they
were unwilling to take the time to trace down the possible losses from
given situations. This admittedly would be difficult to do since labor
deployed and reaction to situations varied depending on type of construction
project, its current state of vulnerability, and other variables which
could only be obtained from back records. Even if such information had
been provided, it would have been difficult to generalize over a whole
season, not to mention year-to-year comparisons.
2. A state automobile association
' Several phone interviews were conducted with this single client to
learn if significant economic benefits were likely to arise in connection
with this study.	 Conversation revealed that up to 90 employees could be
called in for overtime in two types of situations:	 rain with temperatures
rising from the 30's to the 40's (causing motor condensation), and temperatures
,
g of 10° or below in November and December (causing engine starting problems).
Since the association was responsible for servicing members' cars, a large
staff was needed to handle early morning service requests.	 In addition,
r.,.
l
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this association was affiliated with about 100 branches, all of whom were
advised by a main office about upcoming demands due to the weather situ-
ation. A director of the association estimated that the forecast caused
overpreparation in 15 to 20% of the overtime cases.
A compilation of forecasts possibly having economic effects was sent
to this client. The club was unable to correlate these forecasts with
their payroll costs. Since workers with different salaries were called in
on different days in random fashion, the economic picture is very confused.
Furthermore, misforecasts that seemed to indicate possible effects on the
club proved to be inconsequential due to the timing or magnitude of the
i	 error. Thus, this client was not used far detaile.'. analysis.
}
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7. Some general observations about user clients
41	 Although a major motivation for subscribing to a weather service
is financial, we should also mention some of the other reasons why people
feel the need for specialized information. A prime interest to many
9
	
	
subscribers is the convenience and increased sense of security with which
short-term planning can be effected. Dispatchers and administrators often
have scheduling problems that can be handled at the last minute should
C
	
	
a weather emergency arise, but these people would rather have a greater
lead time for preparation. For instance, weekend contingency plans can be
readied should a storm appear likely and crews can be alerted. Should the
storm not occur, the monetary loss is not as upsetting as the problems
that would arise from a surprise storm catching the crew unprepared.
Other subscribers feel more secure if they have multiple sources of
weather information; thus they may even consult with two firms and the
National Weather Service in their planning. This approach is not necessarily
bad if the client can knowledgeably weigh the various sources of information.
In practice, however, the user may be prone to plan according to the source
he wants to believe, having no objective way of choosing between them.
We found that a few subscribers did not really know what to do with
the information they received from the consulting service. Sometimes the
decision to subscribe was made at a higher level, and the people responsible
for making operational decisions were not adequately briefed on the use or
need for the service. In many cases, forecasts could be put to better
advantage it' the user knew more about the applications and limitations of
the consultant's service. Also, the user's response to a forecast may
f	
often be influenced by outside factors such as the individual on duty at
{-	 the time, the accuracy of recent forecasts, the timing of the forecast,
4.
t
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and immediate budget considerations.
S
Finally, some clients feel that a subscription to a weather service
looks good on their record regardless of how well the information is
f
actually being used. They can assure the public or others who review
ti
their operation that they are using every possible performance aid. In
addition, they have someone to blame for mistakes in decision making.
It is also unfortunate that some members of the user community,
C mainly governmental bodies and large utilities, are pressured in their
selection of, or use of consulting firms. Some of the clients we dealt
with were forced into choosing the consulting firm with the lowest bid
is	 for the service. Unfortunately, the people who are responsible for the
selection of the service rarely have any practical contact with its
products. Their primary concern appears to be economy rather than quality.
{	 If they were surprised by a snowstorm or hit by power outage due to
unforeseen overloaded circuits, then they would realize that meteorological
forecasts are a science rather than a commodity.
r
"N'  Ar.	 -
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8. Discussion
t
	
	 In the preceding sections, a summary of statistics and observations
describing the benefits received by a variety of clients from private
meteorological forecasts has been presented. In spite of this emphasis,
the problems and potential of satellite data use has been the constant
focus of this study. Even though we cannot present precise dollar benefits
resulting from satellite data use, we can draw a number of conclusions
about how satellite data can be used for greatest economic benefit.
Perhaps the most telling part of our study lies in the type and amount
of use to which the McIDAS system, and satellite data was put. Before this
subject is discussed in detail, some additional background information is
necessary.
Weather Services haj one McIDAS terminal which was located in the
-room where the sLurm and marine forecasts are made. Most of the personnel
work in other parts of the building on scheduled forecasts or agricultural
work. In these rooms are the facsimile maps, clip boards on to which
forecasts are placed and terminals to their own computer system. Hence,
in order for most of the forecasters to use the satellite data they had
to make a special effort to go to the room in which the terminal was
Located. In addition, if McIDAS were being used to prepare a marine
forecast, for example, a forecaster wanting to check on the movement of
showers had to wait his turn. This situation tended to discourage the
use of McIDAS by some of the forecasters. The terminal could not have
been placed anywhere else due to space and logistical considerations.
A second important point is that McIDAS was designed as a research
f	 tool, and up to the time of this study was never used for operational
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forecasting. While we at SSEC were not forecasters, and hence were not
totally familiar with all the tools used by operational forecasters,
the Weather Services personnel had little familiarity either with inter-
active video computer systems like McIDAS, or with satellite data. Hence,
the design of the system was probably not ideal in the sense of applying
our resources most efficiently for forecasting. Where we erred was mostly
towards excess-including much software which was rarely used.
In an earlier section, the problems with the analog disk were discussed.
Being the prime source of system unreliability, the inclusion of an analog
disk affected system use. Aside from causing the system to be down, the
primary problem caused by the analog disk was the skipping of frames during
looping. This caused disruption in the satellite use and frustration among
some of the forecasters. During times of unreliability, the effort
involved in setting up a long satellite loop was often not viewed as worth
the effort, given the probability that the looping capability would
malfunction. In retrospect, however, the forecasters at Weather Services
knowing the problems involved would still have chosen an analog disk with
one hundred frames over a digital disk with only ten or twelve frames. The
capability of setting up long loops was felt ,.o be too useful to be
sacrificed.
Although the McIDAS system presented all of the above difficulties,
It was used and used effectively. As mentioned previously, our means of
keeping track of the satellite data usage was the log adjacent to the com-
puter terminal (see Fig. 4). Forecasters were supposed to make entries
when McIDAS made a difference in their forecasts. Unfortunately, because
entering information into the log was not always utmost on the minds of
LL
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WSC personnel, we have a good indication of the type of uses McIDAS was
0	 put to rather than the actual amount of use.
As stated earlier, the WSC operations are in four general areas:
marine, storm, general operations, and commodities. What follows are
subjective appraisals of the usefulness of McIDAS and satellite data
for each of these operations:
(1) Marine - one would expect any data source to be helpful for
these forecasts which encompass large data void regions. The
marine forecasters used McIDAS extensively, especially for the
satellite data over the Gulf of Mexico. They were able to see
'	 cloud growth, the early formations of potential tropical systems
and movement over the Gulf plus location and strength of rain
producing systems. The satellite images were invaluable for
forecasts affecting drilling, marine construction and other
marine activities. In addition, the satellite data was extremely
useful in preparing forecasts for hurricanes of which there were
two significant ones during the forecast year. The forecasters
did not find the tropical weather advisories issued from Miami to
be helpful, and felt that their problem was the lack of adequate
satellite data access. In fact, the WSC forecasters were able
to produce accurate and timely forecasts and were able to give
adequate warnings to their clients because of their ability to
identify, track and predict movement of tropical systems from
F; the satellite L.-o_r.s. 	 They would not have been able to do so
without the McIDAS system.
(2)	 Storm - this group ir_r." ,tides forecastsi for snow and ice, heavy
rain, high winds and thu"dersto*ms. Their use of McIDAS was
S
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heavy, though somewhat less than the marine group and was split
in half between the satellite pictures and the graphics. The
f	 ^:
satellite pictures were used to locate and track storms,
especially off the coast, as well as fields of clouds and
thunderstorms. The graphics were used in the traditional way
(i.e. height fields, streamlines, temperature, etc.) The com-
puter system streamlined their procedures and enabled them to do
types of analyses which were ordinarily too time consuming. Its
impact on the actual forecasts was not concrete enough to be
measured.
(3) General Operations - these consist mainly of temperature and
weather forecasts. Operations used the system about a third of
the time, usually using only the graphics. When the satellite
pictures were used, it was to aid in the forecasting of low
temperatures by locati:.g and tracking cloud layers.
(4) Commodities - their use of the system was the lightest of the
four, only relying on satellite pictures of South America.
These were used to track cold frontal penetrations into the
coffee growing regions of Brazil as well as to catch moisture
inflow into South America's soybean growing regions.
The four features of the McIDAS system which had the most frequent
use were graphics, the real-time satellite capability, looping of satellite
images and color enhancement. The ability to get real-time satellite
images enabled them to locate various cloud features; getting images
several hours old over the facsimile circuit had much more limited use.
The ability to loop the current satellite pictures seemed to be the most
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useful feature by far. Many of the forecasters had little experience with
C	 satellite loops prior to this program, and these loops greatly aided their
understanding of various weather phenomena according to their own reports.
In a practical sense, the loops helped the forecasters track clouds, cloud
shields and storms. The average loop of half hour pictures ranged from 4
to 12 images and often contained only the infrared images because they
could cover longer time periods. The visible images were also used (for
fog tracking, for example) but rarely was the full resolution of these
iaages employed. McIDAS was of greater use in getting a general overview
of the motion of the synoptic weather patterns, rather than in identifying
4'	 and tracking small scale features. Color enhancement was used along with
the cloud loops to note intensification of thunderstorms, the development
of tropical features and to get a feeling for the relative changes in
f'	 cloud-top temperature (although the IR brightnesses were not calibrated).
All of these were not readily available from other sources.
The Weather Services McIDAS system contained a variety of features
r	 which were seldom used. These included most of WINDCO, for the deter-
mination of cloud winds (the motions of clouds were mainly viewed but not
measured) cloud height determination, the statistics packages (for
obtaining cloud areas and brightness frequer--y distributions) the plotting
of conventional data on satellite images, plus many of the plotting routines.
In addition to the frame skipping caused by the analog disk malfunction,
the biggest problems were associated with the grids that came with the images.
The grids were often highly inaccurate, inconsistent and visually very
distracting. When a satellite loop contained these inaccurate and moving
'^	 grids (a frequent occurrence), the loops were difficult to use even though
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WSC had the capability to navigate their own images. This undoubtedly
lessened the frequency with which the loops were employed.
We asked the following question of WSC staff: knowing wrat you now
know, how could the McIDAS system have been designed to beat meet your
needs? The following are some answers:
(1) WSC would have been better served by more terminals, placed in
the various locations where the forecasts were being prepared;
(2) It would have been useful to have an operator whose task was to
injest and navigate images and set up loops;
(3) McIDAS could have been designed with less and much simpler
software--about 1/4 of its software was routinely used; and
(4) If money were no object, they would have preferred a system
with its own receiving antenna. In that way they could
receive whatever images they needed, and these images would
+r
be ungridded.
Two possible measures of the economic value of McIDAS and the
' satellite data were (1) the interest of WSC in buying McIDAS at the con-
clusion of the study, and (2) the continuation of their access to satellite
data.	 Meteorological consulting is a highly competative field. 	 The
financial foundation for these firms is usually the business from a large
contingent of small clients who pay small fees for services which are
hopefully renewed yearly. 	 The major resource of consultants is manpower
C rather than equipment, and hence, most of their expenditures are spent on
f
salaries.
	
It should also be noted that WSC has already invested heavily
= in their own computer system. 	 It was felt that no matter now good the
_r
equipment, the most WSC could afford to invest was in the neighborhood
of $20,000.	 This is far less than the cost of McIDAS which it any case
C
,.
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was not the ideal system for their needs.
	 Hence, their decision not to
buy McIDAS.
When the computer system was removed, WSC decided to let the contract
f
" for the GOES-TAP lapse.	 But, many of the forecasters had become accus-
tomed to the access of real-time satellite imagery, especially in the
areas of tropical weather and commodities forecasts for South America.
Thus, the GOES-TAP line has been restored, and a device to produce hard
copy images has been purchased. 	 Therefore, WSC views the value of satellite
data to them to be at least the several hundred dollars per month this new
service costs.
A final question we posed was: knowing what you do now, would you
have participated in this program? The answers were not unanimous. Some
felt that the rewards were not worth their inconvenience and expenditure.
Others felt that it was well worth the effort, if only for the educational
value. When asked what the economic benefits of the satellite data were,
one reply was: "I don't know whether you can quantify the effects, but it
certainly did help us, and in turn, our clients."
t
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9. Summary and Conclusions
Five years ago, we stated in our proposal "...we propose to determine
the impact that the addition of satellite data has on a particular segment
of the public by introducing this data to a consulting firm and determining
the value to their clients of the augmented weather service." We acknowl-
edged the myriad potential difficulties ranging from governmental involve-
ment with private industry to the fact that the type of study we proposed
had not been performed before. 13e accomplished what we had set out to do,
although some of our specific plans were thwarted by unforseen circumstances.
Regarding the use of the satellite itself, we gleaned a number of
conclusions. As one would intuitively expect, satellite data is especially
helpful in data-poor areas (e.g. the oceans), and in detecting the formation
and movement of storms, and other cloud systems. Temperature forecasting,
except in cases where it is directly affected by cloud cover, remained
relatively unaffected. Satellite data is most useful when it is relatively
recent ( real-time), enhanced to bring out cloud brightness variations, and
in loops to show relative motion. There is also an indirect benefit to
satellite data: exposure to a satellite view of cloud systems illustrates
and clarifies many meteorological concepts. This, satellite data has an
educational value which undoubtedly results in better forecasting.
There is one additional point to be made about the usefulness of
satellite data. Even if one makes allowances for the quietness of the
weather over the last year of the s t udy, and even if one considers that
the forecasters did not make perfect use of the system. there were nonetheless
relatively few times when the satellite data proved essential in preparing
routine forecasts for temperature and weather. For those who had hopes
that this data in its rp esent form would revolutionize or even substantially
Ri4111. i
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modify forecasting in general, the results are disappointing. While
satellite data proved extremely useful for dat a poor areas, the simple
fact is, that in the vast majority of cases, satellite data served to fine-
tune forecasts produced for data -rich regions. This does not mean that
the satellite data is without great economic benefit even in data rich
areas. As we have shown in our client studies, even one improved forecast
per client per year can result in thousands of dollars saved. Multiplied
by many clients even a few improved forecasts per year can mount into the
millions of dollars. These figures are hypothetical but the principle is
not: even minor improvements in the state of the forecasting art can, in
	
(	 today's economy, result in significant benefits. This prospect has caused
WSC to invest several hundred dollars per month in retaining its satellite
link.
our results probably would have been more convincing were it not for
the various problems encountered during the program. The most significant
of these problems in terms of its effects on our final results was, of
course, the unusual weather conditions that prevailed during the period
of our study. Instead of fluctuating in an interval reasonably close to
mean values, temperatures and snowfall alike gravitated to the extremes.
A vear of record snow was followed by one with nearly none. Winter tem-
peratures 5 or 10 degrees below normal preceded unseasonably warm ones.
Worst of all, the final year. the year in which the benefits of the
	
a	 satellite data were to be examined, produced virtually no winter storms
over a large part of the study area. We were thus deprived of both the
opportunity to document significant case studies and to apply statistical
	
k
t	 techniques to smooth out the yearly variations.
r
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Though the obstinacy of the weather had by far the greatest influence
on our results, there were several other problems which diverted energy or
l
interest that could have been used more constructively. Certainly, the
1
	 occasional malfunctioning of the McIDAS system was chief emong these. Com-
puter down time shortly after installation was considerable, and intermittant
analogue disk problems thereafter disrupted use and tempered enthusiasm for
the system. Even under ideal circumstances, it can be difficult to intro-
duce new technical aides into an established routine: this resistance was
compounded by the initial system failures and no doubt decreased the
opportunities for the f eneficial use of the satellite data.
We are happy to note that there were areab which could have had serious
problems but which did not. Among these were the relative stability f the
client base, the good cooperation beyond the call of duty by the personnel
at Weather Services, and the stability of the staff at SSEC. The deterio-
ration of the world energy situation during the course of this study did
not seriously affect our gathering of information and statistics althoisgh
the operations of some utility clients did change drastically between 1976
and 1978. On the whole, the energy crisis worked to our advantage by
increasing interest in our efforts.
Overall. the problems we had, while serious, did not prove debil-
itating. We did, after all, intri. , ice a satellite system successfully
into a firm which had previously not had such capabilities. Generally,
forecasters there achieved greater awareness of the usefulness of the
satellite and made an effort to take practical advantage of the new
technology. This, in itself, is quite important. That effort was quite
sufficient to enable us to assess the impact of the satellite data on both
r
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the forecasting operations and the forecast itself. Had there been no
system problems and had the weather cooperated fully, the impact of the
data might have been greater in magnitude, (i.e. number of forecasts altered,
dollars saved) but would have on the whole shown the same pattern ,- of
usefulness (which we have outlined in Section 8).
Perhaps the most interesting resu'.ts to come out of the study are in
a sense by-products of our major goals. In order to consider the effects
of the satellite data on the user client, we had to know the details of
WSC's and the clients' operations. These facts have been presented in
detail. because they are interesting in their own right. No other study
has shown, in as wide-ranging terms, the actual impact of private meteorolog-
ical forecasts based on actual forecast/verification data. Consequently,
this study lays the foundation for future economic impact studies based
upon actual conditions.
Although the methodology has been tested, there is definitely room,
and in fact, a need for future studies of this type. We hope some lessons
can ae learned from our experience. Chief among these would be the need
for a longer experimental period to oi)tain statistics. A year or even two
is subject to fluctuations that can provide a very poor data base on which
to work. Ideally the experiment should be open ended--continuing as long
as necessary until a balanced sampling of different storm and forecasting
situations has been obtained. More practically speaking, a three to five
year experimental period (not including any c,3ntrol period) would substantially
decrease the likelihood of obtaining an abnormal sample, especially one that
was lacking in potential case studies.
6
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We have also learned that for the purposes of this study a much
simpler satellite data system could have been used. A video system dis-
playing real time, navigated and concurrent IR and visible pictures with
a looping capability would have ultimately been received more enthusias-
tically by the forecaster and would have also been easier to install and
maintain. This option would be more feasible if the national satellite
data dissemination service did not grid its images (or at least gridded
1't
	
	 them accurately) and allowed the reception of visible and IR image pairs.
The current GOES-TAP images are not set up for an interactive-video com-
puter system with looping capabilities, and is not flexible enough for a
firm who forecasts in varied geographical areas. "These lessons should be
heeded when future national forecasting systems are designed.
Regardless of the alternatives chosen, planners and proposers should
not overlook the necessity of including input from the forecaster in the
design of any satellite (or any other data) dissemination or processing
system of the future. These are the people who will determine how much
the benefits of the meteorological satellite will filter down to the wider
public. If their needs are met, we can be confident that the considerable
economic benefits of this data will be realized.
To conclude, meteorological satellite data produces a positive economic
effect when included in forecasts; in certain situations, it is invaluable.
It is the only data source in some vital weather producing regions, and its
	
f
	 educational value is great. To be put to better use, however, it must be
	
.f
	 available to a wider variety of potential users in a more flexible, usable
r
form.
r
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10. Personnel
4	 Over the four years of the program, the bulk of the scientific work
was performed by Mr. Brian Auvine, Dr. Barry Hinton and Dr. David Suchman,
}	 who also served as program manager. Additional scientific contributions
were made by Prof. Roger Miller of the economics department and Mr. David
Floyd. Mr. Thomas 0. Haig played a large role in early program planning.
The computer system construction was initially managed by Robert
i	 Norton, and later by Gary Banta who oversaw system maintenance. Hardware
support was supplied by Chris Davis, Robert Oehlkers, Doyle Ford, Juris
Afanasjevs, and Eldon Grindey; software was constructed by John Benson,
i,.	
Ralph Dedecker and Gary Chatters. Ruth Lieberman, Russell Dengel and
Tim Browning helped compile the climatological statistics. Secretarial
support was provided by Angela Crowell and the late Barbara Mueller.
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APPENDIX A: THE SELECTION PROCESS
i) Criteria for selection
ii) Information to be Obtained from
Consulting Firm
iii) Interview Questionnaires
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0 CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF A CONSULTING FIRM
Essential
1. The firm should not be using real time satellite data in any significant
way (though should have some knowledge about it) to date, although it
should otherwise be a technologically advanced company (make full
utilization of "conventional" data).
2. Firm's clients should be a large and stable group containing a mix of
public, industrial, and agricultural users (e.g. agriculture,
construction, commodity forecasts, municipal services, transport,
recreation, utilities).
3. Firm's clients should be located preferably in a region near a
C	 meteorologically data sparse area (East Coast), or at least in a
relatively meteorologically active region (Midwest).
4. The firm or its clients should have available records over a 5 year
period detailing charges for services, use to which service was put,
and ultimate outcome of use. In addition, there must be ready access
from both consultant and clients of financial data for performing
cost/effectiveness analysis.
5. The firm should be providing several types of services to its clients
(e.g. short term forecasts, long term forecasts, emergency warnings,
current weather data).
D_nForol.I-
6. The firm should preferably have at least one certified consulting
meteorologist on its staff.
7. We prefer a firm that has internal quality control--ongoing evaluations
of effectiveness of service, documented information on loss of accounts,
etc.
it	 Additional Criteria
8. It would be an asset if the firm provided the same service to more
than one customer.
9. Firm's staff should be large enough to allow the availability of at
least one liaison person who would be available to work with us when
needed.
10. A large part of data processing and predicting should be done in-house.
Firm must be willing to pay the major portion of the cost of hardware
to obtain this data.
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ii) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE
OBTAINED FROM THE CONSULTING FIRM
1.	 A list of clients who have received services for a year or more. 	 This
list should indicate the type of client (i.e. industrial, public, etc.)
where this is not obvious, the length of time the firm has been a client,
the type and frequency of forecast product(s) received, and the client's
location.	 In addition, we should find out if the firm has a record of
the accuracy of their services (outcome of the forecast) or whether
such information would be available from the client. 	 Would the various
clients be amenable to giving out financial information as to the
value of the forecast product to them (and whether this information
exists) and the nature of the operation toward which the product was
applied?
2. What type of internal quality control does the firm have in regard to
effectiveness of service, documented information on the loss of accounts,
etc.?
3. A description of the type of hardware being utilized by the firm, and
their plans for future modification (NWS TTY circuits, fax machines,
computers, software, etc.).
4. A description of their daily and weekly forecast operations. This could
best be approached by considering the particular kinds of forecast
products !e.g. emergency warnings, x%or*_ term or long term forecasts)
and describing how the firm goes about preparing this product--who
does the forecasts and what information he relies upon. How do the
forecasts differ from those produces by the NWS?
S. A detailed description of what is currently being done with satellite
information (type of satellite information received and how this data
is being included in the forecast). In addition, how much the
forecasters know about it, how willing they would be to use it, and
how much new training must be done.
R	 6. An estimate of what sorts of satellite information, in what format and
how frequent a reception of data would be most useful to the firm.
7. An estimate of what financial commitment the firm could make to rent or
purchase such a system.
S. The number and professional expertise of the staff: we want to talk
to as many staff members as possible; do they know about the program?
9. The name or designation of the person who would be the liaison with us
in future work.
r	 10. Why does the firm want to participate?
11. If possible, we would like to contact a few clients, get idea as to how
cooperative they would be to participate, give financial data, talk, etc.
12. Accessibility of financial data from both clients and consulting firm.
i
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t
iii) INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
9
r
s
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STAFF ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
1. Names of people on the staff, their duties and qualifications:
t -
2. How many of these are part time? How many full time? How many hours are put
in on an average working day?
3. What sort of crofessional contacts does the firm have with other meteorologists?
4. Who would be our liason person in the event we were to work with this firm?
(Explain what we would expect from such a person).
5. Does the staff generally work alone or in pairs or in some other combination?
6. Pick out the names of two people on the staff and find out what their typical
working day activities consist of (e.g. how many forecasts, what order of
activities, what responsibilities).
-144-
7. Ask to see some typical operations in progress and summarise pertinent
observations below:
(If possible, ask the observed staff the following questions)
a) What does the forecaster think of satellite data? Is it useful, and
if so, hog: a:id when does he use it (be sure to ask when, in the
process of forecasting, he decides to look at the satellite data)?
f'
b) What would the forecaster do with an increased capability if he had
it (describe the SSEC system).
V
8. Does the same forecaster always issue the same product? For how long?U	
Are records kept for who does what?
9
r
,- g --
i^
QUALITY CONTROL
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1. Dees the firm archive its analyses and charts? How far back?
2. Is a record kept of the final product and the actual information conveyed
to the client? How far back do these records go?
3. Does the firm keep a record of forecast accuracy or outcome?
4. Would the firm be willing to do any of the above for our records, if they
are not doing so already?
5. Does the firm do any sort of quality control on a periodic or on-going
basis (loss or gain in clients, effectiveness, speed, accuracy in various
areas, etc.)? Describe the procedures used.
a) Do you analyze these to Improve service?
b) Do you have specific procedures to review compliants by customers?
How are they resolved?
6. Does the firm keep a record of fees charged to client which would be
available for our inspection?
7. How are charges arrives: at?--Flat rate? --Competitive market prices?
--'rime that goes into forecast?
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8. If you invested in satellite data, would your fe?s change? How?
9. In what ways do clients benefit from your product? (ask it for clients
we personally talk to)
10. How do ycs sell yourselves to a prospective client?
0 What application?
x=	
. s•^ 
as
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PRESENT AND FUTURE SATELLITE DATA USAGE
1. What satellite data is currently received?
a) What orm?
b) How processed?
f-
2. In what types of forecasts is it being used and how? For what clients?
r
3. How is satellite data incorporated into the forecast (beginning, middle,
end)?
U
+. Is the firm currently anticipating any c'ianges in the above procedures?
If so, how? Would Lt try to gain satellite data anyway?
I -
5. What is your knowledge of the types and uses of satellite data? What
types of an_plications have you seen?
6. Does anyone in firm have experience with satellite data?
It
a) Where?
b) When?
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d) How does he feel about applications to your business?
7. Do you think satellite data would: produce better product? reduce cost?
produce more salable product?
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FORECAST OPERATIONS
TYPE OF FORECAST/FREQUENCY
NAMES OF STAFF WHO DO THIS
WHAT EQUIPMENT AND READY-MADE ANALYSES USED (i.e. fax charts)
WHAT IN-HOUSE ANALYSES PERFORMED
WHAT IS FINAL FORM OF SERVICE
HOW CONVEYED TO USER
# HOURS SPENT IN PREPARATION
# PEOPLE NEEDED IN PREPARATION
STEPS IN PREPARATION OF FORECAST
HOW DO FORECASTS DIFF M FROM/COMPARE WITH THOSE ISSUED BY THE NWS?
f.	
WV
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Daily and Weekly Forecast Operations (To be used as a guide- -for each
type of forecast)
1. Do you issue emergency warnings?
49	 2. What are these?
3. Which clients receive each of the above?
r C
4. Who is responsible for each?
5. What data are relied upon for each?
6. How or from whom are data obtained?
i'
7. How are data processed or treated?
8. How is information assembled for forecast decisions?
I	
r
9. Do you issue daily forecasts on regular basis?
lit	 10. Do you issue other regular short term forecasts?
^	 S	 11. Do you issue weekly forecasts regularly?
12. Do you issue longer range forecasts or outlooks?
p^	
.•k .
r^
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HARDWARE DESCRIPTION GUIDE
This is best done by inspecting the equipment room itself and asking the
use and function of each machine, what circuit it is wired to etc. Nevertheless
a responsible person might be asked to list or recall the following:
(1) Teletypes
(2) Fax machines
(3) Radar Displays
(4) Your own private data sources (describe)
(5) Capabilities of the following:
computers
computer/calculators
plotters
software
fi	 (6) Do you use any advanced data storage and or display?
magnetic tapes
microfilm
CRT-terminal
-152-
f
d:
i
(7) List any future modifications or additions to this equipment that
are currently being planned.
(8) Assess the ease with which the hardware interface with our
system.
rt,L
t	
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GENERAL QUESTIONS
1. Why do you want to participate?
2. How much does your staff know about project?
I
3. What type of financial arrangement would you
	 	  prefer for the hardware?
Rental fee? Total monetary investment?
r
4
4. What type of turnover of forecasters do you have for a particular
forecast product?
t
s
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a
a^
RATING OF SUBJECTIVE FACTORS 	 c
w!/ t^ w o°.
1. Pleasantness of working conditions
2. Congeniality of head of firm
and liaison person
Notes
3. Staff interrelationships
(friendliness, frictions, etc.)
4. Enthusiasm of firm for the
proposal
5. Efficiency of and enthusiasm for
the work shown by the staff
6. Potential adaptability for change
7. Enthusiasm of staff for proposal 	 I I
what impressed you favorably about this visit?
What impressed you unfavorably about this visit?
How would you estimate the willingness of forecasters to use satellite data?
;xL
—155—
APPENDIX B: LETTERS OF AGREEHENT WITH WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION
4
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►MCE
5aEAACE me
Ei1 #V£ER/N6
LEMER
1225 West Dayton Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
T6E UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
7 December 1976
9
Mr. John Wallace
Mr. Peter Leavitt
Weather Services Corporation
131 A Great Road
Bedford, MA	 01730
Dear Mssrs. Wallace and Leavitt:
This letter is to confirm our intention of working with your firm in
a study of the economic benefits of meteorological satellite data, a proposal
that has been funded by NASA, and which we expect to continue for a period
of four years, from September 1, 1976, to August 31, 1980. In the remainder
of this letter we have noted our initial expectations in regard to the goals
and methods of this program.
One facet of this study is to establish and document the current
weather service you are supplying to your clients and to establish a
quantitative measure of the value of that service. Toward this end, %::*e
will need a record of the forecast products that you have supplied to your
selected clients and their verification.
We will develop, with input from your firm, and within program
limitations, the facilities and techniques required to supply you with
meteorological satellite data in a form most likely to increase the value of
your service to your clients. We do not guarantee, however, that the data
actually supplied to you will augment the value of your services. We will
be responsible for all costs and manpower associated with the installation
.and maintenance of any project hardware and software.
After a suitable period we will establish a quantitative measure of
the value of the augmented service, a-ain using a record of your forecast
products and their verification as well as other information.
As we do not wish to give your firm an undue competitive advantage
over other firms through our involvement, we ask that you not refer to
this study in any advertising or promotion to gain new clients, and that
you not display products obtained directly from our data installation in any
co-,=unications media daring the period of this study. This prohibition
should continue until the end of the study or 31 August 1980 whichever is
earlier. In addition, we hope that you do not alter your fees as a result
n s	 0
jft
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Monts. Wallace and Leavitt	 page 2	 7 December 1976
Weather Services Corporation
of the acquisition of our data during the course of this study. Of course.
our involvement with Weather Services Corporation in no way constitutes an
endorsement of your firm over other meteorological consulting firms.
We also understand that SSEC will not be involved or responsible in
any way in the actual preparation or dissemination of individual forecast
products to your clients. The derision to use any or all of the services
we provide shall rest with you.
Finally, it is our intention to keep all records confidential which
might affect the competitive position of your firm in relation to other
{
	
	
firms, or which might affect the relationships between your clients and
you. We will view all information obtained from either you or your clients
in that light.
Whether or not you have any comments or additions to these points, we
would appreciate receiving written acknowledgement of this letter. We look
forward to working with you and expect that our cooperation will be fruitful
and interesting for both of our organizations.
Sincerely yours,
zap, t4 Sit a..,n 0" 3
David Suchman
DS/bm
r
I
I
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• WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION
131A GREAT ROAD, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 01730 • TELEPHONE: (617)275-6860
December 14, 1976
Mr. David Suchman
Space, Science and Engineering Center
1225 West Dayton Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
Gear David:
f	 We were delighted to receive your letter of December 7, 1976,
stating your intention of working with Weather Services Corporation
in your study of the ecomomic benefits of meteorological satellite
pia to .
f
We agree to all stipulations and limitations mentioned in
your letter, and will strive our utmost to carry this experiment
through to a successful conclusion.
Cordially yours,
John  E. Wallace
President
JEW:ep
t
•
t
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APPENDIX C: SNOW AND TEMPERATURE STATISTICS
Control Years: 1976-78
Experiment Years: 1979-80
SNOW STATISTICS (in inches)
-160-
Years Control Experiment
of Annual Standard Year Year
Station Record Mean Deviation Snow Snow
Peabody, MA 8 52.7 17.0 78.8 14.8
(1.530 ) (2.230)
Holyoke, MA 26 47.9 16.7 54 13.0
(0.370 ) (2.090)
3 Walpole, MA 25 52.7 17.7 75.6 15.2
(1.290 ) (2.120)
Bedford, MA 17 59.2 12.7 92.3 15.7
(2.600 ) (3.430)
('- Raleigh, NC 32 7.0 5.7 7.1 18.3
(0.020 ) (1.980)
Newark, NJ 34 27.7 16.1 45.0 14.3
(1.070 ) (0.830)
Trenton, NJ 39 22.8 12.1 35.8 18.8
(1.070 ) (0.330)
Wilmington, DE 28 19.5 12.3 31.7 15.9
(0.990 ) (0.290)
Philadelphia, FA 33 20.5 11.2 36.8 20.9
(1.460 ) (0.040)
Norfolk, VA 39 7.9 6.2 10.0 41.9
(0.330 ) (5.480)
Pittsburg,	 PA 23 45.9 15.7 55.8 24.1
(0.630 ) (1.390)
Baltimore,	 1•1 D 26 21.5 13.6 22.7 14.6
(0.090 ) (0.510)
Washington Nat'l 32 16.8 10.5 16.9 20.1
(0) (0.310)
Avoca, PA 21 50.0 16.8 65.0 25.5
(0.890 ) (1.450)
k'orcester, MA 20 72.7 17.4 80.2 26.6
(0.430 ) (2.65(y)
Bridgeport, CT 28 27.4 13.3 40 9.6
(0.950 ) (1.340)
sir
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Blue Hill, MA 39 63.5 23.3
Boston, MA 39 42.7 14.8
Hartford, CT 21 53.8 14.6
Richmond, VA 39 14.0 10.3
Charlotte, NC 35 5.8 5.6
Providence, RI 23 37.4 12.8
New York-JFK 17 24.3 13.7
New York-LaGuardia 32 25.6 14.2
87.6 25.3
(1.030 ) (2.42(y)
71.8 12.7
(1.97 0 ) (2.030)
65.2 16.4
(0.780 ) (2.560)
12.6 38.6
(0.140 ) (2.390)
4.5 14.5
(0.240 ) (1.550)
54.9 12.2
(1.370 ) (1.970)
35.6 11.0
(0.820 ) (0.970)
32.8 10.3
(0.500 ) (1.080)
I
•
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Thirty-Year Temperature Means (1950-1979)
Station J F M A M J J A S 0 N D
Atlanta 43.4 45.8 52.5 61.7 69.7 76.4 78.2 78.2 72.7 62.8 51.6 44.5
Hartford 26.0 28.4 36.7 48.3 59.0 68.4 73.3 71.3 63.4 53.1 42.0 29.6
Bridgeport 29.5 30.8 37.9 48.3 58.4 68.0 73.6 72.4 65.4 55.4 44.6 33.3
Concord 20.5 22.9 32.0 44.0 55.1 64.9 69.7 59.5 48.9 37.6 24.9 24.9
Providence 29.1 30.5 37.8 48.1 58.0 67.5 73.1 71.7 64.0 54.2 43.9 32.7
Boston 29.2 30.5 37.7 47.9 58.0 67.8 73.3 71.9 64.5 55.1 44.8 33.2
Worcestor 23.5 25.6 33.4 45.1 55.9 65.2 70.2 68.4 60.7 51.1 39.8 27.8
Portland 21.6 23.5 31.8 42.7 52.7 62.3 68.2 66.9 58.8 49.0 38.5 26.0
Milton 26.0 27.3 34.5 45.3 55.7 64.8 70.4 68.9 61.5 52.1 41.4 29.7
Richmond 37.6 39.7 47.1 57.4 66.2 74.0 77.5 76.3 69.6 59.0 48.6 39.6
Norfolk 41.5 42.6 49.1 58.3 67.1 75.1 78.6 77.6 72.3 62.2 52.3 43.7
Trenton 32.2 33.8 41.1 51.9 62.0 71.2 75.8 74.2 67.0 56.8 46.1 35.5
NYC Central Pk 32.3 33.7 41.0 51.9 62.2 71.5 76.6 75.1 68.2 58.2 47.1 35.9
NYC Laguardia 32.6 33.7 40.9 51.6 61.6 71.4 76.6 75.2 68.6 58.5 47.5 36.2
NYC JFK 31.9 33.5 40.0 50.2 59.8 69.7 75.4 74.4 67.6 57.4 46.7 36.2
Albany 21.6 24.0 33.3 46.3 57.6 67.1 71.7 69.7 61.4 50.0 39.3 26.4
Syracuse 23.5 24.8 33.1 45.9 57.0 66.9 71.2 69.7 62.0 51.7 40.5 28.2
Buffalo 24.8 25.6 33.0 44.8 55.6 66.2 70.8 69.5 62.2 52.1 40.5 29.2
Philadelphia 32.4 34.1 41.7 52.6 62.9 72.0 76.6 74.9 68.0 57.2 46.1 35.6
Avoca 26.5 2/.9 36.2 48.3 59.1 67.9 72.2 70.3 62.8 52.4 41.1 30.0
Allentown 28.0 29.9 38.1 49.6 60.1 69.4 73.9 72.0 64.5 53.8 42.5 31.4
t
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Control Period Temperature Means and Deviance
from 30-Year Dean (in Standard Deviations)
(Sept 1976-Aug 1978)
Station J F M A	 M J J A S 0 N D
Atlanta T 31.5 40.7 53.5 62.3
	
68.8 76.7 79.1 78.0 71.7 59.9 49.2 41.0
#(a) -2.33 -1.15 1.87 0.26 -0.32 0.12 0.41 -0.11 0.44 -1.75 -0.85 -0.98
r Hartford T 21.2 24.9 39.J 49.6	 61.8 68.6 73.2 71.4 63.3 51.0 41.3 26.5
^. #(a) -1.00 -1.01 0.34 0.47	 1.03 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.74 -0.26 29.6
Bridgeport T 25.3 27.6 38.8 48.0	 58.6 65.8 72.9 74.6 66.6 55.3 48.9 31.7
' #(a) -1.08 -1.04 0.29 -0.11	 0.08 -1.30 -0.41 1.1 0.55 -0.04 1.66 -0.48
Concord
	 T 14.0 17.1 32.4 42.9 57.9 64.1 69.4 68.4 57.9 46.0 35.6 18.5
t	 #(o) -1.44 -1.67 0.12 -1.14 0.88 -1.13 -0.07 0.72 -1.40 -0.95 1.03 -5.36
Providence	 T 23.0 26.0 38.8 48.6 59.5 67.4 73.0 72.2 62.8 50.1 41.9 28.5
#(a) -1.38 -1.41 0.29 0.18 0.60 0.05 -0.05 0.23 -0.48 -1.45 0.77 -1.11
Boston	 T 25.9 29.0 40.4 50.1 60.9 67.9 73.5 72.5 64.7 53.9 45.0 31.6
f	 #(a) -0.83 -0.45 0.82 0.78 1.16 0.04 0.12 0.30 0.10 -0.48 0.08 -0.43
Worcester
	 T 18.6 22.5 34.9 44.1 59.4	 63.4 68.8 68.4 59.3 47.8 37.9	 24.0
#(a) -1.02 -0.93 0.38 -0.34 0.52 -0.90 -0.78 0.0 -0.64 -1.14 C.03 -0.99
Portland
	 T 17.9 20.1 33.2 41.5 53.2	 60.0 68.1 67.6 57.5 45.8 37.8	 22.4
a3	 #(a) -0.84 -0.94 0.45 -0.56 0.23 -1.26 NA 0.28 -0.62 -1.28 -0.30 -0.84
Milton	 T 21.1 25.0 37.3 40.3 58.1 64.7 71.0 70.4 61.3 49.6 40.3 26.7
#(o) -1.14 -0.69 +0.82 o.36 0.96 -o.05 0.35 0.71 -0.10 -0.92 -0.39 -0.81
Richmond	 T 29.7	 5.4 49.2 59.2 66.9 73.9 79.5 80.0 71.4 55.8 47.6 38.2
t}	 #(a) -1.61 -1.18 0.49 0.69 0.29 -0.05 1.25 2.32 0.75 -1.07 -0.42 -0.42
Norfolk
	
T 33.1 39.1 50.1 59.6 66.9 74.2 73.5 80.8 73.7 59.2 50.3 42.5
#(a) -1.65 -1.50 0.25 0.52 -0.09 -0.41 0.63 2.00 0.54 1.08 -0.77 -0.30
i	 Trenton	 T 25.1 30.4 43.6 52.5 62.6 70.6 75.2 75.4 67.5 53.4 44.3 32.5#(a) -1.61 -1.06 0.69 0.21 0.25 -0.33 -0.40 0.70 0.22 -1.22 -0.69 -0.27
NYC Central Pk T 24.1 30.3 42.9 52.6 6 3. 3 70.8 76.7 75.9 66.4 53.9 44.5 32.8
#(o) -1.67 -1.19 0.52 0.26 0.41 -0.35 0.06 0.40 NA 	 -1.54 -1.04 -0.93
NYC LaGuardia	 T 25.6 30.1 42.1 51.4 61.9 69.7 75.5 75.1 67.4 54.7 45.2 33.2
#(a) 1.79 -1.08 0.38 -0.08 0.11 -0.81 -0.60 -0.06 -0.57 -1.41 -0.81 -0.84
NYC JFK	 T 25.6 29.5 41.2 50.8 60.6 69.1 74.8 75.4 66.2 53.3 44.0 32.3
#(o) -1.75 -1.26 0.43 0.25 0.29 -0.35 -0.36 0.55 -0.56 -1.71 -1.03 -1.05
f	 Albany	 T 18.5 21.3 35.5 45.1 59.3 64.5 70.3 68.5 60.3 48.2 38.8 29.1#(o) -0.60 -0.76 1.51 -0.36 0.57 -1.30 NA 	-0.50 NA	 -0.90 -0.17 -0.61
0
4	
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Station J F M A M J J A S 0 N D
Syracuse T 18.5 26.4 34.8 45.1 59.3 63.8 71.8 69.5 61.1 48.7 42.2 25.2
#(a) -1.04 0.43 0.39 -0.25 -0.74 -1.48 0.29 -0.08 -0.34 -1.04 0.59 -0.77
Philadelphia T 24.0 29.2 43.9 54.0 63.6 70.6 76.7 77.7 68.7 53.4 43.1 31.4
#(a) -1.83 -1.37 0.61 0.48 0.27 -0.84 0.06 1.40 0.32 -1.22 -1.30 -1.08
Buffalo T 17.1 1 9.7 39.0 45.7 58.9 64.8 71.2 69.2 61.4 46.7 38.8 25.0
#(a) -1.67 -1.71 1.36 0.27 1.07 0.64 0.21 -0.12 -0.32 -1.60 -0.59 -0.30
Avoca T 19.7 23.1 36.8 47.5 59.4 64.5 70.3 69.9 61.9 48.3 40.1 26.3
( #(a) -1,34 -1.24 0.14 -0.25 0.10 -1.54 -0.95 -0.19 -0.36 -1.31 -0.34 -0.93
Allentown T 21.7 26.5 41.0 51.5 62.4 69.8 79.0 73.2 54.1 51.7 40.9 28.6
#(a) -1.40 -1.47 0.81 0.66 0.69 0.20 0.06 0.60 0.26 --0.71 -1.30 -0.78
2
I
f
1, i
1
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Experimental Period Temperature Means and Deviance
from 30-Year Mean (in Standard Deviations)
(May 1979-March 1980)
Station J F M	 A M J J A S 0 N D
Atlanta T 44.9 41.9 52.1 70.1 75.7 78 3 80.1 72.9 62.4 54.3 46.7
#(o) 0.29 -0.88 -0.10 0.14 -0.28 C.27 1.10 0.00 -0.14 0.96 0.08
Hartford T 27.6 24.3 35.2 64.1 69.0 74.6 60.8 61.6 50.7 45.5 33.6
#(o) 0.33 -1.18 -0.39 1.88 0.29 0.72 -0.23 -0.87 -0.85 0.37 1.00
BridgeporL T 31.7 28.1 37.0 61.7 55.5 73.8 72.8 54.8 53.2 47.3 37.9
#(a) 0.57 -0.88 -0.29 1.27 0.82 0.12 0.20 -0.27 -0.82 1.04 1.38
Concord T 22.4 19.1 31.8 56.3 63.8 71.2 67.5 59.8 49.4 42.2 29.4
#(a) 0.42 -1.09 -0.06 0.32 0.18 0.34 -0.09 0.26 -0.49 1.58 1.13
Providence	 T 29.7 26.8 37.1
#(a) 0.14 -1.16 -0.20
Boston	 T 29.4 27.9 36.9
#(a) 0.05 -0.78 -0.24
Worcester	 T 25.0 22.2 33.1
#(a) 0.31 -1.02 -0.08
Portland	 T 22.7 20.5 32.0
#(a) 0.25 -0.96 0.06
Milton	 T 25.5 24.5 34.8
#(J) 0.14 -0.84 0.09
Richmond	 T 38.8 36.0 47.4
#(a) 0.24 -1.02 0.07
Norfolk	 T 40.3 39.7 46.5
41(0 ) -0.24 -2.15 -0.65
Trenton
	 T 32.9 30.3 40.6
41(0 ) -0.16 -1.09 -0.14
NYC Central Pk T 33.7 31.8 41.2
#(a) 0.33 -0.81 0.06
NYC LaGuardia 	 T 32.7 30.7 40.2
#(0 ) 0.03 -0.90 -0.22
NYC JFK	 T 32.2 29.2 38.4
#((Y) 0.08 -1.35 -0.57
Albany	 T 24.1 14.8 33.3
# (o ) 0.49 -1.18 0.00
Syracuse	 T 25.6 14.8 32.4
#(a) 0.44 -1.33 -0.16
60.3 65.1 73.5 70.2 69.0 53.0 48.3 37.3
0.92 -1.14 0.21 -0.68 0.50 -0.42 1.69 1.21
61.1 68.2 74.5 71.7 54.9 52.7 48.6 36.7
1.24 0.17 0.71 -0.10 0.20 -0.96 1.46 0.95
57.7 63.6 71.2 67.7 60.0 49.0 44.3 31.9
0.62 -1.80 0.56 -0.31 0.32 -0.72 1.45 1.10
55.3 62.7 59.3 64.8 57.4 47.5 42.4 29.8
1.18 0.22 NA -0.84 -0.66 -0.60 1.69 0.89
58.9 64.4 72.9 68.8 62.0 50.8 46.7 34.2
1.28 -0.19 1.48 -0.05 -0.25 -0.48 1.89 1.22
56.1 70.8 76.9 77.8 71.0 58.3 53.3 42.3
0.37 1.54 -0.38 1.56 0.58 -0.23 1.96 0.81
66.7 70.4 77.1 78.5 72.8 60.4 56.4 44.9
-0.17 -2.15 -0.94 0.56 0.23 -0.64 1.57 0.30
63.1 68.5 74.5 74.5 67.4 59.8 50.8 39.4
0.46 -1.49 -0.87 0.17 0.17 -0.72 1.80 1.07
65.3 69.2 76.9 76.8 70.5 57.3 52.5 41.1
1.15 1.15 -0.18 0.85 NA -0.32 2.16 1.56
65.0 68.9 77.1 75.5 68.2 56.0 50.2 39.0
0.52 -1.19 0.27 0.19 -0.19 -0.43 0.94 0.78
62.8 66.9 74.7 73.6 67.1 54.9 48.3 38.1
1.10 -1.64 -0.42 -0.44 -0.20 -1.04 0.61 0.51
60.0 66.0 72.5 67.0 61.2 50.2 44.1 31.4
0.80 0.55 NA
	 -0.30 NA	 -0.20 1.66 1.33
58.6 66.0 71.7 67.9 61.4 50.9 44.5 33.4
0.51 -0.43 0.24 -0.69 -0.23 -0.28 1.38 1.33
f
..	 i
56.9 66.5 71.3 67.5 61.9 50.7
0.42 0.14 0.26 -0.83 -0.12 -0.41
66.4 69.1 76.2 75.5 68.5 54.9
1.35 -1.53 -0.24 0.30 0.23 -0.74
58.6 65.1 70.7 70.7 53.2 51.8
-0.16 -1.27 -0.75 -0.19 0.16 -0.19
62.1 68.0 73.2 72.8 65.3 52.5
0.69 -0.70 -0.41 -0.40 0.34 -0.4,
43.5 33.4
1.21 1.07
50.1 38.2
1.73 0.67
45.9 35.6
1.63 1.4
47.8 36.2
4 2.03 1.34
f
f^	
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Buffalo T 25.8 21.2 31.8
' #(a) 0.22 -1.28 -0.27
Philadelphia T 31.8 24.7 40.2
#(a) -0.13 -1.23 -0.42
' Aroca T 27.8 24.2 35.9
#( a ) 0.26 -0.96 -0.07
Allentown T 30.7 27.3 38.6
#( a ) 0.60 -0.75 0.14
s
f
0-
r J
r'
Electric Client*
A	 ATE
B	 ATE
Il (sAT)
1=
C	 ATE
#(i AT)
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Climatology for Gas and Electric Utility Clients
1976(April-Sept) 	 1977(April-Sept)	 1978(April-Sept)
	
-0.4	 -1.7	 -1.8
	
0.13	 -0.27	 -0.25
	
0.3	 -1.2	 -0.5
	
0.06	 0.30	 0.11
(May-Sept)
	
(May-Sept)	 (May-Sept)
	
0.00	 -0.9	 -0.7
	
0.05	 0.31	 0.02
Gas Client 1976-77(Nov-Feb) 1977-78(Nov-Feb) 1978-79(Nov-Feb)
A AT -5.5 -3.1 -1.0
#(a AT ) -1.44 -0.65 -0.13
B AT -4.9 -2.8 +1.1
#(a AT) -1.37 -0.77 +0.41
C AT -4.0 -1.1 +1.5
#(aAT) -1.10 -0.25 0.44
D AT -5.5 -3.1 -1.0
#(a AT) -1.44 -0.65 -0.13
g E. AT -5.1 -2.5 1.2
#(aAT) -0.97 -0.49 0.50
t
*	 ATE Departure of maximum temperature mean from 30 year mean
#(a AT ) Number of standard deviations that average temperature departs from 30
year mean
a.
11
0	
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE SNOW AND ICE QUESTIONNAIRE
-169-
F1RM: Sure} De^poietare -
The following are a list of general questions that we will use to try and
assess the economic impact of the snow /ice forecasts you receive from
Weather Services Corp. They are not intended to cover every possible
situation, but if any major part of your operation is neglected by these
questions, please indicate.
1. How much does it cost you (per hour) in snow/ice clearing operations
for the followi.- -
a) salaries - Regular time for snow plowing	 $225 per hr.
f	 based on a crew size of 41 men. If the
work was done on overtime, the cost would
be increased to 	 $340 per hr.
If there was no plowing and work consisted
merely of sand and salting, the cost would
be approximately 207. of these figures.
t;
b) equipment: sanding - $10 per hr. per sander. The Village generally
uses 4 sanders. Therefore, our cost would be $40 per hr.
salting - $12 per hr. per salter. The Village generally
uses 2 sal' trucks. Therefore, our cost would be $ 24 per hour.
plowing - $20 per hr. per truck. The Village generally
uses 15 trucks. Therefore, onr cost would be $300 per hr.
c) materials (e.g. sand, salt)
Salt	 - $22 per hr. using 2 trucks.
Sand	 - $ 6 per hr. using 4 trucks.
2.	 What are your costs to mobilize yot:r equipment for
n - !	 • a; sanding - The sanding equipment is placed on our trucks at the beginning
of the season and not taken off until the season is over. Therefore,
there is no mobilization cost for each individual storm.
t
i
a
1'.
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b) salting - The salting equipment is placed on our trucks at the
beginning of the season and not taken off until the season is over.
Therefore, there is no mobilization cost for each individual storm.
c) plowing - $90 per storm for mounting plows, if done during the
regular work day.
Demobilize? _ Approximately $50 to remove , plows.
3. Are these costs (fil or #2) affected by the amount and type of snow
fore cast? Please be specific.
The cost per hour for plowing snow would not be affected by the type
or amount of snow. A large snowfall would naturally extend the number
of hours that we would have to plow.
4. Are these costs (#1 or #2) affected by the time of day or day of the
week? In what way? (Please be specific)
The only effect the time of day or the day of the week has on cost is on
the overtime pay for our workers. Any snow removal done before 7 A.M.
or after 4 P.M. on a weekday, or on weekends or holidays, would be paid
at an overtime rate of 1.5% of regular pay.
9
- -
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5. Under what conditions do you mobilize for
a) sanding - Equipment on trucks during the entire season,
b) salting - Equipment on trucks during entire season.
c) plowing - Prediction of 3 or more inches of snow.
	
6.	 When during the course of a storm do your crews actually do
a) sanding - We usually sand and salt during the very beginning
of a storm and after plowing has been completed.
b) salting- same as a)
c) plowing - When there is 3 inches of snow on the ground and it
appears that the storm will continue, we generally start to plow.
	
7.	 Are your costs affected by the amount of snow received aside from having
to keep your equipment in operation longer? How? (e.g. call in
outside crews, call in backup crews, add more equipment)
Under very severe conditions, we might attempt to hire outside equipment,
but this has not been done in the last 5 or 6 years.
0
-172-
S.
	
If a storm strikes earlier than forecast (or if it were not forecast)
what additional costs do you incur? (per hour)
None.
9.	 if a storm strikes later than forecast (or is of less intensity than
forecast) what additional costs do you incur? (per hour)
If the storm is less intense than forecast, we may be stuck with a
larger work force than actually needed. For example, we might only
call in a crew of approximately 10 for salting and sanding; whereas,
a full scale plowing operation encompasses approximately 40 people.
Therefore, the additional cost per hour could be in the order of
$150 to $250 per hour.
NAME 01' RESPONDENT
DAM	 January 25, 1977
•y
1
Ir
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Flu: ^rt reer Defar^t
6	 1. Number of Lane Miles of load.
148 miles plus 65 acres of municipal lots. Three lots (about 10 acre.
are given high priority because they serve basis needs of the city.
2. What vas your total 1975-76 snow-ice budget?
?974-75
1974-75
3. What other services do you receive from kSC?
Hurricane warnings. The forecast was used to get together a crew with front
loaders to keep streets clear of limbs during the storm.
U
4. How often do you mobilize unnecessarily?
This happens occasionally. For example, with 4" on the ground and snow
predicted to continue, crews were called in at 3 AM to have street
clear by rush hour, but now stopped at 4 Art .
30 menXfour hoursXtime and one-halfX$5.50/hr - $990 lost.
#	 5. How long does it take you to mobilize?
One hour or less. Plows are mounted if thr forecast warrants during the norm-
al work day (i.e. if forecast calls for snow during 'overtime hours'.
Actual trigger for calling mein in is police report of conditions for
sanding and salting. Plowable accumulation initiates plowing. There is
a tendency to leave plows on unless a period of good weather is definitely
forecast.
0	 6. In what ways would you save money through an improved forecast?
Savings in labor costs, especially in overtime (see question 4).
I
Y ^
r0
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE SNOW FORECASTS
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A
WEATHER SERVICES %.AAWORATION	 OPERt.TIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
1:31A GREA T ROAD. BEDFORD, MAS:.ACHUSETTS 0173'.)	 M ul tiple Listing	 Zoc. 2B Us Av^
49	
1 Q EtAILY FORECAST	 3 0 F ORECAST	 5 0 REVISED 60RECAZjT
2 0 PRELIMINARY FORECAST	 A 0 SUN LEMENTARV	 5 0 WEEK ENO OUTLOOK
a -^
jr'^	 f.
i
1
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM-3AM
81 3AM-6AM
9 6AM-9AM
tb 9Ar,' %0ON ^^ aZ tiN^ S ^/ '^ T-	 ^.
11 NOON 3— Pry"
12  3PM 6PM 4 v 2- 3	 .w
13 6PM-9PM
14 9PM-MID. sJ /tit
	 1	 /Gwn.r^	
^__
p mjvL-i / 1^ r f^--3.`^
15	 REMARKS	 Temperatures rede to the last hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period.
N	
d	
IC/^ANOW
'5---0X
TOb10RROW GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. VVINDS
	 GUSTS f
16 1AM-3Avl •	 r _
17 r I	 3ANI.6APv1 / t^1lA i S •^ '	 ^^..	 I
18 (	 6AM 9A'.:
19 9A'NA NOON !
20 NOO N 3Ph' 0 1 3 S
—
21
22
I	 3PM-6PM
6PM 9PNA
i
j
I
231 ./' 9PM-MID
24	 RE "•ARKS	 Temperatures relate to the last hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period.
,REM A P K 5 /1
^	 /4
^r.	
S
ORMAL PAU Be
OF POOR QUALITY
tf,
I
9
4	
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WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION 	 OPERATIONAL WE 14 n FORECAST
131A GREW ROAD. BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing
	 ,bc 2S %apt
f 0 DAILY FORECAST	 3 O FORECAST	 5 0 REVISED FORECAST
2 Q PRELIMINARY FORECAST	 4 O SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 O WEEK-END OUTLOOK
TO D AY GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM-3AM
B 3AM 6Ah1
9 6AM 9AM
10 9AM NOON
NOOr^ 33Ph" i	 •^11
12 3P1^ 6PV
6PDr, -9PM
---
13
15	 REMARKS.	 ' Tenwwatures relate to t e 1	 t hour of the 3hour Forecast Period.
TOMOPROA  GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS
^	 16 .An, 3ar1 .^' 1	 I^ ^^
1GUSTS
1.5 Z^
i
19 9AM NOON
20 NOON 3PM
21
22 Ve
3PM-6PM
6Ph1 9Ph,, _ ^3
_^^
Q
I !
23 9PM-MID
24	 REMARKS.	 Temoeratures retate to the last hour of the 3-tio.r Forecast Period.
A
	 a
-25T
	
RE?,AP -S
	
-
-	
m
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WEATHE R SERVICE] CORPORATION 	 OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD. BEDFORD. MASSACHUSETTS 01730	 Multiple Listing	 Zec 2? : 2007
1 Q DAILY FORECAST 	 3 O FORECAST
	 5 0 REVISED FORECA0
2 O PRELIMINARY FORECAST	 4 O SUPPLEMENTARV	 6 0 MEEK-END OUTLOOK
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM-3AM
8 3AM-6AM
9 6AM-9AM
10 9AM-NOON
11 NOON 3PM
12 3PM-6Ph9
13 6PM-9PM
14 9PM -MID.
5/i5	 REMARKS:	 Temperas res relate to the last hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period.
TOMORROV; GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS
	 GUSTS
16 ^/	 I AM 3AM LLIA-ho T
17 i 3 1,	 3AM-6A%!
?	 6AM-9A'1	 I
9Ah" NOON
18
19
20 NOON -3PM i
21 3PM 61"1.1
22
23 •
6PM-9PM
9PM-MID. :	 Ji	 (S '
^'u	 1	
-
'^4.
24	 REMARKS:	 Temper tures relate to the last hour of the 3-hour rorecast Period.
k4om	 ^ ^c	 ^^ f f 4,A
oe'`	 M
I	 25
I--
REMARKS
v
to
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
--i78-
WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION	 OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREA T ROAD, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing
1 O GAIL Y FORECAST	 3 O FORECAST	 5 0 REVISED FORECAST
2 O PRELIMINARY VORECAST 	 4 O SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 Q WEEK END OUTLOOK
r-
f
I
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM 3AM
8 3AM-6AM
9 6AM-9AM
10 9AM-NOON
L11 NOON-3PM
12 3P%' 6Ph1 ( ^ •
13 6PM-9PPJI f	 j5-,ri
V`
1
t ^-
14 9PM-MID.
15
.000
"REMARKS:	 `• T^emper- ures relate to the last hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period.
y /	 ^.	 614to ^ /ri'l	 / '^ 1
TOMORROW EN RAL WEATHER	 TEMP.{ WINDS	 GUSTS
16 1AM - 3AM f	 t	 I^l	 )	 /	 ! .l•/J	 GjJ
17 3AM-6A%1 —
18 1 6AM-9A%1
19 9AM-NOON
20 NOON-3P M
21 3PM-6PM
22 6PM 9PM
23 9PM-MID.
24	 REMARKS:	 Tem eratures relate to the last hour of the 3-hour Fcrecast Period.
' 
	
^
15' it tj"^ J
--	 n
i
1
i
^^/sue
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VP
WEATHER Gr'_ri ti ICES CORPOQATION	 OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD. BEDFORD. MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing	 bee_ 29 : %%\S
I O DAILY FORECAST	 3 O FORECAST	 S O REVISED FORECAST
2 O PRELIMINARY FORECAST	 4 O SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 O WEEK-END OUTLOOK
t
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINOS	 GUSTS
7 IAM-3AM
8 3AM-6AM
9 6AM-9AM CL?^	 S l
10 9AM-NOON
11 NOON-3PM ,^LTj	 S ;z 0
12 1 3PA" 6Ph1
13 6PM -9PM
^t^t^•a►
14 I	 9PM-MID.
15	 REMARKS:	 Temperatures relate to the iast hour of the 3 -hour Forecast Period.
. 2	 I 
TOMORROW GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS
	 GUSTS
16
18
IANI 3Ah1
3AM 6AV. ,
6.A%19Aty'
v; rJ !	
— i^	
.
`	 m N
L
13
/G
lU-'1 t^- V
i	 19 ^	 9	 A M NOO N
26 NOON 3PM ^i G^ ^SLa! S	
_
Q
^ C/ _J W 3S -:
21 I {	 3PM-6PM
22 6PM 9Pti1 V, 	 S _ 3 /( 3 v
23 9PM-MID.
24	 REMARKS-	 Temperatures relate to the last ';Your of the 3-hour Fore;a;t Period
25 	 1	 REMARKS
I	 rnAx /^
/
f
WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION 	 OPERATE,.	 WEATHER rORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing.^j CRZQ
1 Q OAILV FORECAST
	 3 O FORECAST	 5 0 REVISEO FORECAST
2 O PRELIMINAR Y/ FORECAST	 4 O SUPPLEMENTARV	 6 O 100FIC-ENO OUTLOOK
it
T
I
s
0
{1^	 0
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM-3AM
8 3AM-6AM
9 6AM 9AM 1-3 404
10 9AM-NOON
11 NOON 3PM ^t.t+l tt	 C ^^ a-lVej
12 3PM 6PM
13 3 6PM •9PM f ylov
14 9PM-MID.
15	 REMARKS.	 Temperatures relate to the last tour of the 3 - hour Forecast Period.
^TOh10RR0W l
16	 /	 1 AM 3AM
GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
yo!
17 V 3AM 6AM ^^
18 6AM_9AM 5^ Lod	 t.t 2:-5
19 9AM-NOON --	 ` — 409V 1^	 f
20 NOON-3PM
21 V 3PM-6PM G
22 6PM-9PM
23 3 9Ph1 MID. A14(
24	 REMARKS	 Temperatures roe to the last hour of the 3hour Forecast Period.
ztect
25 ^^ RREMARKS`^
S^	 t-	 &-c -^ ►^r/	 Sec.)E	 ^	 U 2 Fs- 3 3	 GrJ.• ^	 C
i	
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:'VEATHEH SERVICES CORPORATION	 OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD, BEDFORD. MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing	 .,3 , D
1 O DAILY FORECAST	 3 O FORECAST	 S O REVISED FORECAST
7 D PRELIMINARY FORECAST	 * O SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 0 WEEK-ENO OUTLOOK
s
I
0
f
I
TODAY GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM•3AM
8 3AM-6AM
9 6AM-9AM
10 9AM-NOON
11 NOON-3PM
12 3PM-6PM
—	
— I
13 6PM-9PM
14 9PM-MID.
V L15	 REMARKS.	 Temper	 ures relate to the last hour of the 3 - hour Forecast Period
TOMORROW  ENERAL WEATHER • TEMP, GUSTS`WINDS
16 „/ 1 AM 3AM WZ C f't ^'( __— __ 4 ^J^^
	
•
17 3AM-6AM ^^FC ^^ C
18 6AM_9AM
19 9AM-NOON
/20
_
NOON-3PM—
- --_^----- -- -
Gr / /^ ►^ ^(^ '^ I '.3
21 3PM-6PM `r
22 6PM 9PM
9PM-MID.23
24	 REMARKS:	 Temperatures relate to the last hour of the 3hour Forecast Period.
5	 EMAiKS
I
r
'^ .
WEATHER SERVICE ,,,,,iPQRATIOtJ 	 OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD, BEDFORD, MASS /CHUSETTS 01730
	 Multiple Listing
	 Jc%rN. 14 X30
1 0 DAILY FORECAST	 3 O FORECAST	 S D REVISED FORECAST
2 O PRELIMINARY FORECAST
	 + O SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 q WEEK END OUTLOOK
ORIGINAL PAGE: L5
OF POOR. QUALITY
6
ti
TODAY	 ,(,v GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM 3AM
8 3AM•6AM
9 6AM-9AM
gf
10 9AM-NOON U
11 NOON 3PM {	 r Z ^>/
12 3PM.6PM !/
13 ,/ 6PM 9PM J
14 `/ 9PM fViID
.v
NCO _	 r'
15	 REMARKS.	 Temperatures relate to the last hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period.
TOMORROW	 ^ GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS
	 GUSTS
16
17
1 A -3AM
3AM 6Ah1^^ N^ ?-5 n
18 GAM 9A.1
19 3 9AM NOON s -
20
21 3
NOON 3Ph1^^
3PM-6PM
22 6PN1.9PM
---9 PM-MID /	 G23 2^ ^^ g
U24 	 1	 REMARKS	 Temperatu	 s relat	 o the last hour of the 3 hour Forecast Period
25 _
	
REMARKS
	 t"'
I
I
I
f
n
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4
OPERATIONAL WE.	 FORECAST
HER SERVICES CO,' ,'^— R' i'ION
Q04C, BEDFORD. IAASSAi. — - - T 1 S 0 1	 lViUIIijJIt 	Listing
l'U P [C AS 1	 3 0 FORECAST	 6 C) RE VISES FORECAST
4 k Y F I AF CAS7	 4 0 SU"LEMENTAN Y 	6 C) WE E IC END OUT LOOK
TODAY	 GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
9 A M,
1	 9A'.1 N C) C)
14'
tl wal t to tho , iasl hour of the 3-hour Forecast Period
(-E%EHAL ItEATHER	 TEMP.	 VVINDS
	 GUSTS
000,
17 44.
5 ^(, rs18
19,
02 0-4v
I--, 7c^ll
21 3
22!
2
"1 >---
3
w1p , to the Iasi hour of the 3hou r Forec ast Peric io
.s
11,0
'iqw
If
f	
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a
WEATHER SERVICES CORPORATION OPERATIONAL WEATHER FORECAST
131A GREAT ROAD, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 01730 	 Multiple Listing	 3cn ^ : No`s
I C) DAILY FORECAST
	
7 0 FORECAST	 6 0 REVISED FORECAST
2 0 PR'E LIMINAR V FORECAST	 4 0 SUPPLEMENTARY	 6 0 WEEK END OUTLOOKf
y
i
t
'	 TODAY GENERAL WEATHER • TEMP. WINDS	 GUSTS
7 1AM 3AM
B 3AM.6AM
9 6AM 9AM
10 9AM NOON
11 NOUN 3P%1
12	 ! 3Pr., 6Pm
13 ^ 6PM ^;P'^1
14	 9PM MID	 5	 I
15	 (	 RE^.IARK5	 • Temperatures relate to the last,	 yr
 of the 3hour Forecast Period.
Ti^'.'URRC)t'. GENERAL WEATHER TEMP. WINDS
	 GUSTS
-	 —
17! Vo-' 3AM GAV
--
GIF
i18 !^ 6AM 9A".1
l 19 :	 9AN1 N00%
r---
20! ^ -NOON 3PM^ 4
-
21 I 1	 3PM 6PM
22	 6Ph1 yPr.'
231	 —9PM MID
24'	 RFNIARKS
	 r•.,j	 i	 peat	 s relst,
	 to tnr last hour al tfw 3-hour Forecast Period i
25	 F41,14H KS
^I	 t
^.	 t
t
I
-	 ^	 I
Y^	
7
r,	 -
or
3
f
SATURDAY 1/8/77
	 FORECAST
1500EST FORECAST
SATURDAY---INCREASING CLOUDS TONITE WITH CHANCE OF A LITTLE LITE S:13!,
OR FLURRIES DEVELOPING IN WESTERN G AND H AFTER 3AM, LOWS RANGING FP,:.t
5-15 MOUNTAINS TO 15-25 REST OF AREA-,VARIABLE WINDS LESS THAN joMP1{
TONITE.
FOR ZONES NORTHWEST NALF-OF D ALL OF E A14D F
SUNDAY/MONDAY: CLOUDY SUNDAY WITH RISK OF A FLURRY OR 2 DURING THE DAY
WITH STEADY LITE SNOW DEVELOPING IN THE EVENING POSSIBLY PFCuMING
CCASIONALLY MODERATE AFUR MIDNITE SUNDAY THEN ENDING AS A FEW FLURRIES
MONDAY AFTERNOON- TEMPS THRU THE PERIOD 22-32 WITH COLDEST TE14PS IN ZONE
F- NORTH TO NORTHEAST WINDS AT 7- 14t4Pi SUNDAY INCREASING TO 12-20 SUN-
DAY NIGHT AND POSSIBLY TO 15-30MPH MONDAY MORIJIIIG BEFORE
SHIFTING INTO THE NORTHWEST MONDAY AFTERNOON- ACCUMS FROM THIS STOW __
tI LqY RtW SETWEEt` 4-8 INCHES •
SOUTHEAST HALF OF D. NORTH HALF OF B
SUNDAY/MONDAY: CLOUDY SUNDAY WITH CHANCE OF A FLURRY OR 2 . THEN STEADY
LITE SHOW DEVELOPING SUNDAY EVENING CHANGING TO A MIXTURE ALL OR RAIN
MONDAY MORNING. THEN ENDING BRIEFLY AS SNOW 14014DAY AFTERNOON-
TEMPS NEAR 30 SUNDAY RISING-TO 32-35 SUNDAY NIGHT AND MONDAY MORNING
FALLING INTO UPPER 20'S MONDAY AFTERNOON- NORTH TO NORTHEAST WII4DS
AT 7-14MPH SUNDAY INCREASING TO 12-25M PH SUNDAY NIGHT AND POSSIBLY
18-35MPH MONDAY MORNING BEFORE SHIFTING TO NORTHWEST MONDAY AFTERNOON-
ACCUMS EXPECTED TO" RUN BETWEEN 1-3 INCHES OF SLLISfLY_MlaW
I
1M
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RZMARKS.i.	 rr
STORM CURRENTLY DEVELOPING VICINITY OF CENTRAL LOUISIANA
WILL MOVE EAST TO EAST-NORTHEAST NEXT 6-12 HOURS *
 
THEN START
TURN TO THE NORTHEAST * LIKELY MOVING OVER THE VIRGINIA/NORTH
CAROLINA COASTAL SECTIONS HEADING TOWARD SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND
MONDAY. STILL A LOT OF QUESTIONS AS TO THE EXACT TRACY. AND
SUBSEQUENTLY THE PRECIPITATION AMOUNTS AND TYPE. THERE ARE
SUGGEST4 0NS THAT STCRM WILL BECOME MON'wMENTAL IN NATURE•
WITH HEATf PRECIPITATION ALONG ALL OF THE EASTERN SEABOARD.
RAIN/SNOW LINE LIKELY TO SET UP NEAR THE BALTIMORE/WASHINGTON
AXIS, AT THIS TIME WE FAVOR JUST WEST FOR FINAL LINE-
t	 _
ZONES F AND E...
FEW FLURRIES DEVELOPING DURING THE AFTERNOON. SB9_W V yM.Wj G
! _	 MELY EV-912 -9 , VICI 1ITY OF 7- LQPft_THIS_EVENING• SNOW THEN BECOMING
OCCASIONALLY MODERATE TO HEAVY. WITH SLEET AND BORDERLINE FREEZING
RAIN MIXING IN OVER EASTERN E AND SOUTHEASTERN F DUPING THE
EARLY MORNING HOURS *
 LIKELY TO ALL MIXTURES OF SLEET AND BORDERLINE
.RAIN THOSE AREAS BY DAYBREAK MONDAY• BUT THEN LIKELY BACK TO ALL
SNOW AGAIN PRIOR TO ENDING MONDAY LATE AFTERNOON. PRELIMINARY SNOW
ACCUMULATIONS RANGING FROM 10-15 INCHES WESTERN BORDER AREAS OF
F Tk:t-6 INCHES -EASTERN E AND SQU_ THEEASTERN F. RISK OF SOME ADDED
ACCUMULATION LATTER AREAS AFTER CHANGEOVER, TEMPERATURES
DURING TONITE BORDERLINE 30-33# BUT STARTING TO DROP OFF AFTER
SUNRISE, DROPPING INTO THE UPPER TEENS AND LOW 20.S MONDAY.
WINDS BECOMING NORTHEAST 15-20 AND LUSTY TONITE AND NORTHERLY
20-25 AND GUSTY MONDAY.	 -
ZONES D, NORTHERN B AND C...
CHANCE FEW FLURRIES AFTERNOON. CHOW DEVELOPING 7-9PM C AND
REMAINDER BY 10-11PM. SNOW CONTINUING FOR ABOUT 6-7 HOUPS• THEN
BECOMING MIXTURES OF SLEET/SNOW/BORDERLINE F _N. A_CCUMULATION-
THRU THAT TIME 3-6 INCHES. RAIN HEAVY AT TI..&:S INTO MONDAY
FORENOCN.'THEN RISK OF BACK TO SNOW AGAIN PRIOR TO ENDING MONDAY
AFTERNOON. TEMPERATURES IN SNOW NEAR 30-32. THEN IN MI.DLE 30•S
IN MIXTURES. BUT DROPPING INTO 20•S MONDAY LATE FORENOON AND
AFTERNOON. WINDS SIMILAR TO F AND E ABOVE•
r
4	 S108tl F OL.L OW ili An $CHID MJD >rORICA S o .....
	 T-1
12HARKS0 0 0 •..••STILL NO . BASIC CHAMMS TO -FORECAST THINKING ALTHOUGU
TIM M Cr - 3=WIFICAMT'PRECIP lTATION MUST -OE'ADVANCED SONEVIAT: * -
.S ZONI S F AND E•.....000ASI OVAL LIGHT SNOW DEVELOPING CURRENTLY SH O1LD
2&C01RE • STEA DIEAr
 WW7' POT A W OCCASIONALLY MODERATE' AT TITRES DURI NG ' THE
19VMVG AND NiGRIN SLEET AND'SOMERLINE !'REELING • A^I10 IUXIM - IN ftol
THC 3OUTIEAS T' DURING THE &RLY • flDRl4NG .90 0R& LIKELY - BECOMING MOSTLY
Ot ALL NOR-F RF-.-,ZING RAIN AND .SOME SLEET - DURI NG THE FCRZW QA BUT'
CLAN INi - SACK - TO- SNOW PRIOJI TO - ENDING MONDAT AFTIIINOON *- -ACCUMULATIONS
RANG IN G F RO r'! PO TEN TIAL I f ;-I 3_ INCHE IS .WESTERN BORDER AR9XS DOOM TO* " -
3. 6 INCHES_ SOUTIEASTERW PORTIONS WITH nNAL FIGURES 'THERE • tE FINDENT ON
KJX OF - PRECIPITATION - AND EXTUT. OF_ RAIN: TEMPERATURES - 2f -30 THIS
EDEM2100 RISIGNG TO - 30-34 DOSING TU MILY MORNING HOURS AN'! NONDAY
FQFtINOON AR OPP INO Wr T 0 . INZ 9 0 # 5 - MONDAY:-AFTEMOOK AND S+1 90=19G8Tr ' WINDS 110RTHEAST IMC R!A ST Na TO f 0 = 1 S MM BY MI DWI GHT BECOM IW
12=80 - M pA, GUSTY 25 UPS LATE . 70MIGH Ir AND MONDAY MORNING SBITTING TO -- - -
-fD RINV!S T 94-30 MIN AND GUSTY BY -110LDAY APTERMOOR, 3LO9.Y - DI 11I NI SRI NG
AT NIGHT*.	 -	 -	 - -	 - - -	 -	 --
ZONES-Do. NORTREEM - C AND .8•....00CASIONAL LIGHT SHOW SPREADING EASTWARD
ACROSS -T1E ` ARF_II CURREN TO'3 -:'MlECONENG TRICKER 8Y
_
 5-6 PH AND - 000ASIONAT.
ALLY. .MaDERATE DtRIMG - TRE'TATE EVEUIUG. PRECIPIATION - LIKELY BECOMING -
MIX TOME OF* SNDW/SLEE T' AMD . I:ORMRLINE "FAIN BY .2-4 AM MONDAY AF'T'ER- -
ACC UM MA TI ON S OF -3 -6 - INC HES OR S0. - - RAIN HEA VY AT TIMES INTO - THE
FOR ENOON OR MI DDA T - -TR EM • RI SK - OF A AZ N CHA NG ING BA C E TO AC PERIOD OP'
$KOW UFtRE ENDI.N3 DURING. TKE - TARLY OR - MID-AFTER0GN; TEMPERAT.URM
31 ;-32. DROPPING TO 28 -3f IRIS - EVENING; R151N G' TO .34 =36" _ D0RIPG THE -AN MONO
NOIDAY, BUT- M OPPiNG' S ACK_ INTO THZ 20'S _ DURING -.TRE'"AFTERNO ON AND. TO THE
TEEMS A?.HIGHTa
	
_
' V1NDS NOR'ffiEAST IADREASI$3 T015+20 MPH . GUSTY 3fl 1lPK
BT - LATE TONIGHT SHIFTING TO NM7HWEST 20-30 MPH -ANTE GUSTY MONDAY AFTE_11-
NOON* D IN INI SHING 5L 04LY AT 11 GHTv.
2i4L %.^i
ZONES E AND F
34OW BECOMING OCCASIONALLY MODERATE AT TIMES TONIGHT- SOME SLEET
AND FREEZING RAIN MIXING MIXING OVER SOUTHEASTERN PORTIONS DUPING
THE EARLY MORNING HOURS- PRECIPITATIO- aECOMING ALL SNOW MONDAY
AFTERNOON AND ENDING LATE AFTERNOON 01% _' EVENING- ACCUMULATIONS
RANGING FROM 10-15 INCHES WESTERN AND ::ORTHERN F AND NORTWESTERN E
TO 3 TO 6 INCHES 'WHERE FREEZING AND RAIN BECOME MIXEr.
TEMPERATURES MID TO UPPER 20S RISING TO LOW 308 SOUTHEASTERN PORT1uNS
DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS- THEN DROPPING INTO THE MID 20S DURING
THE .AFTERNOON 14ONDAY- CONSIDERABLE DRIFTING AND BLOWING SNOW DURING
THE DAY MONDAY- WINDS EAST TO NORTHEAST 10-20 MPH TONIGHT AND NORTT!
TO NORTHWEST 15-25 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS DURING THE DAY MONDAY-
t
U
t
ZONES B, C AND D
t MIXTRES OF SNOW, SLEET AND
BECOMING ALL SNOW BEFORE
3-6 INCITES. RISK OF RAIN
TEMPERATURES IN THE 32-34
TDNI GHT BECOMING NORTH TO
BY AFTERNOON MONDAY-
FREEZING RAIN WITH BOARDERLINE TEMPZRATURES-
ENDING MID TO LATE AFTERNOON- ACCUMULATION
HEAVY AT TIMES DURING THE FORENOON WITH
DEGREE RANGE., WINDS NORTHEAST 10-20 MPH
NORTHWEST 15-25 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS
^- 1 O 8-
ZONES E AND f
MIXTURE OF RAIN, FREEZING RAIN AND DRIZZLE DU3IM 1HE NEXT 3-6 HOURS,
SOW IC III VALLEY' AREAS, .ESPEC IALLY ZONE F. TURNING COLDER DURI'NG THE
Al'ER143ON WITH PRECIPITATION CRANGING TO SNOW. , S10W BECOMING FLURRIES
THIS EVENING AND EW I N3 19 - THE  LATE EVENI NG o ACCUMULATIONS 1-3 I NCBES,
LOCALLY - 3-: 5 I NCH ES .HI GHER ELEVATIONS V POR TI'ON S: 	 " .	 -
IEMPERATUBES IN THE UP;ER 20,S - VESTERN LOh AREAS TO MID 30,S E
PORTIONS .TWAY* - DROPPING INTO THE LOW - TO MID 20, S._BY EVENUI NG : OVERNITE
LOBS IN THE _MID.TO UPFER TEENS •_ EkSTERLY VRNDS 5-1S WHO- . BECOMING
VARIA73LE DATER THIS MORNING AND' -SHI F'TING TO _VEST' AND NORTHWESTERLY,
IN1 C RFA S I N1 TO 20 -30 MPH 1H I S AF TER NO010, GUSTY TO 45 MPH THIS EVENI NG
. T► S.%Y o' .PTI.Y CLOUDY• WINDY AND COLD. A FEW LITE SNOW SHVRS V POR-
T IONS DUR G THE DAY- LOV S TIE MOANING IN 'HE UPPER TEENS TO LOW 20, 'S.
HI GHS IN THE 20 * So V E STE RLY WINDS 18 -2 5 MPH AND GUSTY -0 -	•-
ZONES B, C A17D D
RAIn OCCASIONALLY MODERATE TO HEAVY AT TIMES E POR11 ONS THI S
MORNING, FIXING VITH _ AND - CHAM Its TO SNOW TRI S . AFTEANOW4
PI MINI SHING TO SNOW SITYRS BY EVM41M • ACC UMULAT IONS OF ABOUTT
1 ;-2' .INCHES V AND .NV PORTIONS, LI TIL.E^ 	
_
IF ANY E AND SE' PORTIONS.
TEMPERATURES IN THE MID 30,S - WEST TO LOW 40, S EASTr IROPPT W
INTO _'DUE MID 20,S WEST AND - LOW 30,S EAST BY - LffE AFTERNOON.
V I ND S VARIABLE , -
 BEC OMINO WESTERLY' 2 0 •.3 0 MPH AND - GUSTY THI S'AFTERNOON.
TUE SDAY • .. VAR I AB L E CL 0 UDI N?. S S AND C OLD ER . LOOS TUE MORNING IN THE
LOW.TO MIV:'Z0,S0 HIGHS IN THE UPFER 26, S TQ WAR 30 • ig ND S VEST TO -
NO RTH6E ST 18-25 --MRI * GUSTY TO 4S MPH DURI N1; TR E DAY*' DI MI NI SH,I NG
SLOWLY - AT NI'TE.
Or
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE ELECTRIC UTILITY QUESTIONNAIRE
I
I
4
I
•
i
9
1
t
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FIRM: E %eQjVcic U*: M*-Y
This questionnaire is designed to help us assess the economic impact of the
weather forecasts that you receive from Weather Services Corporation on your
company. The questions were designed along the lines of your responses to
our last short questionnaire. Although all the questions may not pertain to
your operations or may not be in the format you use, please answer all
relevant questions in the best way you know how. Thank you.
General Question s:
1. How many households do you supply with electric power?
L.  How many square miles do you service?
3. What is your client mix (based on power delivered)? Residential 	 37.3 %
Commercial	 27.6 %
Industrial	 25.7 %
Other (Please describe) 	 9.4 ro
4a) What is your maximum peak load?
, 844 mw
b) What fraction of peak load is normal load?
Load factor is approximately O.0
5. What net fraction of the power that you distribute is purchased from
another source? (exclusive of very short term exchanges)
Approximately IM, (19"(5 data)
6. Do you sell power to others? -- What net fraction of your normal
production? (exclusive of very short term exchanges)
Yes
0
z
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Maintenance (when applicable)
la) What sorts of weather events cause you to cancel routine maintenance
or new construction?
Rain, snow etc. and cold weather of 10OF or below.
For the following questions, also consider outside contractors if appropriate:
b) What is the minimum advance ;yarning time necessary before such a
cancellation that will minimize monetary loss?
On normal working days during scheduled working hours there is
no penalty. At all other times, a twenty hour advance cancellation
is requires: to avoid penalty.
c) What is a representative cost to you (in wages, equipment deployment)
for failure to cancel in time?
Wages or -$15/man plus fringe benefits. Number of men would depend
on particular ,iob. Equipment not normally deployed in advance.
d) Suppose that you cancel. routine maintenance or con3 t_ruction unnecessarily
due to the weather forecast. Do you incur any expenses which would
have been avoided had the forecast proven correct? If so, how much?
No extra expense incurred if 10 hour advance notification given.
0
1
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2a) What sorts of weather events cause you to call up extra crews or hold
over crews to do special emergency repair Mork due to damage to the
f	 system?
Severe winds, gusting winds - branches and trees cause problems.
Lightning - fuse blowing etc.
Icing conditions - branch and tree problems. Sagging conductors etc.
Heavy rain - branches and trees - washing conditions that cause trees
to lean or fall.
b) How far in advance of the occurrence of such a forecast event do
you engage such crews? (Please include dependence of time of day, or
day of week when appr:priate.)
Forecasts are tempered by much udEement. Most weather emergencies
are handled by local crews and by relocating
	 system crews.
A hurricane, i.e., forecast to pass through the state, rather
than on the fringes, would most likely require outside assistance.
Additional outside crews would be requested from 4 to o hours
prior co the predicted storm arrival.
Weekends would require greater advance notice as crew personnel
are dispersed widely and require greater time to contact them for
assembly.
c) what is the loss to _you (in wages, cost of equipment deployment) per
hour to engage most or all of your emergency manpower for a storm
which is later than forecast or which never materializes at all?
I
f
Using premium rates, the cost
wages, fringes, vehicle, room,SG ' - ^ ^, -$100/hour. 'this would
:.rows in advance. The number
ati assessment of the path and
ti,e last hurricane resulted in
c re p.,; s
o one three man line crew including
meals etc. would be in the vicinity
be the cost of obtaining outside
of crews requested would depend on
severity of the forecasted storm; i.e.,
an initial request for 50 outside
0
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r
d) If you fail to engage crews in time to handle emergency work when it
is first needed due to a surprise storm, for instance, do you incur
^.	 extra costs? If so, how much?
-Failure to engage outside crews on time results in a slower
1	 restoration of service.
The penalties resulting are: criticism from public and
governmental groups, loss of local crews for a longer period
due to restoration activities and loss of revenue when service
facilities are not in operation.
i
1
0
0
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Load Forecasting (when applicable)
Summer
1. How far in advance do you use weather forecasts?
12 hours.
2. Is there a minimwn lead time after which a weather forecast update is
not useful? What is it?
Approximately 4 hours.
3a) What combination of weather and load conditions would require extra
generators to be brought on-line beyond the spinning reserve, or the
purchase of extra power from another source?
t
Severe storm alerts, i.e., hurricanes, ice storms. We will
anticipate transmission line outages, tidal effects on seashore
plants, etc.. Units will be brought on line as security measures
for localized areas.
t
b) How much of a delay is there between the need for and start of extra
power production beyond that available from the spinning reserve?
1. Jet units - 2 minutes
Gas turbines - 1 minutes
?,. SSteam - 2-t, hours after brief shutdown
- b-12 hours fir cold unit
0
0	 -195-
4. Would additional personnel be required to maintain the extra power
production capacity? Hoc3 many people? What would be their average
wage rate? What is the minimum number of hours for which they would
j	 have to be paid?
It does not appear that there is a wage penalty here. There
would always be enough personnel in the plant to get a unit
on the line.
I
I: additional personnel were required to operate the unit, they
would be called in. Extra personnel would always be called in,
as required, to meet the increased load no matter what the reason.
{
•
E
i
e
►
 f
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5. How much does a 1° change in wet bulb temperature affect your MW load
in typical summer temperature ranges?
4
Not available.
6a) Is there a critical condition (temp, humidity, solar radiation) above
which the accuracy of the forecast becomes crucial? How?
Temperature - variations of 10 0
 F. or more from forecasts.
Humidity	 - at summer temperatures of approximately 75 0
 F
and an increase of tumidity above 60% initiates
critical conditions.
Solar radiation - generally has no wind influence and does not
produce sustained load increase
b) In what way is this critical accuracy dependent upon the lead time of
the forecast (12, 24, 36 hrs)?
1. hours or less_
7. How could a better forecast save you money in a peak load situation?
Peaking units or hydro would be used to shave sharp peaks if
weather forecasts would specify temperatures and time of occurrence.
1	 This would eliminate the conservative attitude of scheduling units
to cover possible longer periods of extreme temperature exposure.
0
8. How do rapid changes in cloud cover affect your load?
Approximately 2 to Ab
I
9. Do changes in cloud cover ever cause your load requirements to increase
to the point where additional power generation capacity is necessary?
I
1I
1
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Winter
1. Do you use weather forecasts as an aid for load forecasting in the winter?
Yes.
2. Haw do the winter weather forecast formats differ from the summer formats?
Formats are similar.
3. Do you experience "peak-load" problems in the winter? Under what
circumstances?
No.
COMMENTS: For information conta<
0
q	 NAME OF RESPONDf	 4~4^
DATE	 V, r,'h '0, I'M
II>'	
-199-
APPFADIX G: SAMPLE GAS UTILI'T'Y QUESTIONNAIRE
f
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
_	 FIRM: Gas `^A\*	 -200-
This questionnaire is designed to help us assess the economic impact of the
weather forecasts that you receive from Weather Services Corporation on your
company. The questions were designed along the lines of your responses to
our last short questionnaire. Although all the questions may not pertain to
your operations or may not be in the format you use, please answer all
relevant questions in the best way you know how. Thank you.
General Questions:
1. How many households do you supply with.gas for space heating?
2. How many square miles do you service?
3. What is your client mix (based on cubic feet of gas distributed)?
Residential 39.4
	
x
	
Commercial 18.7	 X
Industrial 39.9	 X	 Other (Please describe) 2.0
	
X
4. What is your average annual cumulative quantity (ACQ) of gas distributed?
S.	 What is your maximum daily quantity (MDQ) of gas distributed?
I
I s I
S
z	 }
1 ._
r
F
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Maintenance (when applicable)
la) What sorts of weather events cause you to cancel routine maintenance
or Lew construction?
Snow
Extreme Cold
For the following questions, also consider outside contractors if appropriate:
b) What is the minimum advance warning time necessary before such
cancellation that will minimize monetary loss?
Two Hours
c) What is a representative cost tt • you (in wages, equipment deployment)
for failure to cancel in time?
Indeterminate
d) Sup,ose that you cancel routine maintenance or construction unnecessarily
due to the weather foreca st.
 
Do you incur any expenses which would
+)	 have been avoided had the forecast proven correct? If so, how much?
None
0
0
I
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2a) What sorts of weather events cause you to call up extra crews or hold
over crews to do special emergency repair work due to damage to the
system?
(1) 4' of snow accumulation
(2) Temperatures below 21OF average
b) How far in advance of the occurrence of such a forecast event do
you engage such crews? (Please include dependence of time of day, or
day of week wher .appropriate.)
t
	 Implement plan based on 7:30 a. m. forecast and 3:30 p. m. forecast.
f
c) What is the loss to you (in wa ges, cost of equipment deployment) per
hour to engage most or all of your emergency manpower for a storm
which is later than forecast or which never materializes at all?
Indeterminate
0
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{	 d) If you fail to engage crews in time to handle emergency work when it
is first needed due to a surprise storm, for instance, do you incur
extra costs? If so, how much?
Yes - Indeterminate
t
I	 ^
I
1
f•
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Load Forecasting (when applicable)
t	 1. How far in advance do you use weather forecasts?
30 days
I
2. Is there a minimum lead time after which a weather forecast update is
not useful? What is it?
Yes - Two Hours
3. How much does a change in Effective Heating Degree Day (per degree)
affect your load in typical winter temperature ranges?
1,000 - 1.500 MCF per each DDD
1
4a) Is there a critical condition (low temperature, high wind velocities,
etc.) where the accuracy of the Effective Heating Degree Day forecast
becomes more crucial to your operations? Please be specific.
Critical temperature 	 = 10OF (Avg.)
Critical wind velocity = 7 to 8 MPH.
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b) In what way is this critical accuracy dependent upon the lead time of
the forecast (24, 48, 72 hrs)?
it
24 Hours
I
5a) At what point does an unexpected load become so large that you are
forced to buy gas from another source?
#	 At 55 DDD
b) What is the (additional) cost incurred per cu. ft.?
$5.00/MCF
c) How could you have saved money by an accurate forecast? Please be
specific.
Could have curtailed and issued conservation requests.
i
0
0
-206-
I
62) Sonpose that the forecast mistakenly leads you to prepare for a load
greaL-^r than that which You actually need. What additional cost do
you incur, which would not have been present had the forecast been
correct?
Additional cost may run as high as $2.00 - $3.00 p r MCF
b) How great an error has to be made in load forecasting for these
costs to be incurred?
Average of 20 - 30 F
7a) At what point (if any) does an unexpected load become so large that
you are forced to call up additional manpower?
At 55 DDD
•
•	 b) What is the additional cost to you to do this over what your costs would
have been had you known in advance what the exact load would be?
$2.00 to $3.00 per MCF
•
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F
B.
	
If the weather forecast compelled you to erroneously shut off (or not
cut off) gas to an interruptible customer, are you hurt financially?
In what way? Please be specific.
All gas under contract is on a take-or-pay proposition. If
we cannot dump excess gas on interruptible customer once contracted
for, we lose abaut $1.00 per MCF for all gas we are stuck with.
9.	 Do you use Weather Services for summer forecasting? Does this
forecast format differ from winter forecasts?
Do not use weather service in summer
CMENTS :
I
0
NAME OF
0	
DATE	
_ March 9, 1977
0
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APPENDIX H: SAMPLE FUEL OIL QUESTIONNAIRE
FIRM:	 ^'V £ l
	
1L	 O
t^	 -209-
-This questionnaire is designed to help us assess the economic impact of the
heather forecasts you receive from Weather Services Corporation on your
Company. The questions were designed along the lines of your responses to
our last short questionnaire. Although all the questions may not pertain to
;our operations or may not be in the format you use, please answer all
relevant questions in the best way you know how. Thank you.
Ctneral Questions:
1. How many households do you supply with fuel oil for heating?
CONV-- IbEN T %RL
2. What is your client mix (based on gallons of fuel oil delivered)?
1
`	 Residential	 %	 Commercial	 %
Industrial	 %	 Other (please describe)	 %
3. What is your annual quantity of fuel oil distributed for 1976-197"?
V
b.	 During the heating season how many drivers are normally engaged in
keeping customers supplied? 	 /(o
E	 Haw many employees/truck?
	 ^C-'Q-
i	 About how many deliveries does each driver make per day? ^n
S.	 On the average how many hours per week does each driver normally spend
delivering fuel oil to customers?
♦ i	 6.	 How many total miles do your trucks drive per week?
E
1
^J
1	 ^
1
a
j
i
i
1
i
i
t
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7a. Wha t
 is your average hourly wage paid to drivers?
f	 ^
cot^Ftz)zN7 1 f)L-
b. What is your hourly overtime rate paid to drivers?
C. Is there a minimum number of hours guaranteed to drivers called up for
overtime duty?
Questions Relating to Degree Day Forecasts:
la. What is your optimum fuel oil drop per household?	 r
b. What is your average fuel oil drop per household?
/ f /C2e
2. flow many days reserve of fuel do you aim to keep in a customer's tank
just before refill?
fir's.
3. Has any household that you service ever run out of fuel oil due to
a bad weather forecast? In such an instance, what penalties did you
incur?	
,/
/1( d
1
P	 ^	 ^
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4. In plan wing to meet your optimum fuel oil drop per household, how do
the fol_cving enter into your planning:
a. Cumulative degree days since the last drop
HI-5 t5
b. Forecast degree days
Please explain.
5a. Hod far in advance do you set up your delivery schedule?
b. What would cause you to modify this present schedule?
WC^!-fT try
c. That is the minimum forecast lead time that would affect your planning?
-212-
6. By how many degree days must a forecast be inaccurate before it costs
you money? (degrees le) l^^st,^,u= t'^n,/^. r-ne— (-_^cT^n/v^"o ^c=.^c.►7
between the inaccuracy of the forecast and monetary loss? If so, what
is it?
7. Do you ever schedule (a) overtime for drivers presently on shift or
(b) call up additional drivers because of a predicted number of 'degree
days?' If you can, please give-a recent example. 	
/,^
C' Lt.^^A r rG^- ^5 f` ,^E- Dry Tc7 d ^^` C..t^
^^C^ G/3DFID ^F^t	 Lv C W/ [.L :JCS ^c=OcP^—L ^i^/c^er;5
n
r ^	 If the prediction proved to be incorrect, how might it cost you money?
'cJc
Fs
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Emergency Storm Warnings
la: Do you step up your delivery rate because of a forecast of light snow
♦ 	 (less than 4")? If you can, please give a recent example.
Alp .
If such a prediction proved to be incorrect, how might the accelerated
deliveries (which were not necessary) have cost you money?
In overtime wages
Maintenance and materials
". Do you step up your delivery rate because of a forecast of heavy snow
(over 4")? If you can, please give a recent example.
i
i
f !	 If such a prediction p roved to be incorrect, how might the accelerated
deliveries (which were not necessary) have cost you money?
In overtime wages
Maintenance and materials
2.	 Has it recently happened that an unforecast storm, or one which arrived
early, interfered with deliveries? How did it cost you money? Please
be specific.
^	 ^	 f
F
^	 Y
I
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E
s
3. flow far in advance do you have to receiNe an emergency storm forecast
7	 [^ in question (1)j in order to alter your delivery schedule?
3	 '
-r
y
P
We appreciate your cooperation. It sometimes happens that key information is
not covered adequately by the questions, so please add anything you might think
helpful to understand the impact of weather and weather forecasts on your
business.
COMMENTS:
ir
f
r
! 
f^
1
NAME OF RESPONDENT
s
DATE	 r'	 -
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APPENDIX I: SOME ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRIVATE METEOROLOGICAL FORECASTING
s
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Abstract
The clients of a meteorological consulting firm were studied to deter-
	
-	 mine the effects of weather .forecasts on their operations. We determined
what weather conditions triggered certain operational decisions in three
f	 groups of clients--governmental bodies, gas utilities, and electric
	
_	
utilities. Then, using actual forecasts over a two year period, we cal-
culated the monetary losses incurred as a result of incorrect forecasts.
	
-	 The results generally show losses in the thousands of dollars for each
erroneous forecast. Thus, i' the weather service is able to prevent even
one set of poor decisions based on a forecast, the cost of the service
would be returned and in many cases greatly exceeded. Other effects of
the clients' use of the forecast are discussed qualitatively. These
	
r	 include ncn-monetary gai.. to the clients and their customers through
increased convenient_, easier planning, and fewer breakdowns in service.
At least some clients fail to realize these advantages through inefficient
	
-	 use of the forecast.
'f
^y
t	 #
3
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1. Introduction
Meteorological information specially tailored to the needs of both the
public and private sectors of the economy has become increasingly in demand.
As industrial and business operations generally become more efficient, well-
planned, and technical in nature, the effect of small environmental changes
has become of obvious importance to the overall success of an operation
[see WMO (1968), Maunder (1970), and Taylor (1970)]. Many, if not most,
jobs are sensitive to both weather and weather information either directly
or indirectly. As business and governmental concerns become more aware of
how -eather affects their personnel, equipment, and timetables, they
desire to control these effects as much as possible, [Collins (1956)].
At the same time, meteorologists are becoming better equipped to satisfy
these desires through advances in communications, real time weather
depiction, and improved forecast techniques.
The task of the meteorological consulting firm is to provide tech-
nical information to meet the client's needs which, because of their highly
detailad and specialized nature, cannot be met by the National Weather
Service. C nsulting meteorology covers many diverse areas: providing
meteorological advice and information on instrumentation, weather modifi-
ca%^ion, advertising and marketing, statistical analyses, surveys and field
studies, data processing, legal matters, radio and television programming,
as well as short and long term forecasting for various business and indus-
trial operations. In this paper we concentrate on the effects of short
term forecasting.
While other studies have centered on consequences of alternate
decisions, [e.g. Thompson (1972)], we use actual forecasts, outcomes, and
consequences, to examine some clients typically served by the private
consQltant in cerms of their weather sensitive operations, their use of
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the forecast, and the benefits, economic or otherwise, gained from such use.
i	 One reason for choosing this area of concentration is that the effects of
the consultation are more easily quantifiable. Forecasts are typically
issued on a routine basis, thus allowing the collection of an adequate data
sample, and these forecasts are applied to specific practical problems about
—	
which a decision must be made, usually in a relatively short period of time
(hours, or at most, days). Such decisions, as, for example, those made by
a city department responsible for plowing snow, have direct economic conse-
quences. Another reason for addressing the area of operational forecasting
has been our experience that this function of meteorological consulting is
not well understood by the public and in some cases by the client users
themselves. We hope to clarify the relationship between the service the
consulting firm provided and the uses to which such information was put by
the user in actual circumstances.
2. Consulting Firm Operations
The organization and facilities of meteorological consulting firms
vary considerably [Myers and Cahir (1971), Wallace (1971), and Hallanger
(1963)]. There is no minimum standard to which they must conform. Although
0	 the American Meteorological Society has a Certified Consulting Meteorologist
(CCM) program consisting of certain professional and ethical standards to
which a member must adhere, consulting meteorologists may and do operate
without this certification. :here are no restrictions to prevent a
person with no experience from setting up an operation in a basement and
using a dart board to prepare the forecast. There are, however, many com-
petent meteorologists in consulting who are not CCM's simply because they
have not had th,i time nor felt the need to go through the process of
0
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applying for certification. Unfortunately, many clients choose consulting
firms solely on the basis of their fee schedule rather than on their com-
t
	
petence.
In the cooperating consulting firm, whose clients were contacted in this
study, operational forecasting is divided into two areas: daily or routine
forecasting and storm or emergency forecasting. Routine forecasts include
information such as temperature, degree days, humidities, and cloud cover
that is sent out several times daily to utilities, fuel oil companies, con-
l	 struction companies, and others. Forecasts are made for specified times
or for three hour intervals and cover periods of up to 72 hours. Storm fore-
casts are only sent out as the need arises and can include notice of such
events as snowfall, flooding, high winds, or thunderstorms. These forecasts
give expected time of arrival, plus or minus a few hours, intensity, areal
coverage, and ending times.
I
The level of service depends on how much the client is willing to pay.
Reports are sent out by phone or teletype once a day or every few hours
with updates as needed. These forecasts are usually tailored to the peculi-
4	
arities of a client's needs. For example, areas prone to flooding, hills
that ice up rapidly, or highly vulnerable power lines may be of particular
concern to individual clients. Clients whose geographical area of respon-
M
sibility is wide may require forecasts by districts. A major advantage to
the client is the freedom to telephone the forecaster if additional infor-
mation or clarification is needed.
The National Weather Service (NWS) and the Federal Aviation
Administration are the consulting firm's basic sources of data. Facsimile
machines reproduce NWS maps and analyses. Teletype circuits from the
i
Federal Aviation Administration supply hourly surface and upper air synoptic
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data from most North American stations. Satellite data are becoming more
widely used. Pictures in facsimile format from government transmission
lines can provide satellite data as often as every half hour in the visible
and infrared. Radar information can be obtained even more frequently (up
to every five minute) from certain NWS stations in the U.S. by means of
e dial-up facsimile system. Finally, the computer is beginning to make
itself felt in many private consulting firms by supplying instantaneous
data recall and display; mapping: data storing; and calculating derived
quantities such as streamlines, divergenze, and degree days. Such systems
are likely to become more widely used.
3. Collection and Analysis of Data
We chose a reputable consulting firm with a large and varied clientele
who received regular operational forecasts and categorized over 400 of
these clients into groups with similar needs and activities. These groups
are governmental bodies concerned with snow and ice removal; gas utilities;
electric utilities; fuel oil companies; commodities dealers, processors and
brokerage houses; and a miscellaneous group including oil prospecting
companies, an automobile club, and several construction firms.
Our next step was to contact most clients through a questionnaire
specially designed for each group. First, some preliminary inquiries
vere put to the clients. Then, many of the questionnaires were reviewed
+	 by a person knowledgeable in the client's area. Questions were included
to obtain a general description of client activities in terms of size,
budget, manpower, equipment, and facilities and to determine the use of
0	 the consulting service's forecast. In particular we were interested in
operational decisions directly affected by the weather forecasts and the
t_	
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process used to arrive at these decisions, the deadline for such actions,
and the financial losses or benefits incurred by alternative options. We
telephoned the clients and sent follow-up letters to explain the purposes
of our research and our need for prompt replies. More than 50% of the
questionnaires were returned. After a questionnaire was returned, it
was usually followed up by a phone call to clarify answers or get further
information. In some cases, personal visits were made to clients to get
a first hand view of their operations. (For more details see Suchman
et al., 1978) .
In analyzing the great volume of data we collected we had to impose
a number of limitations on the scope of this study. One of these was the
assumption that the client always followed the general procedures described
in the returned questionnaire, although this was not slways the case. We
were interested in obtaining a general model of the clients' actual
operations with regard to the forecast, not an idealized mode). of what the
client's method of operation should or could be.
We also decided only to measure those effects directly produced by
the consultant's weather forecasts rather than trying to assess the
relative merits of alternative courses of action. The impetus for this
•	 study (still in progress) was to eventually determine the benefits of
satellite data to the cooperating consulting firm and its clients; the
control statistics are presented here. Towards this end, we used as a
r r	standard reference the "perfect forecast," rather than a forecast produced
by some other source (e.g. NWS). We assumed that if the client did not sub-
scribe to the cooperating consulting service, lie would have followed either
A ..,	 the NWS forecast or that of anot.er service. The former was not pra,.tical
.y
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for comparison because the wording of local forecasts are not precise
enough for verification. "A low in the low 20's" could be 21°, 22', or 230;f
"snow up to 2" in coastal areas and heavier amounts inland" could mean from
2.5" to 4" or more inland with exact accumulations unknown. Also, the NWS
forecast does not give exact timing, and a few hours difference in the on-
set of snow can result in the saving/spending of thousands of dollars.
Most of the clients felt that this feature alone was worth the cost of sub-
scribing to the consulting service. Because of this choice of reference
the effects of the forecasts all appear as losses relative to the perfect
forecast, this in no way reflects on the consultants.
Finally, the effects measured were what we call "direct economic
losses." These are specific monetary losses accruing directly to the client
(not the client's customers or the general public) over a short period of
time (usually days). Examples of these include payroll costs and money
spent for equipment deployment and materials (e.g. sand, salt, fuel).
There are other sorts of losses associated with incorrect forecasts, but
1	 these are difficult or impossible to quantify. For instance, the client's
working conditions and reputation may be adversely affected by a incorrect
forecast. The client's public may also experience similar losses which
are again not easily measured in dollars, such as time wasted getting to
or from work, vehicle accidents, and personal injury. These are very real
effects of incorrect forecasts which may be comparable in dollars to the
W --	 direct economic losses we have measured. Though these effects may be the
most significant in the long run, we can only mention their presence where
appropriate.
The client's responses to the forecast situations were determined from
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their answers to our questionnaire, and the consultant's forecasts. The
costs for specific operations were then calculated. These costs were
f
then compared with the clients' costs had the forecast been correct. The
difference'was the loss due to a poor forecast. Thus, for each year we
i	
tabulated the total forecast situations, correct and incorrect forecasts,
and net loss. As stated above, only some effects of the firm's forecasts
are included, and this paper does not intend to evaluate the actual worth
of the consulting service. To give an additional perspective to our
results, we do compare the "net loss" with total operation budget and the
cost of the consulting service.
We have assumed consistency of action--that once a procedure is set,
it is always followed. This is probably not true in practice for each
individual case, but it was impossible to monitor actions due to every
forecast. We assumed that the client's behavior conforms to his question-
nacre response.
4. Client Group Results
t
a. Road and Street Departments
The storm or emergency forecasting area mainly supplies governmental
bodies (city, state, and county transportation and public works departments)
vith snow and ice storm forecasts in wirer and issues alerts for heavy
-"	 rains, high winds, and severe weather during the other seasons. Snow and
ice forecasts result in decisions of whether to plow or sand, when to
r—
mobilize equipment for these operations, when to keep people on alert or
send them out, and whether and when to call out contractors.
The two significant forecast parameters for snow forecasting are
r
timing and amount within specified limits. The latter is used to determine
what action will be taken--sanding/salting or plowing. Most clients sand
r
i
	e	
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..	 when minimal amounts of snow fall, but plowing criteria varies from as
R
	
	
little as 1 1/2" to as much as 4". Hence, a city that plows at 4" will.
have one course of action for any forecast less than 4" and a different
one for 4" or more. In most cases a forecast of 4" produces the same
action as one of 10". The exception is when outside contractors are called
	
--	 in, usually at a 6" or 8" forecast. Contractors often require two to four
hours notice and Oust be paid for a minimum amount of time (usually four
hours) whether or not the storm materializes. Forecast amounts can there-
fore be translated into mobilization and personnel costs--what equipment
should be mobilized and who should be put on alert.
Timing is used to determine when the above occurs. During weekday
work periods timing is not that crucial, but at night and on weekends it
determines which crews are held over and who is put on alert at premium
wages. A storm that begins 12 hours after it was forecast can thus cost
thousands of extra dollars.
There are a few other significant points. First, for about one fourth
of the clients surveyed, the forecast of adverse weather has little economic
impact. Many of these are small townships who use the forecast for infor-
mation purposes only; mobilization time is so short and costs are so
minimal that they can wait until the last minute to prepare for a storm.
	
--	
The security of knowing that they will be contacted at any hour in case
of an emergency is well worth the cost of the service (usually under $1000
per season). Other clients, for example, those in high snow regions, are
always mobilized for adverse weather or, at least, automatically mobilize
prior to a weekend or holiday.
1
About one fifth of the respondents react to storms only when they
are in pr,gress. They never mobilize for sanding until the snow begins to
0
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fall, and the plows are never brought out until a plowable amount is on
the ground. We also encountered many clients who seemed unpredictable;
--	 they either subscribed to other weather services or only occasionally
listened to the consultant's forecast. These people preferred tr.ir own
interpretations to those for which they paid. Finally, public officials
are very reluctant to admit to misspending money or making mistakes; this
makes the task of assessing the impact of weather forecasts even more
difficult.
The-"overforecast," a forecast predicting more snow or ice than
actually fell, seems to cause the greatest quantifiable losses for snow
and ice clients. In such cases, crews are called in and equipment
mobilized unnecessarily. Given personnel salaries for sanding and salting,
plowing mobilizations and road operations, and a knowledge of when and
for how long crews would be called in, we were able to construct a fairly
exact method for calculating the cost of all overforecasts.
The "underforecast" was not so amenable to analysis. Many of the
"losses" here are indirect, as previously described, involving increased
complaints, loss of reputation, delays and inconvenience to the public.
Another more quantifiable loss is the increased amount of time necessary to
clear or improve streets given a start in operations after the onset of
precipitation. Most clients had no idea how much such situations affect
their total time on the road; although one client thought it would result
9	 in about s 25;. increase in time and therefore in cost. Unfortunately, this
estimate is only approximate. In addition to the uncertainties inherent
in speculation about wnot would have happened if the forecast had been
0_	 otherwise, the actual difficulties imposed by a late start would depend
significantly on the rate of snow or ice fall at the beginning of the
S
i
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Tab le 1
Monetary Losses Due to Incorrect Snow Forecasts
City A
Forecast
less than 4"
legs than 4"
greater than 4"
greater than 4"
greater than 4"
City B
no snow
greater than 2"
greater than 2"
greater than 2"
State C
less than 2"
greater than 2"
f '	 greater than 2"
greater than 2"
Outcome	 Cost
no snow	 $44/hr. + $750 (mobilization and
demobilization)
later than forecast	 $44/hr.
no snow	 $132/hr. + $750 (mob. b demob.)
later than forecast	 $132/hr.
less than 4"	 $88/hr.
Four hour minimum, 1.5 for overtime,
2 for holidays.
plowable	 $150/hr. extra (standby)
no snow	 $200/hr. + $150 (mob. & demob.)
later than forecast	 $200/hr. (standby)
less than 2"	 $1000/hr. + $100 (mob. 6 demob.)
If during regular hours (8 &4 to
4:30 PM) costs are 1/3 less S mob.
cost - 0
no snow	 $27,050/hr. + $9,800 (mob. b demob.)
no snow	 $27,050/hr. + $15,200 (mob. b demob.)
later than forecast	 $27,050/hr.
less than 2"	 $5,800 (mob. b demob.)
1.5 for overtime
s
I	
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storm, the condition of the streets before the onset of precipitation, the
speed with which crews could mobilize and be out on the streets, and the
total effects of the storm including such factors as drifting or heavy
icing that could magnify or minimize the effects of a slow start. Since
it is almost impossible to obtain meaningful quantitative losses for the
underforecast, in most cases we used only the overforecast for loss calcu-
lations; thus our total costs will underestimate the true losses to the
clients due to imperfect forecasting.
Because different criteria are used for snow removal, a good forecast
to one user could cause a major loss of money for another. Table 1 shows
this varia— on for three governmer:tal bodies including possible monetary
loss. Two of these are public works departments in moderate sized cities
and the third is a state highway department. The dollar figures in the
cost column are a combination of expenses for (a) mobilization and demobili-
sation of sand and salt equipment; (b) the same except for plowing equip-
_	
sent; (c) payroll cost per hour for sand and salt crews; (d) the same except
for plow crews. Plow crews are usually larger than sand and salt crews
and thus involve greater expense. Mobilization is the process of readying
the trucks for street work; this includes loading materials into the trucks
and mounting plows.
Every client has its own peculiar combination of costs. For
instance, some clients incur no mobilization expense if the snow fo-ecast
t	 is received during regular work hours because there are enough personnel
to perform the mobilization as part of the normal daytime routine. Such
factors along with overtime costs arc noted in the table.
In general, mobilization is a one rime cost (i.e. the entire cost
.is incurred once the decision to mobilize is made). Waiting time costs
;f
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(.. and d above) are hourly and rise proportionately to the length of the
delay in precipitation onset or until the decision is made to demobilize.
The decision to demobilize is usually made when a forecast update is
received cancelling the snow alert.
Thus, for City A a forecast of less than 4" of snow would cause the
sand and salt trucks to be mobilized ($750) and the crew to wait ($44/
hr.), if necessary, from the time the snow was forecast to begin until
the snow actually began or until the decision was made to demobilize.
Mobilization costs in this case would only be counted as a loss if no snow
fell; hourly crew costs would only be considered losses if the crew was
required to wait for precipitation to begin.
Similiarly, fo_ec3sts and outcomes for over 4" cause plow mobili-
zation ($750) and possible waiting time for the crew ($132/hr.). The
case of a forecast greater than 4" and an outcome of less than 4"
Is a hybrid: the losses are the result of paying for a plow crew when
only	 sand and salt crew was needed ($132/hr. - $44/hr. _ $88/hr.).
This loss would be incurred for every hour the unneeded plow personnel
were held over. For City A no mobilization loss would have occurred in
this hybrid situation since the tasks involved are the same regardless
i
of whether sanding or plow'	 is being planned. In other cities mobili-
zation tasks vary between sand and salt and plowing preparations, and the
difference in expense would therefore enter into the total loss.
0—
City B estimates that it costs them about $150 per hour more to
deal with an unexpected storm than one they are prepared for. They also
have a skeleton crew ($200/hr.) on standby until precipitation begins at
1
which time their full crew ($1000/hr.) is put on their payroll. State C
puts it full crew out for any amount of frozen precipi tation, with the
0
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only difference being in mobilization costs.
Appendix A illustrates the calculation procedure with a sample calcu-
lati	 for an overforecast storm in January, 1977. This overforecast pro-
,_	 duced an unnecessary expenditure of $13,000. In our study, however, most
clients said they would prefer to be prepared for a storm and lose money
if the storm does not develop than to be caught with their plows unmounted.
Finally, there is a situation in which an apparently incorrect forecast
is really more than adequate. Thi-- would be in a case where a client receives
a forecast for 6" and the actual accumulation is 15". The 6" forecast
implies that the subscriber should put its entire plo:ring force into
operation, and once this is done, total accumulation does not alter the
procedure--the operation just takes longer.
Detailed analyses were performed on data for 26 clients in eight
eastern states. Among the clients are six state or turnpike authorities
and cities ranging in population from 10,000 to 300,000. *lean snowfall
for these clients ranges from over 100" to ac low as 5". The results for
the 1976-77 and 1977-75 snow seasons are summarized in Table 2.
the economic losses due to incorrect forecasts varied from an average
_	 of under .5,000 for the smaller communities to over $60,000 for the .larger
subscribers- This represen_ed 3%-157 of their annual snow budget. Half
-"	 of the clients studied had received morn than five poor forecasts that
caused economic loss while only six subscribers had fewer than three. The
majority of mi.sforecasts were for light (up to 3 11 ) snow which never
materialized. Though poor forecasts of plowable storms were infrequent,
they caused considerable loss. Thr, number of erroneous forecasts not
causing direct losses averaged about four with most of these being under-
0
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forecasts. The percentage of correct forecasts averaged about 85%, which
is rather high.
The consultant's fees ranged from about $1000 per snow season for
many of the cities to over $10,000 for the larger units. In most cases,
one forecast which prevents a client from unnecessarily calling in a con-
tractor, mobilizing, or holding crews over at night pays for the service for
the entire snow season. As the fee was usually less than 2% of total expen-
ditures, the clients who reponded felt that the service was well worth the
cost.
b. Electric Utilities
In general, both the electric utilities examined in this section and
the gas utilities in the section following are more professional and less
subjective in their use of the consulting firm's forecasts than the road
	
_	
and street departments discussed previously. From the utilities' point
of view, the economic advantages of predictions tailored to their operations
is both obvious and of sizable magnitude. For most utilities, the weather
forecast is therefore incorporated into daily operations in a routine and
well- defined way.
Electric utility clients were studied from two perspectives: the use
of daily forecasting to predict and plan for peak loads, and the effect of
snow, ice, and wind on the maintenance of the highly vulnerable power
system. Load forecasting was studied with the help of daily forecast forms
and verifications over the summer months when the utilities are most vul-
nerable to unexpected peak loads. The maintainance situations were done
on a case study basis.
t
c^y
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Peak load forecasting [see Barnett (1973)] refers to the necessity
for ele,:tric utilities to predict the maximum power usage on any given
day. During the summer months when power demand is often expected to
exceed the amount of power available from other outside sources (many
companies belong to a network which supplies all members with power), the
utility must plan on generating its own extra power, usually from either
steam or combustion turbines. Given plenty of warning, cheap steam tur-
ns	 bines can be put on line. However, because such turbines have a long
(12 hour) "warm-up" time, a company may be forced to use combustion tur-
bines when adequate warning is not received. These can be readied in a
matter of r.-es but are about twice as expensive to operate as steam
generators :he economics of the situation are apparent; an overforecast
of degree days, temperature-humidity index, or other measure of heat and
9	
humidity used by the company results in unneeded steam turbines being
brought on-line. An underforecast results in the use of expensive com-
bustion turbines.
f
There are a number of factors which affect the economic impact of
the weather forecast on these users. They are:
Tolerance--All companies have a certain amount of slack in their
power usage and can tolerate unexpected fluctuations in temperature. This
leeway can be as large as 10% but usually it is from 2° to 4°. Leffler
(1972) has found that utilities can , tolerate forecast errors of under 3%.
Size of the System
--Naturally very large systems covering population
centers or even whole states are more greatly affected by temperature
fluctuations than are small systems. The typical cost of a 1° error in
the forecast above the aforementioned tolerance is about $2000, but this
D
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can go as high as $3000 or as low as $300.
Critical Point--This is the temperature/humidity above which a
utility must schedule the use of its own turbines ( i.e. the maximum
available power is already being used). A forecast or actual weather
near this point has a potential economic impact. Below this point, the
system would not ordinarily schedule extra turbines and thus would not
be vulnerable to forecast errors. Critical points are usually at a THI
of 70-75, or about 85°F.
Given information on the tolerance, size, critical point, and cost
of turbine power generation, it is possible to calculate the economic
impact of a forecast on a given sys'-m. Such information was available from
three sys-ems in the eastern U.S. An example of such a calculation is
`-	 given in Appendix R. The results for the 1977 summer season are presented
in Table 3.
.	 The losses to Company C are high because they are vulnerable ro any
misforecast whatever the temperature. Company B exceeds Company A in
losses because the former has a small tolerance and a low cri-ical point.
One may also note that overforecasts are more common than underforecasts.
The total losses for these companies were probably larger than average due
to a summer which was slightly warmer than normal.
The northeastern snow storm of 22-24 March, 1977 provided an example
of the effect of a forecast on maintenance. This storm, which produced
v	 u to 30 of snow over a two daUP
	
"	 y Feriod was not correctly forecast.
In fact, even at the time that maximum electrical outages were being
reported, the forecast was calling for only 1-2" of snow. The cost of
hiring extra crews to service the area was in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars. (One company estimated the cost to be $351,900). No forecast
w ^.
F:
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Table 3
Electric Utility Results
Max Power
— Total No. of Over- Under- Used in
Company Misforecasts forecasts forecasts Cost/deg. Mega Watts
A 11 8 3 $2205 4,425_
B 38 29 9 $2200 2.932
C 43 23 20 $2000 5,760
Mil
Total Loss
Critical due to
Serviced Pt Tolerance forecasts
A 10,000 850 4° $55,125
B 1230 70 THI 20 $281,600
—	 C 2475 None 3° $937,000
i
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could have reduced this figure to zero; however, the failure to give
+	 adequate warning of the impending crisis no doubt took its toll in the
slowness of the recovery. A company, adequately warned, would have had
its crews on the road ready to work on outages. When caught unprepared,
"	 repair vehicles may not be able to reach the scene of trouble. One company
reported up to 59,930 outages at the peak of the storm on the 22nd. While
this was reauced to 9,500 two days later, the remaining restoration was
made difficult due to the inaccessibility of roads due to snow. Not until
the 26th was full power restored. Restoring power quickly is highly desir-
able not only because of the inconvenience to the customer but also because
storm conditions might worsen and totally prevent access to problem areas.
The potential importance of the forecast in this process is obvious.
Most companies, given the option will choose to be overprepared rather
than risk system damage. For example, during ice storms, crews are often
deployed to remove potentially dangerous tree limbs, whether or . not any
outages are reported.
In general, the cost of the service to electric utilities ranges up-
wards from about $800/month, depending on the company's size and areal cover-
age. Enabling the company to correctly prepare for a single severe weather
*	 event will more than cover a year's service. One company last season spent
$75,000 holding crews over for an ice storm that never materialized;
however, being caught unprepared would have cost even more. With temperature
forecasts resulting in a $2000 per degree cost within a critical region,
the yearly costs can often be recovered by one improved forecast.
c. Gas Utilities
r
Gas utilities are vulnerable to many of the same problems as electric
S
AJ
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utilities, although maintenance problems are not nearly as extreme. The
factors of threshold, system size, and tolerance apply here as they do
-'	 for electric companies [see Ruskin (1967), Roth (1963)]. Gas companies
can draw only so much from their pipelines; afything above this set amount
west be provided from in-house supplies such as liquid natural gas (LNG),
propane-air, or stored gas. These sources are generally more expensive to
use [anywhere from $1.50 per thousand cubic feet (MCF) to $3.50/MCF]
than pipeline gas. and therefore unneeded use of these due to forecast error
will have an economic effect. Sometimes the unneeded gas generated can
be stored for the next day thus eliminating a portion of the financial loss.
_	
In ether cases, a company may have a special contract whereby gas can be
provided through storage or pipeline on a few hours notice. But often
such flexibility is not available, and the loss due to excess gas generated
cannot be mitigated. Likewise, the failure to prepare for an actual peak
load will mean using either pipeline gas at penalty rates (up to 10 times
more expensive), using storage gas that must eventually be replaced, or
t	 shutting off interruptible customers with a consequent loss of income.
This latter possibility has become increasingly rare in recent years due to
tight supplies. A sample calculation for a gas utility is given in Appendix C.
!	 The results of our calculations based on 1976-77 data are summarized
in Table 4. The critical points for gas companies are in degree days.
These values are relatively uniform except for Company A, which is in the
'	 !	 South and evidently has a plant designed for a relatively small intake of
pipeline gas. Because gas companies are winter peaking, cold temperatures
are usually responsible for turning a misforecast into an economic loss.
^-	 This was especially true of the 1976-77 winter when temperatures much below
i
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-	 Table 4
Gas Utility Results
Total No. of Over- Under- Max Gas
Company Misforecasts forecasts forecasts Cost/deg. Used (MCF)
A 22 7 15 $2500 144,000
B 12 4 8 $7000 260,000
_	 C 25 12 13 $8750 206,000
D 7 2 5 $1540 52,328
E 1 1 0 $1995 36,000
F 1 1 0 $3125 91,878
Mil
Total Loss
Critical due to
— Serviced Pt (DD) Tolerance forecasts
A 1025 28 30 $122,500
B 1703 50 20 $175,000
f
C 666 52 10 $336,875
D 314 50 20 $30,800
E 150 55 20 $1,995
F 225 55 20 $9,375
Ik-
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normal were reported all along the East coast. Because gas companies
differ greatly in size, the cost per degree varies more widely than with
the electric utilities. Unlike electric utilities, gas companies more
often have incorrect forecasts turn out as overforecasts than underforecasts.-
The smaller losses for companies E and F are mainly due to their higher
critical points. If these values had been lowered by even a few degrees,
losses would have been substantially multiplied. For at least three of
the companies (A, B and C), forecasting has significant impact on their
yearly budget.
Gas utilities pay from $600 to $1000 per month for daily forecasts.
As with the electric companies, a small improvement in forecast accuracy
more than pays for the forecast service.
5. Some General Observations About User Clients
—	 While a major motivation for subscribing to a weather service is
financial, we should also mention ,^We of the other reasons why people
i
	 feel the need for specialized information. A prime interest to many
subscribers is the convenience and increased sense of security with which
short term planning can be effected. Dispatchers and administrators often
have scheduling problems which can be handled at the last minute should a
weather emergency arise, but these people would rather have a greater lead
time in preparation. For instance, weekend contingency plans can be
N—
	 readied should a storm appear likely and crews can be alerted. Should the
storm not occur, the monetary loss is not as significant as the problems
that would arise from a surprise storm catching the crew unprepared.
Other subscribers Feel more secure if they have multiple sources of
weather information; thus they may even consult with two firms and the
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	 National Weather Service in their planning. This approach is not necessarily
bad if the client can knowledgably weigh the various sources of information.
In practice, however, the user may be prone to plan according to the source
he wants to believe having no objective way of choosing between them.
We found that a few subscribers did not really know what to do with
the information they received from the consulting service. Sometimes the
	
--	 decision to subscribe was made at a higher level, and the people responsible
for making operational decisions were not adequately briefed on the use or
need for the service. In many cases, forecasts could be put to better
advantage if the user knew more about the applications and limitations of
the consultant's service. Also, the user's response to a forecast may
often be influenced by outside factors such as the individual on duty at
the time, the accuracy of recent forecasts, the timing of the forecast,
and immediate budget considerations.
Finally, some clients feel that a subscription to a weather service
looks good on their record regardless of how well the information is
	
-	 actually being used. They can assure the public or others who review their
1
operation that they are using every possible performance aid. In addition,
they have someone to blame for mistakes in decision-making.
i	 6. Discussion
Although the illustrations presented are of cases in which poor
forecast information resulted ir losses to subscribers, the vast majority
of forecasts we encountered potentially resulted in savings far in excess
of the fees paid by the subscribers for the services. In most cases, the
fees were a minor part of the subscribers' operational costs. A few of
the large clients have tried in-house forecasting but found the consultants
t
r
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to be more accurate and less expensive. The yearly expense of hiring a
consulting service could usually be offset by the savings resulting from
one accurate forecast the client would not have had without the service.
	
..	 The cases discussed in this paper are just examples of how the varied
clientele of one meteorological consulting firm benefit economically by
using the forecast service. It is not intended to be more than that; all
consultants operate differently--they disseminate different products that
are received and processed in different manners than those described here.
The end results for the clients, however, are the same; more efficient
operation and more objective decision making.
All of the client groups that were contacted were not discussed due
to a lack of space. Construction companies, ski and yacht resorts, trans-
portation companies, oil companies, and air transport users all have needs
	
--	 for timely and accurate weather forecasts. A final group, the media, was
also not mentioned. Although accuracy is important, the media do not generally
play an important role in organized economic decision making. In the race
for viewer appeal, meteorological professionalism in the media is often of
secondary importance.
i In summary, private forecast services meet very important needs; they
provide specific, localized, and interactive forecasts geared to the needs
of their subscribers. They are most valuable when the subscriber is fully
	
r
	 aware of what the information means and how it can be used. Finally, the
accuracy and timeliness of these forecasts can have economic ramifications
which can benefit the user directly and those served by the user, indirectly.
These benefits depend upon the particular needs of the client and can vary
from client to client within the same user group.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE SNOW CALCULATION
r
--	 Forecasts
Jan.	 13	 9 : 30 A.M. lt.	 snow 1" - 3" beg.	 1 A.M.
r	 2:00 P . M. snow beg. 3-6 A.M.	 1"-3" by afternoon	 55% chance of 4"+
Jan.	 14	 9 : 30 A.M. snow re-develop 9 P.M.	 1"-3" by midnight
3"-5" by 3-6 A.M.
4"-6" by 9 A.M.-:loon
1:00 P.M. snow developing 6-9 P.M.	 3"-5" by 1-3 A.M.
6"-8" by 6 A.M.-9 A.M.
10:20 P.M. 3"-4" by 3 A.M.
V-8" by 6 A.M.
-' 7"-9" by 9 A.M.
	
-	 Actual Conditions
January 14
Snow began at 7 P.M., ended at 2 A.M. next morning
Total accumulation: 1.5"-2"
Because the snow did not reach plowable amounts (3") during the evening,
plows were mobilized unnecessarily ($3300); contractors were called in at
a forecast accumulation >6" and paid the minimum four hours when they were
not needed ($7000), and day crews were unnecessarily held over until the
	
0"	 snow stopped at 2 A.M. (10 hours x $250/hr. - $2500). Total loss was
$12,800 or close to 9% of the total seasonal snow budget.
i
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE ELECTRIC CAL.711LATION
Forecast
Given at 8 A.M.; 7/1/77 for 3 P.M. 7/1/77
Temperature = 81% R. Humidity = 64%
Actual Weather
3 P.M. 7/1/77
.Temperature = 86% R. Humidity = 69%
Critical point at which extra turbines are added: 70 THI
Since both the forcast and the actual weather exceeded 70 THI, an error
of 5° wou?.d potentially cause economic loss. The system had a tolerance
of 2° which means that the actual impact on the system was V. Each one
degree error caue:es a 100 1V change in load. Multiplying this rimes the
cost of power generation ($22.00/.T; HOUR) gives a cost of $2200 per degree.
Thus the extra cost of scheduling steam turbines to cover a high temperature
1
that was 5° in error was $6600. If the same error had been made ir_ the
60° range, no loss would have been incurred since the critical point of
70 THI would not have been exceeded.
^ V
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE GAS CALCULA710N
-	 City W City F
Forecast Forecast
Effective Effective
Degree Degree
Temp.	 Daars T_ emp.	 Days
7:00 AID!	 15 	 ' 7 17'	 55
12:00 Noon	 16	 55 18'	 54
9:00 FM	 19	 S3 22'	 50
Actual:	 20% 53 DD.. -Attu IL-	 23°; 49 DD.
Critical Point for Supplemental Gas:	 52 DD
Need 4 hours Lead time.
Can absorb 1° error
f
C^ ity W City F
(2' error - 1' tolerance) x (5' error - 1° tolerance) x
_	
1875 MCF/DD - 1875 MCF. 625 ?ICF/DD -	 '.500 MCF.
1875 x $3.50/MCF extra 2500 x $3.50 /11CF extra
$6562.50 $8750.00. +
Manpower Costs:
	
$40/hr x 24 hrs
$960.
`- Total:	 $8750 + 960 a $9710.
Total Loss: $16,272.50
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This utility receives forecasts for two cities within its service area.
The critical point is 52 degree days (DD), determined b y their send out
and gas availability. They can tolerate a 1° error and need a lead time
of four hours to adjust their operations. The 1200 forecast is the one
used for verification. For City W, the error was 2°. Since they use
1875 thousand cubic feet/degree day (MCF/DD) and expensive gas is $3.50/
MCF extra, the extra cost is 1875 x $3.50 = $6562.50 (considering 1°
tolerance). For City F, with a 5 0 error and a sendout of 625 MCF/DD
the cost foi the gas is $8750. In addition, it cost thew. $40/hr x 24 hrs
($960) to man the peaking facility when it could have remaine3 idle.
Hence, total loss for the utility this day was $16,272.50. On the
other hand, with a forecast of 50 DD and a verification of 42 DD t',ais
larger error would not have had an adverse economic impact because it
was not in the critical temperature range.
QF —
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THE USE OF AN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEM IN
APPLIED METEOROLOGICAL FORECASTING
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
+
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Interactive computer systems have
the potential for being a very useful tool in
meteorological forecasting. In this paper we
intend to present the application of one such
system, McIDAS, (Man-computer Interactive Data
Access System), developed at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison in a few typical forecast
situations with the intention of illustrating
the capabilities presently available.
It is not possible here to present
a complete outline of McIDAS hardware and soft-
ware. For further information we refer you to
Hilvard (ed., 1977). A brief summary of pre-
sent McIDAS capabilities include the ability
to: receive full resolution digital radar and
real time satellite visible and infrared
imagery, and display these on video and loop
them; provide accurate latitude and lonlitude
gridding which can be overlaid on the satellite
images in the form of geographical maps tr
grids; ingest all Service A and C data fir
later recall either in its original form as
overlays to the satellite image; isopletl any
of these data or calculate derived quantities
such as divergence, vorticity or equivalent
potential temperature and display these in
analyzed form; enhance any part of the bright-
ness spectrum and display the image so as to
bring out particular features of interest; and
calculate the speed and direction of any cloud
or cloud feature.
There are two clear benefits of
such a system over conventional methods of data
handling. One of these is simply the ability
of the user to quickly display and analyze the
portions of the incoming data of immediate
interest. In many forecasting situations with
time being in short supply, it is clearly
helpful to the forecaster to have analyses of
his or her own choosing for immediate use--
analyses which might ordinarily be too time
consuming or of doubtful utility.
Another major benefit of this
system is the ability to compare diverse
sources of data, in particular satellite and
conventional data. Satellite imagery is most
useful when it can be transposed onto surface
or upper air temperature, moisture or wind
analyses a, au aide to interpreting the complex
cloud patterns. Together the two data sources
can reveal trends which might easily be
obscured or ambiguous with only one source.
Some example, of what can be done using such
techniques follow.
Fig. 1 shows visual imagery
photographed from a video display. This image
was obtained from the NOAH operational GOES
satellite at 1500 GMT on 14 Oct. 1977. The
coastal storm in this picture poses a number of
forecasting problems: for illustration purposes
we confine ourselves to two of these The first
is the forecasting of 'clearing'. The time and
area of clearing are of interest because of
their influence on surface temperature and thus
on utility load forecasting. Pictures, similar
to that shown can be obtained every hour, or
half hour and the motion and growth of the clear
areas monitored. Variations of this kind pro-
duce a rather small associated change in power
or gas demand--of the order of a few percent.
If, however, a gas company were operating near
its critical value of degree days, even a small
change might require a decision to order (or
not order) expensive supplemental gas to be
supplied along with the maximum allotted pipe-
line natural gas. As can be seen in the figure,
the clear tongue has encircled 285' of the
closed surface low. The edge of the clearing is
located over the Atlantic, and could not be
precisely defined by land based surface obser-
vations. Looping of the images indicate that
this tip of clear air is moving NNW toward
Pennsylvania. Massachusetts and New `,ork. It
can easily, and quantitatively be tracked on
the video images.
A few stations showtd precipi-
tation at the time of this image. Precipitation
is usually associated with thicker and higher
clouds. Thickness can be qualitatively esti-
mated from the visible brightness, while height
is related to IR- brightness as illustrated in
fig. 2. Note the spatial differences between
the low and high cloud clearing. In direct
transmission of the stretched VISSR data one
can obtain simultaneous visible and IR, though
users of sectorized data receive them on alter-
nate half hours. In any case, for images on 14
October, the hypothesis that precipitation was
associated with locations of bright visible and
IR images was verified at 1500 GMT Iy plotting
hourly surface weather symbols on tl..- satellite
pictures. Once this association w.u. made the
precipitation areas could be tracke.' and extra-
polated to give the time of onset (,,r :.
nation) of precipitation in specifi. .t-cas.
Precise precipitation forecasts a:c of interest
to many private forecast users. esp.cially
r	 ,:tc -Pibi: image as seen
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maintainance, construction, sporting avant@ and
other outdoor activities.
It is possible to go to a ao"what
more physical approach than simple extrapola-
tion. For example, surface pressure can be
superimposed on the satellite image and the
progress of cloud features can be monitored
together using the hourly service A data.
Similarl ••
 one can look at surface winds or
derived parameters such as 0 , surface diver-
gence, or vorticlty which are valuable for
chort range prediction of severe weather situa-
tions.
One is not restricted to surface
data however. As shown in fig. 3,upper air
data, for example 850 mb height, can be used.
One can also obtain upper level winds, diver-
gence, thickness, and vorticity among many
other options. These can be grldded, contoured
and displayed minutes after they are received.
Using upper air data, forecasters
can prepare longer range outlooks and forecasts.
Here again, however, St has been found useful
to associate these fields with patterns of
cloud features which can be tracked hourly, or
half hourly, while the upper air data are
usually available onl y twice daily. This is
quite useful for detecting departure of the
develop.ng situation from the forecast, and the
consequent need for updating or revising a
forecast.
Fig. 4, visible imagery, was
obtained for 1700 GKI on 7 June 1978. Fig. 5 is
the corresponding simultaneous IR picture.
Tog-xther, they illustrate a polar cold front
delineated by a cloud band. The change in sur-
face tem'.-erdture and precipitation associated
with the passage of such a front might be of
interest to a utility load dispatcher. Fig. 6
shows how the cloud pattern Is associated with
surface temperature. Tracking the front will
allow an extrapolation several hours into the
future, while upper air data, can be considered
for longer forecast periods.
The third situation, sh cr.•n In fig.
1 represents a area in which the forecast of
severe convective storms would be expected.
Virtuall y every user in the affected area would
be Interested in the forecast.	 It might be used
to dispatch e¢ergency crews, secure equipment,
materials and buildings, terminate outdoor acti-
vities and the like. This case occurred on 20
May 19?7 over Kansas and Oklahoma. From the
visible Image alone along with surface stream-
lines we can see the cylonlc current of des-
:ending air and convection originating from the
tip of this tongue as if it were lifting sur-
face air. To the southeast apparent Helmholtz,
or gravlt y waves give evidence of a low level
inversion, or at least a very stable layer.
Also quite evident In this picture is the cirrus
from mature convection. In the original video
images one can bee that this is dotted with
over-shooting towers. For more precise cell
lu,ation and tracking,, It is very simple to
blow up the imdgeb (fig. 8). B y examining the
1R image or,e can see from the bri:..htnens that
the taps of these mature cells are very high.
216
Figure 9. iW)ES vied• le ieuge for 1700Z, June
7, 1978, with a 6:1 reduced resolution and a .
e upe ri "pose mz, for the Ecs tern and Ce n t ra l
U.S.	 A fn7ntaZ cloud band can be seen over
the uri r Mi;Lws t.
fie-ure 9, ea-ept the IR
Figure 7. GOES visible satellite picture for
2000Z, May 20, 1977. Surface strramlinee and
a map for the Tense, Oklahoma, and Arkansas
area are overlaid. Heeo1ution is 8 to I
reduced.
Figure 8. A full reaolution visible GOES-1
irnge for 2000Z, May 20, 1977. The picture is
centered alono the e':Ptrrr, Texas-OkZahom border.
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l.sli^g a simple program and a Joy-stick posi-
tioned cursor box, temperatures for individual
data points can be read out. 	 It was found that
many cold doers had temperatures below 210 K,
indicative of very severe weather. By looking
at an animated loop of pictures (usually avail-
able at 15 minute or more frequent intervals
when severe weather is expected), one can spot
the most rapidly developing cells and thereby
track the line of the storm's maximum severity.
As mentioned above we have found
it useful to superimpose conventional data on
satellite images or on a satellite image pro-
jection. Figure 9 shows the 300 mb. stream-
lines and Isotachs illustrating the location of
the upper level wind maxima and divergence.
Conventional and cloud drift winds can also be
combined to produce a single, more complete
analysis field.
Though we have mentioned, "track-
ing" and "extrapolating," we should point out
that this task is carried out by a sophisticated
set of software tools (WINDCO) which, gives u
and v components of motion (L meters per
second), plots the resulting 	 ctors, and esti-
mates the heights of target clr—is automatically
if requested, based on IR and, if available,
visible brightnesses.
As illustrated by the above
examples, an interactive computer is capable of
increasing the accuracy of a prediction (as,
for example, in predicting the amount of pre-
cipitation or the size of a temperature change)
as well the precision of the timing of such
events (i.e. the time of precipitation onset or
temperature fall). While such improvements may
not be crucial to the general public In a direct
way, many business and industrial operations are
seriousl y affected by even small errors in
Liming or accuracy. We can clarify this state-
ment by looking at a few of those operations in
detail.
Our first example, that of @now
and ice control, is found to be a significant
budget item for most northern cities and states
In the U. S. Even in the South, a minor storm
can cause  great chaos. Many Southern cities
spend large sums of mone y .ash year although
annual snow accumulations are low.
-_ g overly prepated for a storm
by calling out equipment and crews too early
can result in unnecessary expenditures of money
for "waiting" time or work (sanding and salting,
plowing) that need not be done. On the other
hand, failure to mobilize in time can prolong
the clean up process, create traffic delays
and accident,, and cause great public distress.
Thus the time of arrival of frozen precipita-
tion is (or should be) significant to any state
or municipal street department; an error of
even an hour results generally in thousands of
dollars of direct cost.
Likewise every such department has
a critical point at which plowing operations
are readied. Usually this point is the recep-
tion of a forecast calling for between 2 to 4
inches of snow in the nrxt few hours, the
I
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actual critical amount depending on the type of
equipment and the qualit y of the snow removal
effort in a particular city. A forecast of snor-
close to this threshold is of critical impor-
tance in determining the number of people and
the type of equipment employed. Oddly enough,
If the actual snow amount falls on the same side
of the threshold value as the forecast, the
actual error is relatively unimportant econom-
ically. For Instance if 12 inches is forecast
and only 6 inches of snow falls, a department
would still have wanted to deploy its plowing
crew, but if 6 inches are forecast and only 3
inches fall, a city with a 4 inch plowing
criteria would be adversely affected. We should
also note that not all such operations are run
efficiently and with proper use of the forecast.
Some groups out of mistrust, lack of communi-
cation, or ignorance, do not understand what
they are being told In a forecast or will not
admit the- , have made mistakes in their tecponse.
An analogous situation holds for
gas and electric utilities, each of which has
its own critical point for peak load fore-
casting. Most utilities prepare for peak loads
by scheduling more expensive supplemental power
sources on the basis of some combination of
temperature, humidity, cloud cover, or wind
forecast during heavy use hours. Specifically,
the forecast is first used to determine whether
a certain value in degree days or other index is
exceeded. Very cold temperatures and wind for
gas utilities and very warm temperatures and
high humidities for electric companies alert
them to the possibility that power beyond their
usual resources is needed. The amount of this
excess then determines how many supplemental power
sources will be needed. These decisions are
usually made early in the day as there in a
significant lag time before equipment can he
readied. Again, errors in the forecast beyond
the threshold value, especially in temperature,
typically result In tens of thousands of dollars
lost due to the unnecessarily high cost of the
additional power generated. Another factor to
be considered, especially In the case of elec-
tric utilities, is the system vulnerability to
high winds, icing, and lightning. 	 1114 . timing
and magnitude of the weather event are necessary
to forestall system disruption.
What we have attempted to show in
this paper is that mode nt technology has in-
creased the demand for h1Vhly accurate and de-
tailed meteorological forecasting. Even the
most mundane weather events can have important
economic consequences because our systems have
become more sensitive to minor environmental
changes. The interactive computer is certainly
one means by which our present-day meteorolo-
gical network can be made to provide the pre-
cision in forecasting demanded by today's
society.
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